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SUMMARY
The use by the European Court of Justice of General Principles of Law 
is the subject of this study. It relates to the way the Court refers 
to and the extent to which it relies upon General Principles. On 
occasion, the Court refers to General Principles as synonymous with 
rules, at other times as separate but not clearly defined entities. 
Equally noteworthy, the Court, despite its aforementioned reliance on 
General Principles, elaborates little on the functions General 
Principles fulfil. To sum up, the Court acts in an intellectually 
provocative manner.
The major part of this thesis concerns the analysis of a number of 
cases involving General Principles from which certain contentions are 
derived and examined; that General Principles are an important source 
of European Community Law; that their use by the European Court of 
Justice has had a profound effect on European Community Law; that this 
area of law is an example of the dynamic tension between institutions 
and Community members, such tension being a natural consequence of a 
developing new legal order.
This analysis is preceded by a basic explanation of General Principles 
and a survey of their use in various systems of municipal law and 
international law, such analysis providing a framework in which it is 
possible to analyse the work of the European Court of Justice.
Ill
The thesis concludes with the observation that the above contentions 
are, in greater part, borne out and that General Principles are still 
and continue to be for the foreseeable future, an important source of 
European Community Law.
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
39A429
CHAPTER I
In readings in the area of law before specific work was undertaken for 
the present dissertation, the author's attention was attracted by the 
ambiguity with which the term "general principles" was used. This 
initial interest in "general principles" was later strengthened when 
reading cases decided by the EGJ.^ The Court referrred to GP 
sometimes as interchangeably synonymous with "rule" and sometimes as a 
separate but not quite clearly defined conceptual entity. Responsible 
for the elaboration of Community law with particular reference to its 
interpretation and application (Article 164, EEC) the ECJ quoted or 
referred to GP in an intellectually provocative manner : it mentioned 
Implicity or explicity GP and their various functions without 
supplying however, in its reasoning, any exhaustive analysis or
explanation as to the functions which the specific GP in question
2fulfilled in the progressive elaboration of Community law This 
observation was the starting point for the choice of the topic for the 
present dissertation.
Indeed, an examination of the text of cases decided by the ECJ reveals
many references to GP of law, and one may date such references as
points to an underlying fundamental question relating to the nature of
Community law, and the function of such principles in the context of
3the Community legal system. Community law, and in particular the 
law of the EEC, is based on broadly formulated texts.
Historically, this is due to a necessity, so common to international 
agreements, (and the Community Treaties are international agreements)
of compromise between the interests of individual states and the need 
to CO ordinate them as contractual (treaty) rights and obligations.
Not infrequently, in such situations, treaty texts are drafted in such
'a way that they represent the lowest common denominator, that is, a
' '■■basis of agreement as a starting point which may be developed through 
subsequent interpretation and application including application by 
judicial authorities. With reference in particular to EC law and its
broadly formulated texts, it is evident that it would have to be 
articulated with reference to a number of sources, including GP of 
law.
■
Going beyond the immediate confines of Community law, that is in a 
more comprehensive survey, the term GP is mentioned frequently in 
literature relating to jurisprudence, legal theory, Municipal law. 
International law and, as indicated above, in the practice of the ECJ.
In such contexts GP seem to fulfil an important function in the 
development and substantiation process towards a defined corpus of 
legal rules, that is, legal rules may draw from the sphere of GP, new 
substance for their consolidation and concrétisation. But the 
corresponding functions of GP may respectively vary and indeed do vary 
from one sphere of law to another. As the general function is not
limited to the sphere of Community law and a better understanding of 
it in the system of Community law would be enhanced by a comparative 
approach, the present dissertation concentrates on its main topic in 
Chapters V to VIII, i.e. after introductory Chapters II to IV which
il:deal with the concept of GP, their application in the Municipal law,
I
,
— 3
and no less, the importance attributed to them in the specific 
structure of International law. For this reason in the present study 
the main core of the dissertation represented in Chapters V to VIII, 
dealing with GP in the context of Community law, will be introduced 
and treated against a background relating to GP in law in general, 
that is, a jurisprudential and theoretical approach (Chapter II); 
Municipal law (Chapter III); and International Law (Chapter IV).
It is thus intended to discuss the function of GP in Community law 
against a contrasting background of respective comparable functions in 
the above-mentioned areas of law, that is moving (1) from a conceptual 
level in Chapter II; (2) to the sphere of Municipal law, in which GP, 
by virtue of de facto codefied law (rules) have a narrow functional 
margin to fulfil and (3) to International law, which by its 
incomplete, not systematically codified and relatively dynamic nature 
offers, at least theoretically, a wide functional margin for GP,
Chapters V to VIII examine in detail the functions of GP in Community 
law and more specifically in the practice of the ECJ. In order to 
ascertain the limits of the concept GP in Community law, Chapter V 
looks at the latter in the light of questions resulting from its 
specific nature as a new legal order or a legal order sui generis.
Chapter VI constitutes the core or the focal point of the study by 
analysing the function of GP specifically in the practice of the ECJ, 
Thereby questions such as the following will be considered: Has the
Court adopted a considered approach to use of GP? In which specific
context or otherwise does the ECJ resort or refer to GP? Which 
specific functions do GP fulfil in those contexts? To what extent do 
GP in the practice of the ECJ clarify the nature of Community law as 
to its details and to what extent do they contribute towards its 
consolidation as a system?
Given the relative frequency with which the ECJ has referred to 
Fundamental Rights within a number of cases in the last ten to fifteen 
years and also with reference to the fact that in the framework of FR 
and Human Rights the ECJ has referred to GP, special reference will be 
made to principles and FR in the practice of the Court in Chapter VII,
Chapter VIII is a conclusion summarising the results of the study and 
trying to integrate them into a few basic points for an evaluation of 
GP and their application in the judicial practice of the ECJ and, 
therefore, in the progressive elaboration of EC law.
In terms of method underlying the present study, the title implicity 
indicates that, in the first place the study is based on an analysis 
of cases decided by the Court, or opinions formulated by the Court.^
As a result, reference to treaty and to statutory texts is of 
secondary importance,
The author hopes to show in this dissertation, using the above 
methods, that, through use of GP in cases, the ECJ has made an 
important contribution towards the development of EC law.
Furthermore, it is desired that this thesis may contribute towards a 
better understanding of the nature of GP and more specifically their 
function in the new legal order, European Community Law.
I1
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NOTES - CHAPTER I
1. Hereforth, the term general principles will be abbreviated to GP 
in the text.
2. See Chapter VI for an analysis of the possible reasons behind this 
action of the ECJ.
3. See Chapter VI for an examination of cases Involving reference to 
GP.
4. Further reference to the writings of the judges in their 
individual capacity is also studied, where possible, as a 
secondary source.
CHAPTER II ~ GENERAL PRINCIPLES
jurisprudential analysis of the concept "GP'
As jurisprudence is a universally recognised area of legal research 
any conclusions reached here are to be considered as applicable to all
A useful starting point for analysis is a basic definition of the
7 >
Section 1 - Definition of GP
This dissertation, while dealing in the main with European Community 
law, also touches upon International law and various systems of 
Municipal law. Writing about Municipal systems that are the product 
of differing European cultures, about International law, which in
-comparison with the former is still at an early stage of development
and of course, about the relatively sophisticated supranational order,
European Community law, the need arises for a basic definition of GP
1which is equally applicable to all legal orders. The first aim of 
this chapter is to provide such an explanation by giving a brief
2
legal orders. Further, the concept GP lends itself well to such 
usage. Cheng; speaking of the principles of salus populi supreme lex, 
good faith, responsibility and GP pertaining to judicial proceedings 
stated, "It is of no avail to ask whether these principles are GP of
-International law or of Municipal law, for it is precisely the nature
Iof these principles that they belong to no particular system of law,
3but are common to them all". It will be shown that the above 
phrase can, in fact, be extended to every GP, that is, that all 
principles irrespective of whether or not they are actually present in 
more than one system of law, contain within them the germ of 
universality.
II
I
î
'I
actual words. The Oxford English Dictionary, for example, supplies 
copious meanings for both general and principle. The word 
"general" means in essence not specialised, universal# It thus has a 
meaning that is both easily comprehensible and narrow in scope.
This is in direct contrast to the word "principle". It is a word 
which functions merely as a convenient means to encapsulate a concept 
of limitless scope. Its definition recites many words and phrases 
which, without of course fully explaining the concept, make it more (; 7:
clear. Only through further definition of a number of these secondary
phrases is an explanation of principle possible; the three phrases
. .that are most helpful with such definition are "source of action", "a 
source of action", and "the source of action". Before going on to 
analyse these phrases, two points should be noted# First, despite 
their similarity these expressions illuminate three distinct aspects 
of principle. Second, the word "action" in all phrases is taken to
I
mean any fact situation where a positive act of will is required by a
5person or persons. Such an act of will may be either action or 
deliberate inaction.
"Source of action" has been analysed by Walker to show that GP of law 
operate both inductively and deductively. His lucid explanation is 
hard to better, "Inductive inference consists in drawing a GP from a 
number of similar observed instances, deductive inference is the 
process of applying GP to suitable particular instances. Both are 
illustrated repeatedly in the way the Courts handle previous reported Î
- i
9 -
■15
decisions, to help them solve a new problem before them".^
.
It is submitted that the phrase "GP are a source of action" infers 
that GP need not always be the only source of action. Thus they may 
be only one of a number of sources. As such, principles may be not a 
compelling source of action but only a useful tool in decision making. 
Used thus, principles seem to have at best an influential but not 
decisive role. An analysis by Havener and Mosher shows that, in a 
legal order, GP are most frequently used in this way, that is, in 
conjunction with other sources. They conclude that "although GP may
alone provide the grounds for the Court’s reasoning, they are usually 
cited in combination with other sources".^
"GP are the source of action", this phrase means that GP can, on I
occasion, be either the main reason for action, or as Havener and
Mosher state, the only reason for action. This could be interpreted
ito mean that GP act as gap fillers, to be used as a primary source .
only when no rule is available or when other sources of law are scanty 
or of little relevance. This, indeed, is probably a correct 
definition but not a complete one. For, on occasions when GP are the
source of action they may be serving as ultimate or fundamental 
precepts; i.e. whether GP are cited by themselves or in conjunction 
with other sources they may be serving as ultimate or fundamental 
precepts. This relatively scarce latter function of GP is extremely 
important for it reveals the depth and complexity of the concept of GP 
which, while present when GP are used in the other ways previously
■i
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GP when they act, or more correctly stand in for, fundamental reasons
itmentioned, normally remains hidden. As such a further explanation is 
needed of GP as "the source of action", when GP function as ultimate 
precepts.
"GP as "the source of action" means that GP function as a concept 
phrase for the deepest motivation that prompts human action. Such 
motivation forces are termed values. To have a clear understanding of
I
a'for action some characteristics of the concept "values" must be 
understood. Before such characteristics are examined, however, a 
basic explanation of values is given.
8An interesting definition of values is given by de Bono. He states 
that values are converters, that is they act as the link between the 
need for action in a given situation and emotion. His explanation of 
values also includes a comprehensive classification which he labels 
the Four-M system of values; Me, Mates, Morals, Mankind. Me relates 
to the individual and includes all values that bear upon the 
self-image, status or ego of every individual. Mates concerns values 
that affect the relationship of the individual with those close to 
him. They include family, friends, groups of people, classmates and 
clubs. The third classification of values contains all those values
I
*
that mankind relates to morality e.g. justice, ethics, religion.
Mankind, the newest indentifiable grouping concerns such values 
relating to concern for the environment e.g. pollution, ecology. De 
Bono further states that the final group Mankind is at present the I
Ê
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.focus of world attention, but that the third group Morals is the most 
9important.
:'|3
classified under morals. As such law comes within de Bono’s 
10classification.
In relation to law, the values most cogent are those that could be
This is not to imply that the above explanation and classification is 
either unique or correct. It is doubted that there is only one 
correct explanation or classification of values. It is also thought 
unlikely that any one explanation can be totally correct or 
comprehensive. A further subjective explanation is that values could 
be seen as a formless mass of ultimate moral premises. This second 
explanation leaves open the question of whether values are converters. ■1
■.;,y
A third evaluation does away altogether with this property of values.
#
It suggests that values can be seen purely as perfect models (for 
conduct); ideal states which have no direct link to facts or action
Leaving open the question of definitions of values, it is however
possible to show how they operate as ultimate moral premises. For
example, a value of interest to law is justice. Some shades of its
meaning can be illustrated by showing how different individuals
perceive justice; Daniel Webster wrote that, "Justice is the highest
interest of man on e a r t h " . H i s  notion of justice gives it
precedence over all other values. St. Thomas Aquinas wrote that an
12unjust law is a corruption of legality. In his opinion it seems
II
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that law and justice are one; any law which he believes unjust,
despite its legal status is not law. As such, justice must be rated
higher than man-made law. The views of both men, taken together, show
that values are placed above the law. GP based on values may
■therefore be more important than rules of law. Sir Edward Coke, for
example, judges law by an equally relevant value; he wrote, "How long
soever it hath continued if it be against reason it is of no force in 
13law". Collectively speaking, the above views show that values
of the thought process.
Another important characteristic of values is that they possess both a 
stable and a dynamic aspect. Values are stable in that, throughout 
history, justice, truth and morality, for example, have remained the
.rank higher than law. If so, then GP closely linked to their value 
bases may be more important than rules of law.
Having stated, however loosely, what values are, their major
characteristics are now listed. The first, and principal
characteristic of such basic motivations for human behaviour is that
they cannot be arrived at by purely logical reasoning. The work of
Hume and Reid has demonstrated that there are no statements of pure
fact which we can give to back up whatever we set forth as our
14ultimate premises in moral arguments. These conclusions find an
.
echo in the work of de Bono who has frequently stated the
15impossibility of decision making without the use of emotion. He
has also written that emotions and values are the most important part
16
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standards to which mankind aspires. As such, justice, for example, is 
stable geographically as an ultimate moral premise worldwide, and 
stable historically, from the beginning of civilisation until the 
present day. The dynamic aspect is the necessary complement to the 
former, for while the abstract concept justice is aspired to, the 
definition of what constitutes justice is constantly evolving. As 
society advances, human beings both on an individual and on a 
collective scale absorb new experiences which shift the current
acceptable standards to a new form.^^
This last characteristic of values has three important overlapping 
consequences. First it means that values can never be precisely 
defined; there can never be a final and complete definition of e.g. 
justice, that is acceptable to the entire world as a whole, to all 
possible groupings, or even to a single individual, that will stand 
for all time or even at any precise time. Second it- must then be the 
case that values cannot be limited by definition to a given number of 
actual and potential fact situations. Third due to this abstract 
nature of values, they cannot (for law at least) apply directly to 
most fact situations.
It is this final consequence that provides the link between GP and 
values. GP are the expression of values in a form concrete enough to
apply to a given fact situation. If so, then de Bono’s explanation of
values as converters that link action to emotion is in reality also an 
excellent definition of GP.
14 — ■77
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Another way to state this could be to say that a GP is situated 
between two spheres. The first sphere is the sphere of ideal order, a 
perfect model, This encompasses all values. Here, in this area where 
pure ideas exist without relation to facts, GP begin. Tiiey too exist 
without relevance to the second sphere; fact situations. Concurrent 
with this mode of existence GP are also the source leading to action,
i.e. they bridge the gap between the two spheres.
This inter-relationship between GP and values provides the key to 
understanding the nature of GP. Due to their direct link both to fact 
situations and values, GP have several novel features which make them 
unique legal tools of importance, both in a practical and a 
theoretical sense, to law. As GP are directly linked to values, the 
following statements can be made. Any GP that is relevant, in the 
opinion of the judge, to a fact situation whether it is a source or 
the source of judicial action, can be traced back to a value. It is 
impossible to give an exhaustive definition of a GP that will cover 
all actual or potential fact situations. As values constantly shift 
new GP will be created as a natural consequence of such movement. No 
GP will, in relation to actual or potential fact situations, have a 
constant theoretical definition or weight. GP will have constantly 
varying weight in relation to each other. A GP may well be traced 
back to more than one value, including values outwith the purely legal 
sphere. As values are universal, GP are, in theory, also of universal 
application.
%
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next step is to identify their major functions in that legal order.
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Section 2 - The Relationship of GP to a Legal Order
Having given a basic explanation of the concept GP, the second aim of 
this chapter is to deal with the question, "What is the relationship 
of the concept GP to a legal order?" The broad answer is that GP are 
a source of law. As Silving has noted the word "source" may be used 
either in a causitive or normative s e n s e . A  causitive source of
law answers the question how law came to be. A normative source is an 
answer as to why it ought to be. As GP are based upon values which, 
in the opinion of the majority of philosophers, have been shown to be 
fundamental reasons for behaviour that are not ascertainable, that is, 
behaviour which defies totally logical explanation, GP more closely 
correspond to the category normative sources of law.
Having established the basic relationship of GP to a legal order, the I
It is suggested there are four major functions that GP perform - 
justification and/or explanation, clarification and two forms of -|519interpretation. As all four functions relate to language in 
certain ways, this subject is briefly elucidated. I
It is possibly more accurate to say that GP relate to the defects of 
language for it is this point, the imperfection of language that is 
here stressed. As language serves, above all, as a means of
I:
communication, if it is flawed, then it must be an imperfect form of 
20communication. To some extent this is shown in its inability to 
give a generally agreed meaning to justice, religion and other values.
Such flaws however, are not the result of human error in the
■I
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construction of language but are inherent in the device itself. As 
human beings, we receive through our five senses so much information 
from the world around us that it cannot be encapsulated by words 
alone. Further, all information received from sight, hearing, smell, 
touch and taste is processed by the emotional/intellectual complex of 
the human mind. Part of such information is collectively processed 
and then shaped into standards and rules for conduct designated by 
governments as law. As law contains complex abstract ideals as well 
as rules which themselves are by no means simple, it is impossible 
that it can satisfactorily be communicated by written and spoken 
words. To state this simply, words are insufficient to express all 
that is contained in law. GP have as their function the task of 
interacting with law to overcome, as far as possible, such problems. 
Though they are, of course, expressed as words themselves they have, 
as has been shown, a partly abstract nature through their direct link 
with values. As such they aid law in the following ways.
The first use of GP is that of explanation and or justification. Law,
both written and oral suffers from an inability to express its 
relationship or link with the society that created it. Law is 
composed mainly of rules. Once a rule of law has been created, it 
attains a force or legality of its own, that is, it is not dependent 
upon GP or any other rule creating organ. It exists free from ties 
with society. Principles perform the task of keeping law linked to 
society. They perform this function for law as a whole, for groups of
rules and for individual rules. For example, a rule concerning
parking regulations viewed on its own may appear harsh and
17 -
nonsensical. Relating that rule to others on traffic control may
show up principles of public policy or public safety which explain 
21the rule. These principles may also justify the rule, though this
function is of a more subjective nature. For example, for Thomas
Aquinas explaining a rule as coming under a principle would be
meaningless if that principle could not be linked to the value 
22justice. Whether justification of a rule is necessary for that
rule to be acceptable to an individual must depend upon that 
individual’s perception of law.
The above shows GP acting as the link from law to society. Equally
they may link society to law. That is, starting from a value or GP
pertaining to that value, one could examine a rule or rules and check
if they conformed to these GP, and therefore to that value. Thus it
might be said of, for example, Scots rules on censorship that they are
explained or justified by the present interpretation of freedom or
23morals by the majority of the Scots people.
The second function of GP is clarification of law. This function 
comes about when law, of necessity, includes concepts that defy total 
elucidation. In other words, GP are used to express the abstract in 
law. A pertinent example, to be seen in greater detail later is the 
preamble of the EEC, This contains fundamental GP concerning the 
spirit of the law, GP here act as a link that relates directly to 
values yet are concrete enough to be put in a legal text.
18
This function differs from the first in that, whether or not the GP 
used here justify or explain any rule or rules, they definitely help 
law to state more clearly its intention in this given area. They thus 
help the law to operate. In a sense such GP are, more so than any 
principles mentioned in the first example, GP of law. That is they 
can more easily be found directly within the legal order. Thus GP 
have a utility which makes for a better understanding for the system 
and structure of law. This means that GP are decisive for the unity
or homogenity of a system of law.
The third function of GP is to interpret the rules where, due to the
fallibility of language and/or the complexity or uniqueness of the
fact situation, their meaning is in doubt. Even apparently
straightforward rules can result in complex cases to determine their 
24meaning.
A fourth use of GP is to allow the formulation of a rule where none 
previously has been articulated. Such a situation could arise due to 
the fact that the potential area of dispute was not thought of by the 
legislator at the time. Equally it may well be that, as society is 
constantly evolving, new interpretations of rights and duties have 
arisen. In this latter situation it is impossible for legislation to
cover (or indeed try to cover) every contingency.
Section 3 - GP and Rules
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Having stated both what GP are and what they do in a legal system, it 
still remains to show that they have a separate and unique identity 
within that legal system. This constitutes the final aim of this
Possibly this is overstating the case as Positivism accepts that rules 
and principles do differ and that each has a place in the legal
The latter statement is true but is, it is believed, inadequate for 
these reasons. In the vast majority of cases, principles are general
j
%25chapter and is achieved by differentiating principles from rules.
I
system. Instead, the positivist approach is to show that such 
differences are miniscule.*' This, of course, has much the same 
effect as the original argument for if GP have little distinction from 
rules then, in effect, they cease to have any sort of independent 
function. The analysis that follows will deal with the problem in 
this manner. Several differences between rules and principles will be 
noted, after each, any relevant positivist counter-argument will be 
given. Conclusions will then be drawn as to the validity of such 
arguments. Finally, an evaluation of the situation will be stated.
I
In the first division between rules and principles which Tur labels as
the traditional view, rules are held to be detailed and principles to 
27be general. The distinction, one of generality, was well put by
Paton who stated "There is a vast gulf between the elasticity of a GP
28such as Public policy and the rigidity of a detailed rule". The
counter to this argument is that many principles are detailed and some
29rules are of general character.
Si
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and rules are detailed. This is admitted by the positivist Tur, who
wrote "There is an element of truth in the view that principles are
30less detailed than rules" Thus, as the distinction of generality 
need not apply in every case and in fact does apply in most instances 
it is submitted that it is a correct (and important) distinction.
A second traditional view is that GP are the reasons behind the rules.
As such they are again broader than rules and as Walker puts it
31"justify and explain rules". There are, in the main, two 
positivist attacks on the second statement on the difference between 
rules and principles. The first counter argument can be stated thus.
Both Walker and Tur agree law is a science, and as Tur says; "It is
32not the function of a science to justify legal rules". The second 
counter-argument is that even if it could be shown that GP did justify 
rules it proves nothing, that is, no concrete conclusions follow. For 
example, rules which cannot be related to GP are still rules.
Further, rules that are justified by GP are no more legal than rules 
not so legitimised, that is, they have no supralegal standing.
As to the legitimacy of the first counter-argument, that the function
of science is not to justify rules, the following point should be
noted. It is not universally accepted that law is indeed a 
33science. For example, Bailhache, in Belfast Ropewalk Co. v
Bushell, stated "unfortunately or fortunately, I am not sure which,
34our law is not a science". There are in fact so many adverse
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opinions on the nature of law that no-one can say with any certainty 
what law actually is. If it is accepted that law has not yet been 
categorised as a science then moral justification is a valid 
expression for the relationship of GP to rules. As GP have values as 
their basis, and, as the work of Hume and Reid showed, values cannot
satisfactorily be explained by logic alone, GP may be seen as a moral,
or at least as a non-scientific justification for rules.
The second counter-argument seemed to foreshadow the above conclusion
when it stated that even if it could be proved that GP justified
rules, it meant nothing. In fact, there are also several ways that
this latter criticism can be refuted. For those lawyers, theorists
and academics that hold to the natural law viewpoint, the criticism
becomes i n v a l i d . T h i s  is freely admitted by the positivist Tur,
who stated that such a viewpoint would explain the inconsistencies he
37believes GP possess for the legal system.
For those who fail to agree with the natural law position however, it 
is suggested that, even so, it is still possible to believe that GP 
are part of law and also that GP can in fact validate any rule. If 
so, then all rules are equally legal in the legal order.
The third distinction between rules and principles is the more recent 
view that GP, whether or not it is believed they justify a rule, also 
serve as the explanation for that rule. Thus this third division 
relates to explanation not justification and therefore deals with the 
function of a rule, for, by classifying the great mass of legal
22
rules according to function, their rationale becomes clear. The
action of GP in this instance was well put by Harari who wrote;
"By looking for principles, one is looking for the very essence of the
law". To put it another way, rules tell us about the what of the
law, principles tell us about the why.
Again there are several comments that can be made here. One argument
however must be seen as insufficient as it fails to refute the
Further Dworkin makes it clear that no formulae exists to make a
41principle a legal principle. That is, no conditions of
7:7
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The counter-argument to this seems particularly strong. If a 
principle is incapable of stating the conditions of its own 57':
applicability it is hard to see how it can function to determine the 
applicablity of a rule. This statement is given weight by the opinion 
of Paton who confirmed that; "The most accurate expression of a 
principle may still leave its application to particular circumstances 
in doubt
I
could be the pragmatic statement that, whether or not it is 
theoretically sound, judges do frequently gauge the applicability of a
rule to a novel fact situation by use of GP,^^ This argument
validity of the basic counter-argument.
cl1
applicability exist for the general case. His statement reflects the 
abstract intangible nature of principles; "We argue for a particular 
principle by grappling with a whole set of shifting, developing and 1*
23
overcome,
relevant to the one fact situation, they are judged against each other
comes about without in any way diminishing the importance or legality 
of the other principles in this case or in future cases. A further
:
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inter-acting standards (themselves principles rather than rules)". In 
fact, the most positive statement that may be made is that a GP of law 
is one which officials must take into account, if it is relevant as a 
consideration that inclines the decision in one direction or another.
'■If
7:'-!A refutation of the counter-argument is the statement that if a GP may
determine its own applicability it would, in effect, become a rule.
It is again Paton who makes it clear that vagueness "is a
42characteristic inherent in all principles" In effect therefore,
the positivist argument critises principles for not being rules. If 
there is a recognised procedure (as opposed to a scientific formulae) 
for determining the applicability of GP to rules in given fact 
situations, which in a legal system are the tasks of the judges and 
the legislators, then this argument of the positivists can be
;3
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The above in fact helps to lay down a further division between rules 
and principles. Thus the fourth distinction is that principles do not 
purport to lay down the conditions of their own applicability while 
rules do.
The fifth distinction is that principles have different weight in 
given fact situations. That is, that where two or more principles are
Î
and the principle most fundamental to the case will prevail. This
Ï
The sixth distinction is one given by Dworkin in relation to the 
above, he writes that rules are applicable in all or nothing fashion
— 24
point is that the weight of every principle is a constant variable for 
every fact situation, i.e. each fact situation is unique and requires 
an assessment of the importance of a GP or GP to that particular 
situation. By contrast where two or more rules are in conflict in a I
case, all but one must fall, that is be judged illegal for all
43 44time, (All rules being equally legal).
while principles only incline towards decisions but their
45determination is not conclusive.
The seventh distinction is that rules are written while GP (in the 
main) are oral.
..1
An eighth distinction is that rules are relevant only to one legal
.
order, while principles are relevant to them all. When a rule is 
taken to another legal order it is taken under the guise of a 
principle - a function unique to GP.
The above does not purport to be a complete catalogue of all arguments
concerning rules and GP. Nor is it claimed that there has been Iexhaustive coverage of all the arguments which have been outlined in 
the proceeding pages. It does however, it is suggested, present 
enough evidence to support the claim that GP differ from rules.
- 25
A further important point that should be brought home is that the 
above debate, unlike the current positivism versus principles debate, 
was not a conflict type of debate where one viewpoint alone must 
prevail. This debate did not attempt to make value judgements as to 
whether GP were better than rules or whether rules were more valuable 
than GP. In fact it is submitted that the above debate had several 
positive aspects. It showed that both GP and rules each have a place 
in any legal order. It further showed that GP and rules each have 
certain unique characteristics, such analysis contributing towards a 
better understanding of both GP and rules. By having as much 
knowledge as possible of GP and rules society is in a position to make 
the best possible use of rules and GP, both individually and 
collectively, for the benefit of all individuals within that society.
Having analysed the important question of whether rules differ from 
principles, a lesser question is now answered.
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Section 4 - GP and Policy
■■
Are principles different from policies? At the simplest level of 
argument, the answer would seem to be yes, that is principles are 
norms while policies are "is" statements. On a more sophisticated 
level, the argument becomes more complex* Dworkin for example devoted 
much thought to the problem before concluding that there is indeed a 
distinction, with arguments of policy justifying a political decision,
"by showing that the decision advances or protects some collective 
goal of the community as a whole", while arguments of principle 
justify a political decision by showing the decision respects or 
secures some individual or group right.
It is not argued that this analysis by Dworkin is incorrect but rather
that its emphasis is placed incorrectly, that is, he searches for a 
tenuous distinction between policies and principles while devoting 
less space to the similarities between the two. It is contended that 
what unites is greater than what divides. As Dworkin himself notes 
the justification of a complex proposed action "will ordinarily
i
47require both sorts of arguments". Even action that seems
.primarily to come under the heading of policy "may require strands of
48principles to justify its particular design" Unlike the preceding
paragraphs which argued that, though similarities exist between rules
and principles the differences between them are important it is
suggested here that the theoretical division between policies and
principles, if any, be disregarded in practice. As Dworkin stated:
"rights conferred may be generated by principle and qualified by
49policy or generated by policy and qualified by principles".
Î
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With regard to community law, this loose explanation of GP and 
policies is adhered to. In particular, when the word policy is used 
it should not be assumed that GP are excluded from the areas dealt 
with at that point.
'f
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NOTES - CHAPTER II
1. It should be noted that this dissertation also deals briefly with 
the law of the United States of America (Chapter III).
2. The second and third aims are to determine the relationship of GP 
to a model legal order and to list their functions within that 
order; to state and evaluate the differences between GP and legal 
rules.
3. Bin Cheng, "General Principles of law as applied by International 
Courts and Tribunals" (1953), p.390.
4. A selection of such meanings is given here both for "General" and 
"Principle"
General - adjective; relating to a genus or whole class; 
including various species; not special; not restricted or 
specialised; relating to the whole or to all or most; universal; 
nearly universal; common; prevalent; widespread. The above are 
only a sample of definitions - see the Oxford English Dictionary 
for the full version.
Principle - (1) origin, source, source of action; beginning; 
fountainhead; original or initial state (2) that from which 
something takes its rise, originates or is derived (3) in the 
general sense; a fundamental source; a primary element, force or 
law which produces or determines particular results; the ultimate 
basis of the existence of something; cause (4) an original 
tendency or faculty, a natural disposition.
5. The word "action" is a concept word that covers a specialised area 
of legal research* See Alan R. White (ed), "The Philosophy of 
Action" (1968) for a selection of essays on this theme.
.
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Fundamental truth, law or motive force. A fundamental truth or
proposition on which many others depend. A fundamental assumption
forming the basis of a chain of reasoning. A general law or rule 
as a guide to action. Sir J.A.H. Murray (Editor), "Oxford English 
Dictionary" (1884-1928 Edition with supplement).
6, David M. Walker, "The Scottish Legal System" (3rd Ed., 1969), p.5. 
See also p. 30 "Principles are not commonly laid down by Statute 
or case but more commonly arrived at inductively by jurists from 
consideration of the particular decisions of various cases laid 
down in textbooks”.
7, N.K. Havener and S.A. Mosher, "General Principles of Law and the 
U.N* Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" (1978), 27 ICLQ, pp. 
596-613 at 599.
8, Edward de Bono. He made these statements during the course of his 
Television Lectures, "De Bono’s Thinking Course" (1982). Further 
see his various books for a fuller exposition of his ideas 
generally. His quotations given in this dissertation should be 
seen only as an interesting point of view intended to provoke 
further debate rather than as an authoritative definition of
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values.
9. Edward de Bono (fn. 8).
10. Other theorists e.g. R.M. Dworkin and Sir H. Laterpact seem to
agree with this classification of law under morality. Dworkin
defined a principle (of law) as a "standard to be observed ... 
because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other 
dimension of morality". Ronald M. Dworkin. "The Model of Rules 
I" p. 22 in "Taking Rights Seriously" (1977, 3rd Impression with a 
reply to critics 1981). Laterpact defined law as the maximum 
allowable morality - Vol. I "The General Works" (1970), p. 13,
11. Daniel Webster, in Rhoda Thomas Tripp (compiler) "The 
International Thesaurus of Quotations" (1973), p. 516.
12. St. Thomas Aquinas, "Summa Theologian" (1964 translation), Volume 
XXVIII, lazae, 90-97 at 96,5 p. 133; "The argument is about a law
which inflicts an unjust grievance on its subject ... in such
Violence in Peace and War" (1948), 2, 150 also strongly condemned 
such laws by stating: "An unjust law is a species of violence". 
The quote is in Tripp (fn. 11),
Institute 62a, "Oxford Dictionary of Quotations" (3rd Ed. 1979) 
p. 154 no. 17.
cases a man is not obliged to obey". Mohandas K. Gandhi in "Non
.■'7a
13. Sir Edward Coke, "Institutes" commentary upon Littleton First
31
14. David Hume "A Treatise of Human Nature" (1978). T.E, Jessop, "A 
Bibliography of David Hume and of Scottish Philosophy from Frances 
Hutcheson to Lord Balfour", (1938). The book by Jessop is the 
standard bibliography of Hume's work. More recent books also of 
interest are Roland Hall, "Fifty Years of Hume Scholarship: A 
Bibliographical Guide", (1978) and David Fate Norton, "David Hume" 
(1982). Thomas Reid "Essays on the Power of Human Mind (1819),
"An Inquiry into the Human Mind" (1970).
15. Edward de Bono (fn. 8).
16. These statements are to be found in many of his works see e.g.
"The Use of Lateral Thinking" (1961). De Bono's attack on the 
importance attached to logic as the main ingredient of the 
thinking process is, as note 8 stated, given as a basis for 
discussion not as a statement of authority.
17. The quote by U.S. Supreme Court Judge Benjamin N. Cardoso, "The 
Nature of the Judicial Process" (1921), p. 29 seems relevant: "For 
every tendency one sees a counter tendency; for every rule its 
antinomy. Nothing is stable. Nothing absolute. All is fluid and 
changeable. There is an endless becoming. We are back with 
Heraclitus".
18. H. Silving, "Sources of Law" (1968), Introduction.
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19. The statement that GP fulfill four functions in a legal order is,
:s
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of course, subjective. J. Raz for example in "The Role of General
Principles in the Law", pp. 839-40, 81 Yale Law Journal (1972) 
gives the following five functions. He states that GP are grounds 
for (1) interpreting laws, (2) changing laws, (3) for making 
particular exceptions in laws, (4) making new laws, (5) act as the 
sole ground for action in the particular case.
20. The imprecision of language and the problems that result from it 
are manifold. See e.g. Robert Thoulness, "Straight and Crooked 
Thinking" (1930 revised edition 1974), for an account of the abuse 
of language by individuals and organisations.
21. See Neil MacCormick "Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory" (1978) pp. 
19-73 on deductive justification.
22. St. Thomas Aquinas (fn. 12). It is suggested that justification 
is necessary, e.g. Cicero said: "The good of the people is the 
chief law” De Legibus III, ii, 8. "The Oxford English Dictionary
of Quotations", (fn. 13) p. 151 no. 17. Thus he submits law to
the test of the ultimate good of human beings. In this manner, 
the law is justified. Presumably if law were to the detriment of 
the people, in Cicero's eyes it would not be justified (and 
therefore not law).
23. It may also be the case that examination of the law and or society
shows that the link has been broken e.g. if views of society
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change and the law remains, the rule, thought it is still a legal 
rule, loses its justification. Possibly this may result in 
pressure on parliament to change (or judges to re-interpret) the 
rule,
24. E.G. take a rule that concerns the number of witnesses needed to 
sign a will to ensure its validity. What does sign mean? Would 
printing be adequate? Is a mark made by an illiterate person 
sufficient? Are initials only acceptable? See the case of Riggs 
V Palmer 115 N.Y. 506 N.E. 188 (1899).
25. It should be noted that the rules versus principles issue is part 
of a larger debate concerning legal positivism. See H.I..A, Hart,
"The Concept of Law" (1961), for the basic exposition of the 
theories on the nature of rules. See also J. Raz, "The Authority 
of Law" (1979), generally for an up-to-date account of the views
of a positivist. For the purposes of this dissertation the most
...
relevant Chapters in Raz are Chapter 4 "Legal Reasons and Gaps" 
and Chapter 7 "Kelsen's Theory of the Basic Norm". Further the 
books and articles by Hans Kelsen are also of interest in this
debate e.g. "The Pure Theory of Law" (2nd edition, 1967), "The 
General Theory of Law and State" (1949). "What is justice?
Justice Law and Politics in the Mirror of Science" (1971) see 
especially pp. 350-375 of this work where he discusses the 
distinction between positive norms and non positive norms which 
Tur (p. 67 see note 26) argues parallels the distinction between 
rules and principles.
«
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For a "refutation" of the above views see, as the major work 
Ronald M. Dworkin, Chapters II-III The Model of Rules I, The Model 
of Rules II in "Taking Rights Seriously" (fn 10). It should be 
stated here that several ideas discussed in the dissertation text 
are from this source. It would be pointless repetition to 
acknowledge each individually. See also the important counter to 
the above article, by Raz, "Legal Principles and the Limits of 
Law" (1972) 81 Yale L.J. p. 823 and the reply by Dworkin contained 
in Chapter III. (The book being the latest printing of the 
original theories by Dworkin which were originally published as a 
separate article in (among others), 35 University of Chicago Law 
Review 14. See especially pp. 71-80, "Are Rules really Diffirent 
from Principles", and more generally pp. 291-369 "A Reply to 
Critics". Also of interest is the article by Colin Tapper, "A 
note on Principles" (1971), 34 MLR p. 628 which again attacks 
Dworkin's theories .
26. See the article by Richard Tur, "Positivism, Principles and Rules" 
pp. 42-78 in "Perspectives in Jurispruence", (1977); Editor, 
Elspeth Attwooll, hereinafter cited as Tur. His article deals 
with the differences between rules and principles. It does not 
argue that GP are not part of the legal order. See the article 
generally and also see p. 72 in particular, where Tur summarises 
his progress and lists his conclusions. Note especially point 9, 
"There is a distinction between rules and principles".
27. Tur (fn. 26) p. 45 uses the phraseology "modern view" and
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'traditional view".
28. G.W, Paton, "A Textbook on Jurisprudence" (1946), pp. 176
29. Tur (fn. 26) pp, 45-46.
30. Tur (fn. 26) pp. 56-57.
31, Walker (fn. 6) pp. 29-30.
36. For a basic definition of natural law, see e.g. "Salmon on
I
f
■i.
:
32. Walker (fn. 6) pp. 3-6. He is of the opinion that the law is a 
true science. Tur (fn. 26) p. 46, states the same view.
33. There have been so many definitions of law given by various legal 
theorists that it is probably best for the individual to formulate 
his or her own. Thus it is suggested law is part art, part 
science, part struggle. The quote by barrister Gerald Abrahams, 
"The Chess Mind" (3rd edition 1975), p. 135 seems to lend this 
view support. He wrote that the part of any science which is not 
completely controlled or articulated is an art.
34. 1 K.B. 210-215 (1918), p. 213.
35. Hume, Reid (fn, 14).
Jurisprudence", (12th edition, 1966), p. 15. "The central notion
essential nature of the universe and which can be discovered by 
natural reason, and that ordinary human law is only truly law in
justice and morality constitute the natural law".
41. Dworkin (fn. 10), p. 40,
46. Dworkin (fn. 10), p. 82. See also his earlier analysis pp. 22-23,
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is that there exist objective moral principles which depend on the
S
so far as it confers to these principles. These principles of
37. Tur (fn. 26), p. 47.
38. Abraham Harari, "The Place of Negligence in the Law of Torts"
(1962), p.2,
39. Paton (fn. 28), pp. 171-177.
40. Tur (fn, 26), p. 48 notes this as an undoubted sociological fact.
42. Paton (fn. 28), pp. 171-177.
43, Dworkin (fn. 10), p. 26.
44. Dworkin (fn. 10), p. 27,
45. Dworkin (fn. 10), p. 24,
:
1Îy
:
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With regard to EG law (Chapter VI) it should be noted that one can 
construe a policy as containing a principle and that a principle 
may state a social goal. If so then Dworkin admits (p. 23) that 
"The distinction can be 'collapsed’".
47. Dworkin (fn. 10), p. 83.
48. Dworkin (fn, 10), p. 83.
49. Dworkin (fn, 10), p. 83.
Î
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CHAPTER III - GP AND MUNICIPAL LAW
- 38 - I
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Section 1 - Introduction
Since both Municipal law codes and courts refer to GP, the question 
arises; what kind of functions are GP expected to fulfill in a legal
Before going into details, reference should be made to the historical
%
order, what purpose do they serve? Is there, in this respect, a 
differentiation between one legal order and another? As the subject 
of the dissertation concerns GP in the context of EC law any 
observations in this present chapter are, with one major exception 
limited to the municipal legal systems of the MS.
I
differences between the municipal law systems influenced in the first
place by Civil law on the one hand, and on the other hand the 
municipal systems which have more dominantly followed the Common law, 
or Anglo-American tradition.
This differentation appears all the more meaningful as reference 
explicit or implicit, to GP is relatively more frequent in judicial 
practice than in statutory codification and judicial practice has had 
an important part to play in the development of common law countries, 
whereas statutory codification has in Civil law in the first place
.provided for the development of the law. Thus the Continental Civil 
law system and the Anglo-American system are the subjects of this 
chapter.
As to the continental system, the following remarks can be made.
Firstly, as to how judges find the law, Zweigert and Kotz, whose book 
on comparative legal systems is both comprehensive and authoritative
■3
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stated: "The rule, applied all over the Continent, which determines
how a judge must find the law when all else fails, is formulated in
the Swiss Civil Code, Article 1, paragraphs 2 and 3, as follows; "If
no statutory provisions can be found, the judge must apply customary
law, failing which he must decide according to the rule he would, were
he a legislator, decide to adopt - in doing so the judge must follow
1accepted doctrine and tradition'
Secondly, the continental legal system is the root of the Community 
2Legal Order. When the Community was formed there were six original 
member states, the Federal Republic of West Germany, France, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Italy and Holland. The legal systems of these states can 
be classified under the broad heading of Civilian systems.
Though the Community is a new legal order, it has strong affinities
with these legal orders. No new legal entity can arise, complete, out 
3of nothingness.
Most of our ideas have roots in the past. Tradition is the storehouse 
for many apparently original ideas. To apply some thoughts from 
Kant's "Critique of Reason", legal experts seeking to evolve a 
coherent corpus of law for the Community may be said to be caught in 
something deeper than logic and which may best be expressed as 
"Meta-logic"^ This transcends immediate categories of their 
reasoning and, in a similar way, transcends the foundations of legal 
traditions which have evolved in the past.
I
.
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Thirdly, the major point about the civilian systems is their adoption
5of a written code as the basis of their legal orders. There is in 
this an obvious affinity to Community law in that the Treaties are at 
the heart of the Community Legal system.^
It can therefore be said that, in keeping with the logic of Civil law 
tradition and with due regard to the broad form of EC law texts, the 
legal drafters of the original six MS had, more or less, a 
codification approach. In spite of its traite cadre nature, the EC 
treaties fall, in a categorical evaluation, more into the sphere of 
Civil law than Common law.
I
Î
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Section 2 - United States Law - The Marshall Cases
Kingdom is based on evolution through customs and conventions and
Of equal interest, and possibly greater relevance to EC law, is the 
legal system of the United States. In certain specific areas United 
States' law has had a major influence on Community law.
Third, it is suggested that the present stage of EC development is
As to the Anglo-American system, its influence on Community law is 
overall of a lesser degree. This influence however, should not be 
underestimated. For example, for over a decade the United Kingdom has 
been a full member of the EC. The constitutional system of the United
Ï"
constitutes, in the opinion of experts on constitutional law, a system
7that bears comparison with any other constitutional framework.
I
:
First, modern United States' law and practice has provided valuable 
specialised information on Anti-Trust Law, the results of which may be 
seen in the formulation of Articles 85 and 86 EEC and subsequent case 
law relating to these articles. Second, the Supreme Court of the 
United States is comparable in its role and structure to the ECJ. :ï;
Advocate General Lagrange has stated that the Supreme Court is the 
closest legal relative of the ECJ.^
3
comparable to the United States law of the early 19th century. A
.
study of the Supreme Court cases of Chief Justice Marshall are the
9most relevant examples. The main issue in Marshall's cases was how 
trade should be regulated among states. In Friedmann's opinion "The 
Supreme Court, with other important political factors believed that
■tI
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the country should be governed as a single large free trade area".^^
The major case on this issue was Gibbons v Ogden, 1824 where, for the
first time the court was confronted with the problem of interpreting
the commerce c l a u s e . J o h n s t o n  commenting on the case wrote that:
"In terms of the economic growth of the United States, Gibbons v Ogden
liberated interstate trade from trade barriers erected by the various
states.. Upon the holding and dicta of Gibbons v Ogden the entire
12body of federal regulation over interstate commerce is based."
In fact, McGloskey went so far as to say that on the answer to the 
questions in Gibbons v Ogden "the future of America as a nation 
depended".
It seems clear that the above case is, for United States' law, the 
magna carta of free trade law. Yet before examining aspects of 
Gibbons v Ogden in detail, it should be noted that the foundation on 
which such a forthright judgement was made were laid in earlier cases, 
McCloskey noted the important facts that "the judges have been deviled 
by uncertainty about their own status in the young American polity", 
and also, "the constitutional agreement of 1789 was inexplicit about 
the nature and scope of judicial a u t h o r i t y , I n  brief, this meant 
that the court itself was responsible for drawing up its own 
commission.
In the case of Marbury v Madison 1803, the doctrine was established 
that the Supreme Court will interpret and construe the constitution 
and that any law in derogation or contrary to the constitution is
43
unconstitutional and null and void.
Marbury v Madison dealt with the division of powers within the 
branches of the federal government. It provided a strong statement of 
the nature of federal law at a critical time in United States' 
history, when, as Johnston put it, "the seeds of dissention over 
slavery were beginning to sprout".
Another relevant case that laid down a base for later judgments was 
Cohens v Viginia. This case involved the authority of the
Federal Supreme Court to review the judgements of the judicial systems 
of various states. Because Cohens upheld the federal supremacy, it 
was far more significant than the previously cited case of Marbury v 
Madison which, as stated, dealt with only the division of powers 
within the federal government. In fact, of this case Johnston said: 
"One cannot overstress the importance of Cohens v Virginia"
Having shown how the Marshall court first took upon itself power to
judge the issue in Gibbons v Ogden, its use of GP in this and
19subsequent cases, e.g. Brown v Maryland is now examined. Once 
again, the statements made here should be seen in relation to Chapter 
VI.
As Johnston noted when Marshall took up his position as Chief Justice
there was "substantially little constitutional law to be consulted for 
20precedents". The actual clauses to be examined, the contract
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clauses were, at that time, drafted in a much broader fashion than 
their modern equivalent. The technical rules of contract were only 
beginning to be evolved.
In plain language, the Marshall court decided the cases, of necessity,
on GP. Marshall set forth what Frankfurter and Holmes both
characterised as "guiding principles" and entrenched these in a
21position "above the reach of Statute and State". Further,
Marshall, in using GP as the means had a clear aim in mind "to combat
an incipent state oriented mercantilism on the one hand and
legislative supremacy on the other. Even in these areas, the balance
22of federal state power was to be maintained".
The results of the Marshall cases are these; the unification of the
commercial law of the c o u n t r y ; t h e  development by American
commercial law of its own substance and style, the curtailing of the
23bpower of the State to pursue independent policies on trade.
A final point to note on this chapter of United States' law is that
the Marshall cases did not, as might be deduced from this brief
discussion, produce a total solution to United States trade problems.
As McCloskey noted Marshall felt he had failed to resolve the great
problem of nation state relationships.^^ McGloskey's own analysis
on this point bears out, once again, the correctness of a Marshall
opinion. He also takes his analysis one further step to make a most
important point which is equally relevant to the European Community
Court, that no court could, on its own, finally settle an issue of 
25such dimensions.
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Section 3 - Civil Law and Anglo American Law
The Anglo-American system, though overall of lesser influence on EG 
law than the civilian system, warrants, as has been shown, a full 
explanation. By a comparative analysis both systems of law will now 
be seen in sharp focus, with their fundamental differences clearly 
outlined.
As to a basic comparative explanation of the two legal systems and the 
positions of GP, both in legal theory and judicial practice in 
Anglo-American law and Civil law, the exposition given by Lord Cooper 
is hard to better. As a Scottish judge he deals with a legal order 
that has elements of both systems interwoven in its fabric. His 
statement is the distillation of both theory and practice. Lord 
Cooper wrote: "A Civilian system differs from a Common law system much 
as rationalism differs from empiricism or deduction from induction.
The Civilian naturally reasons from principles to instances, the 
common lawyer from instances to principles. The Civilian puts his 
faith in syllogisms, the Common lawyer in precedents. The first 
silently asking himself as each new problem arises, "What should we do 
this time?", and the second asking aloud in the same situation, "What 
did we do last time?" The instincts of a Civilian is to systematise. 
The working rules of the Common lawyer is solvitur ambulando".
The basic distinction between the respective legal systems can be 
summed up thus, in Common law, inductive problem-solving. Civil law; 
systematic conceptualisation. As to principles it is clear that both 
systems make use of principles. The basic difference is that, in 
Civil law the principles are there, implanted and or implicit in the
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code waiting to be used, while Anglo-American law has present the 
rules and cases, waiting to be analysed to discover the principles.
As regards the use by the ECJ of GP, the Civil law methodology should
. \prevail. If so, a major part of the dissertation. Chapters V to VII,
.
must be to find the principles that are present in EC law. Once this 
is done their use can then be analysed.
This statement, that the Civil law methodology is the major influence
on ECJ practice, is a major point that should be made in order to
understand the workings of the ECJ and their use of GP. Yet to stop
here, stating only that Civil law and Anglo-American law are different
and that the major influence in the Community both in formulation of
the EC and ECJ methods is the former, would be a shallow analysis of
.
the situation. While this statement is broadly correct, the Civilian
and Common law systems have since evolved from the clear cut position
■
previously outlined.
I
'I
The present situation is that the two legal systems are moving closer 
together, that their major conceptual differences are eroding. Though 
Lord Coopers's definition of the systems is correct as such, every 
statement that seeks to fix the meaning of a legal system or any part 
of it must always be subject to later review. i.
■
As Zweigert and Kotz note in their important statement: "To sum up; On 
the Continent the days of absolute pre-eminence of statutory law are 
past, contrariwise, in the Common law there is an increasing tendency
.1
,33 V;
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to use legislation in order to unify, rationalise and simplify the
law. On the Continent, law is Increasingly being developed by the
judges into a systematic order, so as to make it easier to understand
and master. There are therefore grounds for believing that although
the Common law and the Civil law started off from opposite positions,
they are gradually moving closer together even in their legal methods 
27and techniques".
In attempting to construct a frame of reference by which to examine 
(or judge) the work of the ECJ with regard to their use of GP, the 
above statement has several points of interest. As the Community is a 
new legal order such a frame, ideally, should be constructed purely on 
the basis of European Community law. Yet in a new legal order at an 
early stage of development, it is in the foundations, rather than in 
the structure itself that materials for a frame of reference are 
found.
The most obvious place to start the construction of the frame of 
reference is by reviewing Community judicial activity purely in the 
light of Civil law. Such review would be insufficient however as 
Civil law as was noted noted above is steadily growing closer to 
Anglo-American law. Some account of this latter system would need to 
be included. Given the built-in influence of Anglo-American law in 
the EC, this trend is dramatically accelerated in that legal order.
A further factor that increases the influence of Anglo-American
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instances *
The later chapters of this dissertation, having examined a number of 
ECJ cases involving GP, will give a more exact account of the 
methodology of the Court. It can still be noted at this point 
however, that the EC judge, while still (broadly speaking) a Civil law 
judge has greater scope than his Civilian counterpart.
■
methodolgy is the present state of EG development. As a relatively 
young legal order the rules are few. Thus the code of the EC is 
sparse and the work of the judges seems more to follow the Common law
practice, from instances to principles rather than from principles to
II
J
«
«
For all practical purposes, therefore, the frame of reference for 
"judging" the work of the ECJ is in constant flux, for, though its 
base is in Civil law, changing circumstances both in comparative law 
and within EC law result in a progressively greater amount of 
Anglo-American methodology being added to the frame of reference.
:
To sum up, this makes for greater difficulties in constructing any 
satisfactory sort of reference by which to analyse the use of GP by 
the ECJ. Civil law and Anglo-American law are in a state of 
progressive harmonisation while Community law is, as yet, too new to 
possess the authoritative identity by which such precise judgements 
can be made. Thus, in the final instance the onus falls on the judges 
themselves to evolve a code of practice. I
iI
'f
Nowhere in this relatively complete definition is GP mentioned. The 
major task of this section is therefore to find GP, if they exist, in
character" rather than GP, when dealing with English law as a whole. 
As Duhamel and Smith correctly noted, English lawyers at that time
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Section 4 - English Law
Having given a brief outline of the schools of law, individual legal
systems are now examined. With Scottish law being, as previously 
stated, somewhat of a hybrid system, English law is the major common 
law influence on the EC. This system will now be examined. Edward 
Wall stated English law was an "interaction of Roman law. Canon law. 
Common law. Statute and Administrative law as well as custom and
usage".
" 'I
I
the English legal system.
English law, unlike the majority of Member State legal systems, has no 
developed doctrine of GP. As will be shown, it is nevertheless the 
case that GP exist in English law. It is probable that principles
i
have always been present in that system, though under a different
.
label. Professor Lawson, writing during the 1950's showed that
English law had a strong element of rationality, or, in otherwords a
29strong base in GP. However, the words used were "general
30did not normally think of GP at that level.
The situation at the present time is being altered, through English
interest in French administrative law, an early example being the 1951 
lectures by Hamson.^^ A more modern indication of the changing face I
has become a pervasive notion that may absorb the concept of
If Brown is correct in his surmise, then it bears out the opinion of 
Zweigert and Kotz that the major systems of law are converging, for 
here the continental notion of GP is clearly being recognised as an
-----
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of English law was given by Brown, who has analysed English law in all
«its main branches, and has found certain key doctrines which may be i
identified as GP.^^ These are present both in substantive law and 
legal techniques, and judicial practice. :
It is further argued by Brown that as well as English law having GP
present within the system, the English legal system is well able to 
33develop GP. For example, recent cases show that reasonableness
proportionality; the GP, "the right to be heard", is being refined
34 '-'Siinto a GP of administrative due process• 1
independent source of law. No longer is it hidden under broad 
statements such as "general character".
;;g
il
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to the point that a mere reading of the text will not disclose what
37the law actually is".
employee and on the employer a general duty of care for the safety and 
welfare of his employees, and a duty to treat them equally. This was
i"
Section 5 - German and French Legal Orders 
The following sections now examine briefly the individual legal codes
of Germany and France. This is done in order to show that, even 
within systems under a common tradition, (Civil law) there are still 
differences of approach as regards the drafting of such documents and 
the use of GP's consequent upon this. Further, this will serve to 
show that, even though the EC follows along Civil law lines, in the 
drafting of its constitution and subsequent use of GP by the ECJ, this 
body reserves to itself a marked degree of individuality. In general 
it is mistaken to be over-zealous in classification of all aspects of 
a legal order.
■ :
The major point to note about the German Civil Code, the B.G.B., is 
its solidity. Though many areas have of course been altered by 
legislation, a prime example being family law, Zweigert and Kotz
correctly state that "the structure of the B.G.B., taken by and large,
35looks very much the same today as it did seventy years ago" The 
maintenance of the structure of the B.G.B. is the work of the
c o u r t s . S u c h  has been the weight of case law on the B.G.B. that 
parts of it "are covered by a heavy gloss of judicial decision often
II
An example of such patina is labour law. In labour law a study 
disclosed that the courts imposed a general duty of fidelity on the
‘i
II
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done mainly by use of GP. Though such judicial action had little 
statutory basis, the principles the courts evolved are often used to 
solve the many and varied concrete problems arising out of the 
contract of employment•
The main statutory tools by which the courts have performed such
actions have been the general clauses of 138, 157, 242 and 826 of the
B.G.B, Zweigert and Kotz suggest that these "clauses have acted as a
kind of safety valve, without which the rigid and precise terms of the
38B.G.B. might have exploded under the pressure of social change".
The explanation by Zweigert and Kotz needs but little elucidation. It 
can, however, be further stated that by action as a safety valve GP 
are a link between a given system and social political substance which 
will eventually crystalize in the form of a rule, GP being the given 
essence of many rules.
Thus all these clauses contain fundamental principles, for example,
242 B.G.B. states, in general terms, that everyone must perform his 
contract in the manner required by good faith, in view of the general 
practice in commerce.
In German law therefore, GP have, and do play, a vital role in the 
maintenance of the law.
A reading of the French Code reveals clearly the depth of thought
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39behind its drafting. This point was also noted by Zweigert and 
Kotz who wrote, "Beyond doubt the French Civil Code is intellectually 
the most significant, and historically the most f e r t i l e " . H a v i n g  
its foundations in the creed of the Enlightenment and the law of 
reason, it upholds the convention that social life can be put into a 
rational order if only the rules are restructured according to a 
comprehensive plan.
A major point to note is that the rules are not too detailed. This 
was a deliberate policy of the draftsmen who realised that even the 
most ingenious legislator could not foresee and determine all the 
possible problems which might arise. Thus room was left for judicial 
decisions to make the law applicable to unforeseen individual cases. 
The wider implication of such far-seeing action is that it can be 
stated that the French Civil Code is suited to the changing 
circumstances of society.
The writings of the 19th century French jurist Portalis clearly 
reflected this trend of thought. Equally impressive, his views 
foreshadowed the current view that the dichotomy between Statute law 
and Common law is not as fundamental as previously thought. He wrote, 
"The task of legislation is to determine the general maxims of the 
law, taking a large view of the matter. It must establish principles 
rich in implications rather than descend into the details of every 
question which might possibly arise .... We shall leave gaps and they 
will be filled in due course by experience"
- 54
interpretation of statute.
I
fAs to the use made of these principles "rich in implications", GP of 
law, as the term is understood in France, are not used as directly 
applied rules but as guides to the lawmaker, the legislator, the 
judge, and the interpreter of existing legislation, e.g. rules that 
statutes are presumed not to be retroactive nor take away common law
:
rights or remedies are seen as GP of law being brought to bear on the
I
The question, on what legal basis do such GP rest? has been 
investigated by Jenneau.^^ He rejected the preambles of the 1946
and 1958 constitutions and also the 1789 Declaration des Droits de 
l’Homme as the source of GP of law. They were, he suggested, only the
crystalisations of GP not their source. Custom was also rejected as 
the basis of GP. Jenneau concluded GP could only be understood as the 
products of the norm creating activities of the courts.
:A further point of some import as regards GP in French law is that judges draw conclusions from principles and not authority. The validity of such conclusions rests, not on the source from which it 
eminates but on the correctness of the reasoning. Conclusions are 
less important than correct reasoning. Thus, for French law, 
reasoning and not rules is the ultimate judicial tool.
Ï
In comparing the German and French codes, each has principles which 
are fundamental to that code' embedded into its very fabric. Further, 
even where principles are used in the less important sense, as gap 
fillers, they advance the development of both German and French law.
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All this, of course, both results in and is the result of, the active 
role played by their respective courts in making use of these 
principles, that is, the legal climates in these countries are 
favourable for principles to flourish. The differences in the method 
of draughtsmanship of the codes, however, lead to a divergence between 
use of principles. The German Code has a terminological exactitute, a 
scientific precision, while the terms of the French Code are often (to 
an extent intentionally) inexact, incomplete or a m b i g u o u s . T h i s  
means that the French Code gives greater scope to the activities of 
the judiciary.
In Community law, it is submitted, the treaties read as closer in 
spirit to the French than the German Code, that is, study of the SC 
Treaties reveals that the terminology of SC texts is, as in French 
law, broadly, vaguely and here and there ambiguously formulated. 
Further Portalis's ingenious phrase "principles rich in implications" 
strikes a chord with the fundamental principles which embody the 
spirit of EC law. These are discussed in detail in Chapter V and VI.
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Section 6 - Conclusions
To conclude this chapter five points should be noted.
Firstly, Municipal law, whether Anglo-American or Civil law, clearly
has GP as a fundamental part of its structure. Further the Municipal
law has a definite need for GP, and this provides a receptive
atmosphere for the judiciary to make use of GP to help integrate law
and society.
Secondly, if, as suggested, the EC is clearly related to municipal law 
systems , GP should have a role to play at least as important as that 
in any municipal system. In view of the relatively youthful state of 
EC law at present, use of GP in EC law should be at its peak in this 
century,
The third point concerns the frame of reference by which to analyse 
the work of the ECJ with regard to GP, If Zweigert and Kotz are 
correct, and the systems of Anglo-American and Civil law are gradually 
converging then the frame of reference must be constructed from a base 
of Civil law, with gradual additions of Ango-American legal methods.
The fourth point is the reminder that, as the EC is a new legal order,
it is of course not bound by the traditions of any or all municipal
legal systems, not even by the French Civil Code. Thus, in essence 
(even at this early stage of EC development) the rules of EC law are
the only true frame of reference by which to judge the judges. Yet as
EC law has, as its sole official interpreter, the Court of Justice, a
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great responsibility falls upon that body to use its powers in a 
responsible fashion. Thus a point is made here which will be 
emphasised throughout the course of this dissertation. In the end, 
for the EC legal system to work, we must trust the judges.
The fifth point is that, in surveying all the various cases mentioned 
implicitly in this chapter, all, with the exception of the United 
States Marshall cases, could be termed micro cases. Chapter VI deals 
in detail with the definition of these terms micro and macro, but it 
can be noted here that macro cases involve a constitutional element 
and, once decided, have a major effect upon the law. Micro cases, 
though important in themselves, have an influence only over the 
particular area of law arising in the case. From this fact statement 
the following points are deduced. All systems that featured micro 
cases are highly developed legal orders. As such it is the norm that 
for advanced legal orders macro cases should be rare. The United 
States legal system, at the time of the Marshall cases, was, it is 
suggested still at an early stage of development as regards the 
workings of the constitution. This resulted in a natural surge of 
macro cases to determine the important issues mentioned in the survey 
of United States law.
Further, as was noted, these decisions had a great influence on the 
development of United States law. This leads to an important analogy 
with EC law. As a new legal order it is to be expected, as a natural 
phenomena, that a relatively high number of macro cases will arise 
during the first decades of ECJ practice.
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Section 1 - Definition of International Law
This chapter has three basic aims. First, it will show the relative 
importance of GP, as applied by the ICJ, to a specific legal order. 
Public International law.^ This will cover both the theoretical and 
practical impact of GP in this sector. Second, a case will be made 
out for the view that there is a strong analogy between International 
and Community law. Third, the question; "What relevance have the 
problems that concerned the use of GP by the ICJ for EC law?" will be 
analysed. A necessary preliminary to these issues however, is to give 
a basic explanation of the meaning of International law.
What is International law? The words themselves suggest the meaning
of the concept they embody. International law, inter-nation law, law
among nations, the law in question consisting of a body of rules
and principles governing powerful independent entities called nations.
International law is law created by, and to some extent binding upon,
2sovereign states This view of the nature of International law
corresponds to the classic definition of the legal order among 
3nations.
There is also a further, more modern definition of International law. 
There is no single form of words that precisely encapsulates this 
definition. All such expositions however, stress the position of the 
individual within the International legal order.^ It is suggested 
that these two definitions can be seen as complementary, that is, that 
the former still contains the essence of the meaning of International 
law while the latter points out the direction in which International
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law is slowly moving.
In order to facilitate explanation of International law it may, for 
this purpose, be seen as consisting of two distinct branches, the law 
of treaties and relations between states where no previous agreements 
on conduct, save loose customs, exist. The major points to note on 
the law of treaties is that in ratifying agreements, states agree to 
be bound only within that limited area of agreement. Further, the 
extent of such restriction is usually clearly defined as falling 
within certain limits. Finally, such treaties bind only the 
contracting parties.^
As to relations between states where no treaties exist, this is by 
nature an area where previous experience cannot be called upon to lay 
guidelines, save in the vaguely defined area of customary 
International law.
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Section 2 -• Article 38(c)
Having stated in a basic form what International law is, it can now be 
ascertained precisely what relationship GP has with this system of 
law. The statute of the ICJ supplies the answer that GP is a source 
of law. Article 38(c) states the sources of International law the ICJ 
will apply (a) International Conventions, (b) International Custom,
(c) The General Principles of law recognised by civilised nations, (d) 
writings of highly qualified jurists. Before Article 38(c) is 
analysed as to its exact meaning, it should be recognised that GP 
constituted a source of law long before Article 38(c) was drafted.
The article serves only as written evidence of this fact.^ It
should also be noted that GP may be used by the ICJ as a tool for the
interpretation of treaties as well as in its own right as a source of 
law. As such GP have relevance for both parts of the International 
law classification, treaty law and non-treaty law.
Article 38(c) has been of the utmost interest to commentators upon 
International law. Much has been written upon all aspects of Article 
38(c), from accounts of the meetings that led to the precise 
formulation of the final draft, to various views as to the exact
meaning of the phrase itself.^ Some of these views on the meaning
of Article 38(c) are now examined.
In brief, there are three major explanations of Article 38(c). The 
first was well elucidated by Virally who held that the words 
"civilised nations" referrred to all systems of law that had achieved 
a comparable state of development.^ Further the words "GP" were
I
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9derived from Municipal law and especially from private law. The 
second explanation concentrates solely upon the meaning of the words 
GP. It believes that GP refers to GP of justice, linked closely to 
the Western World’s interpretation of natural law. Von Glahn outlines 
this as the process of "the transformation of broad universal 
principles of a law applicable to all mankind into specific rules of 
International law". He added the rider however, that in his view 
the law of nature, legally speaking, is a vague and ill-defined source 
of International law.^^
These two explanations may be classified as the major schools of
thought on this subject and the third view, which follows, as the
minority view. It is that Article 38(c) as a whole is a kind of
subheading under treaty and customary law and incapable of adding
anything new to International law. A well-known representative of
this camp, the Russian legal theorist Tunkin, thought GP only
reiterated the fundamental precepts of International law which had
12already been set out in treaty and customary law.
Which, if any, of these above views is the correct one? To deal with
the minority view first, it can be seen as an echo of the positivist
arguments outlined in Chapter II. Again as in Chapter II, there is a
measure of truth in this argument for here there is a close link
between GP and custom. Waldock pointed out this fact when he wrote
that "GP that have made a large contribution to the development of
13International law tended to become absorbed in customary law".
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The arguments against GP being a part of rules and customs of 
International law are as follows. It should be made clear that the 
fact this is only a minority view in no way detracts from its 
correctness or otherwise. As such this does not constitute a 
counter-argument. More to the point, however, are the arguments in 
Chapter II concerning rules and principles. As stated there, the 
arguments countering the view that GP are a sub-group of rules hold, 
in the main, in any legal order. If so, then the conclusions thereby 
arrived at are held to be valid for treaty rules in International law.
Concerning custom, the arguments again come from the definition of GP 
in Chapter II.
As Tunkin stated, and Waldock confirmed, many GP's have become
14absorbed in customary law. However there is possibly some 
semantic confusion in the actual statement by Waldock. His words are 
a form of shorthand that hide what actually happens when GP are used. 
When a GP is used in a concrete situation, a case law rule emerges 
from that particular situation.
,3„!
I
îîi
•SThe role of GP in a parallel situation is thus ended. The rule has 
now taken its place. Where many different examples concerning a 
single GP are tried in court, a good part of that GP is thus absorbed
Sin customary law. If this situation occurs with many GP’s it can be
■
said, in a concise way, that many GP's have been absorbed in custom.
The full statement however, is rather that many instances of many GP
15have been absorbed in custom. As Chapter II pointed out, no GP
: ï
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can be completely defined or exhaused by use in fact situations. Thus 
it is a fallacy to suggest, as Tunkin does, (and Waldock seemingly 
does), that a GP can become completely absorbed, and thus completely 
defined, by custom. Rather, it is the case that so many instances of 
a GP have been settled in court that the case law is almost sufficient 
to deal with potential closely related instances. It is believed 
however, that no principle can thus be totally eradicated. As such,
GP remain an independent source of law.
For the two major schools of thought on the meaning of Article 38(c)
the correct view, it is suggested, is not to see them as incompatable
but to regard them as complementary to each other. This is confirmed
by Jennings in a major analysis on International legal practice. He
concluded that "both approaches are interwoven in the entire fabric of
17the historical developments of International law". This 
conclusion also fits in well with the jurisprudential ideas stated in 
Chapter II, that is, that GP's are not condusive to rigid definition 
or classification.
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possible reasons for this are examined later. The starting point,
replenish without subterfuge the rules of International law by
to strike out a bolder line in its application of International law
;
:
Section 3 - The Use of GP by the ICJ
Having given a basic explanation of the meaning of Article 38(c) and 
having established that it is an independent source of International 
law derived both from Municipal law and the law of nature the 
contribution of GP, both in a theoretical and a pratical sense, 
towards the development of International law may now be examined. 
Within the confines of this dissertation, the extent of such 
contribution is limited to the use of GP by the ICJ.
■
As regards practice, an analysis by Cheng has shown that relatively 
speaking, the ICJ has handled few cases involving GP.^^ The
however, must be theory. The widest and most comprehensive account of 
the possible implications that Article 38(c) had (or indeed have) for
International law was given by Schwartzenberger. His views 
reiterate some theories given earlier in Chapter II.
Schwartzenberger stated that the creation of Article 38(c) had the
19following seven consequences. "First, they enabled the court to
a
principles of law tested within the shelter of more mature and closely 
integrated legal systems. Second, they opened a new channel through 
which concepts of natural law could be received into International 
law. Third, they held out to other international judicial 
institutions a set of rules they might adopt, as a last resort, into 
their own practice. Fourth, they made it possible for the world court
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than, in the absence of such wide reserve powers, the Court might have 
found it possible to take. Fifth, they prevented the failure of 
International adjudication through non liquet. Sixth, they re­
introduced the standard of civilisation into International law and 
divided nations into civilised and uncivilised. Finally, they threw
out a challenge to the Doctrine of International law to sail into new
20and unchartered seas".
This statement by Schwartzenberger is of great relevance both for
International law and Community law. It is taken as the basis of one
of the major points of this dissertation, that is, the major dynamic
impact of GP on the EC. The reasons for this belief will be given
later in this chapter. Further as much of that explanation overlaps
with International law, it is only noted here that Schwartzenberger's
belief in the importance of Article 38(c) to the International legal
order was shared by the eminent jurists Brierly and Lauterpacht.
Brierly wrote (of article 38(c)), "It is an authoritative recognition
of a dynamic element in International law, and of the creative
21function of the courts which administer it" Lauterpacht made a
similar point, "Finally, it gives express sanction and encouragement
to the continued enrichment of International law from the accumulated
22experience of the legal development of the nations of the world".
Thus, the ICJ has a major tool which affords it freedom to uphold and 
evolve the law of nations.
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unknown to the internal state of the law. It successfully challenges
■ÎH
A further point of Article 38(c) is that its creation helped refute
the extreme positivist doctrine, which is that only rules to which
states have given their consent, constitute a source of International
law. Lauterpacht wrote, "It definitely removes the possibility,
asserted by the extreme positivist school of writers, that 
.International tribunals may have to decline to give a decision because 
of the apparent absence of an applicable rule of law - a contingency
■3:the mistaken view that the will of sovereign states is the only source
23of International law".
The last sentence of the statement by Lauterpact brings forth an 
obvious yet vital point. If the will of sovereign states is being 
changed by Article 38(c) from "the" source of law, to "a" source of 
law then, in effect, the doctrine of sovereignty is challenged by GP. 
To put this in a more jurisprudential mode, the GP of sovereignty 
which by virtue of its long establishment in the International legal
order has atrophied into the rigidity of an all or nothing rule, is 
,being forced to revert to the truer, more elastic, form of a GP, that
is, a source of law which, on occasion, may be the source of action. 
This should be noted as a further major point both for International 
law and EC law. Its implications are seen both throughout the course 
of this chapter and this dissertation.
I
Thus, in theory, the ICJ has, through Article 38(c), great freedom of 
action and consequently great power. Has either facility been 
realised in practice? To check on the actual development of
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International law by the ICJ a thorough and authoritative study of 
cases involving principles is needed.
The most comprehensive analysis of this kind was by Bin Cheng in 
241953. Cheng chose four principles and studied them in detail. He 
analysed the principles of self-preservation, good faith, 
responsibility and GP of law in judicial preceedings. Many cases 
relating to specific instances of the above were examined. His 
conclusions were as follows:-
In general, Schwartzenberger’s contention that principles were of
theoretical importance is bourne out. As Cheng wrote, "GP's lie at
the very foundation of the legal system and are indispensible to its 
25operation". He also wrote that this premise held good for any 
legal orders.
As to the practical application of principles by the ICJ (and other 
tribunals) he concluded that GP served three definite functions. 
First, they constituted the source of various rules of law, which are 
in reality only the expression of various principles. Second, they 
are the guides of the juridical order according to which the’ 
interpretation and application of rules are oriented. Finally, in 
International law where rules are few, the function of GP of law 
acquires special significance and has contributed greatly towards 
defining the legal relations between states.
It could be said Cheng's work shows that GP hold a position of
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practical importance in International law while never really reaching 
the theoretical heights expected of them by Schwartzenberger. Later 
studies on GP in International law echo this conclusion that GP are an 
area of unrealised promise, a field of unfulfilled potential. The 
authors of these studies cited three possible reasons for this state 
of affairs. It is suggested that two of these reasons are of 
relatively minor importance and these are now dealt with briefly. The 
first cause is of a technical nature, namely the difficulties of the 
comparative law investigation. Bishop states there difficulties 
plainly, "at one time it was sufficient to examine the Anglo-American 
Common law and some of the legal systems based upon the European Civil 
law. Now Japanese law, Islamic law, Chinese law, Soviet law, Hindu 
law and other legal systems have to be taken into a c c o u n t " . S u c h  
factors complicate the comparative law analysis to such an extent that
doubt is cast on the practical worth of the GP's that result from such
, 27 a a search.
A second reason is that a part of International law, the law of 
diplomacy, is already comprehensively filled out by rules and has few 
gaps requiring the attentions of GP,^^^
The third.and main reason for the comparative failure of the ICJ to 
make full use of GP is difficult to express in purely legal terms as 
it has political overtones•
The problem is that International judicial institutions depend upon 
the consent of states both for their jurisdiction and for the
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acceptability of their opinions and decisions.
Friedmann clearly stated the consequences of such a situation, "They
(The ICJ) therefore have to exercise great caution in the application
of GP of law, lest they be accused of unauthorised exercise of
28international legislation". A close analysis of the cases 
contained in the study by Bin Cheng shows precisely this restrained 
use, by the ICJ, of GP.
Nevertheless, the ICJ has, despite its caution, failed to avoid the
wrath of its clients for, as a recent study by Prott noted, "Its
history is full of examples of defiance of its judgments and 
30opinions. This leads naturally to a fall in the prestige of the
ICJ against other units of International social system, a fact also
31confirmed by Prott in his analysis .
If this is so, then the next pertinent question must be "What are the
reasons for such actions on the part of states?" There are two
possible explanations. The first is that, as Friedmann noted, the
fear by states of judicial legislation. This argument, it is
believed, is not theoretically compelling. The logical counter to it
was pointed out by Lauterpacht who wrote that "use of GP may be a
necessary, and indeed inevitable way of filling a lacunae in the
32interpretation of a specific question".
The crux of the matter does not rest with the somewhat spurious 
argument that judges legislate. The source of this apparently
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political problem stems from the legally cogent point that
International law is still, relatively speaking, a recent 
33phenomena. The recognition of the study of International law as a 
topic dates from the latter part of the 16th century. Historically 
speaking, therefore, the work needed to shape law among nations has 
just begun.
Thus both International law itself, its Institutions, and more 
importantly, its major subjects, states, (as regards their external 
relations), are still in a primitive stage of development.^^
It is not argued that International law is not law as such for as
Lauterpacht says , "the inadequacy or even the absence of any of the
constructive elements of law need not detract decisively from the
35legal character of a system of rules of conduct". However, the 
absence of a superior authority endowed with legal power to impose new 
rules of law binding in all states; the lack of a sovereign executive 
capable of enforcing International law and no regular tribunals gives 
weight to the previous contention that International law is relatively 
backward
As to the states , their handling of external affairs leaves much to be 
desired. In particular, there is a marked contrast between the 
sophisticated internal structure of a state and its conduct in 
external relations. The main evidence for this primitiveness of 
states is the universal strength of the GP of sovereignty. This leads 
to an unsatisfactory state of affairs for, as Lauterpacht stated,
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"Within the community of nations, this essential feature of the rule
of law is constantly put in jeopardy by the conception of the
37sovereignty of states". In International law, the doctrine
reveals itself mainly in two ways, first as the right of the state to
determine what shall be for the future the content of International
law by which it will be bound; second, as the right to determine the
38content of existing International law in a given case.
It was Virally who bluntly stated the major truth regarding the
development of International law, that without some weakening of the
doctrine of sovereignty further progress in International law is 
39impossible.
The above arguments lead back directly to the ICJ and its lack of use 
of GP, for the doctrine of sovereignty manifests itself here in two 
ways ; in the reluctance to grant any form of real authority to the 
ICJ, and in the refusal to accept its decisions in certain cases. The 
argument can be summed up thus. Due to the lack of development in the 
external structure of states, they fear and mistrust International 
institutions. Their power vis a vis such institutions is too great 
for International law to develop smoothly. As GP are, by definition a 
dynamic legal tool that takes law in a new direction, states are 
reluctant to allow the Court the use of GP, For fear of losing their 
control over the law states fear the use of GP by the ICJ,
To sum up what has been said this far, GP are a source of 
International law, theoretically capable of bringing major benefits to
Î
«
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International law. They also provide the ICJ with a certain freedom 
of action. In practice, the ICJ has used GP on comparatively few 
occasions, and then in a conservative manner. Even so, such action 
has resulted in some judgments being virtually disregarded with two 
consequences, the stunted development of International law; the loss 
of prestige by the ICJ. The root cause of the problem was identified 
as the GP of sovereignty. To some extent, the action of the states in 
upholding sovereignty has been cloaked by their unjustified counter 
allegation of judicial lawmaking.
- 81
Section 4 - Affinités between International law and EC law 
The subject of International law is one of great importance for the 
future stability of the world. It is a cliché but true nonetheless 
that the world is shrinking and becoming more interdependent. 
Harmonious inter-state relations are thus imperative. As, however, 
the topic of this dissertation is the use of GP by the ECJ, all that 
has been written so far, while interesting in itself, is to be seen 
primarily as an aid to understanding and explaining the main theme of 
GP in EC law. Thus it is believed that this chapter contains much of 
interest to EC law. Before going into detail, it is necessary to 
establish a definite link between International law and EC law.
First, and most importantly, the EC is at base yet another agreement 
40between states. Second, despite its many novel features, the EC 
still confirms closely in structure to an International law model, 
e.g. a major EC institution, the Council, as ECJ Judge Pescatore 
stated, "remains, from the point of view of its legitimacy, within the 
traditional framework of inter-state relations"
Third, the Community, as an entity, conducts its external
relationships under the rules of International law. Fourth, it is
believed that, as in International law, despite the existence of
Institutions, states are important subjects under the EC law. The
father of Europe, Jean Monnet, was of the opinion that the EG was
42concerned with relations between people. This, as will be argued
later, is a correct theoretical viewpoint but, at this early stage of
EC existence, states have an undue importance in Community
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affairs
The last statement leads directly to the fifth point, the evolution of 
EC law. Unlike Municipal laws which have evolved slowly and 
spasmodically over a long period of time, EC law has, relatively 
speaking, suddenly been created whole. It therefore resembles 
International law both in its origins and in its lack of maturity and 
development.
At this point it could be said that a close link between International 
law and EC law has been established. There is however, a further 
more subjective point to make. It is that International law, not 
Municipal law is the basis of European Community law.
It is suggested that EC law is a positive sign of the continuing 
development of International law. EC law should be seen, not as a 
Municipal law system writ large, but as an advanced sub-group of 
International law and as the logical progression of inter-state 
relationships. Vis a vis Municipal law, International law is the 
base, Municipal law the superstructure of EC law.
The seven statements of Schwartzenberger are now individually analysed 
for their relevance to EC law. The first was that "they enabled the
:
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Section 5 - The Theoretical Impact of GP on Community Law 
Having established the basic position as regards International law and 
Community law, the theoretical impact of GP on Community law will now 
be examined. As stated previously, Schwartzenberger’s statement is 
used as his was the deepest appreciation of the nature of GP.
Further, there are similarities in the way GP entered the respective 
systems. In both International and EC law, GP existed before any 
statutory confirmation (save Article 215 EEC) but Article 38(c) and 
Article 164 and 173 EEC serve as positive confirmation of the fact 
that GP are a source of law.
'I
5.
'Court to replenish, without subterfuge, the rules of International law 
by principles of law tested within the shelter of more mature and 
closely integrated legal systems". This sentence could be, with the 
exception of the words International law, wholly appropriate to use of 
GP in EC law. There is an interesting point in that Schwartzenberger 
seems to imply that before the advent of Article 38(c) the Court did 
use GP, or some similar device, to replenish the rules with 
subterfuge.
I
I:
"They opened a channel through which concepts of natural law could be 
received into International law". This is also a possibility in EG 
law, though the mention of natural law clouds the issue somewhat. As 
stated in Chapter II, it is not necessary to hold a natural law
position in order to uphold various tenets of natural law. Therefore
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this second statement could read that GP open a channel for various
fundamental values e.g. fundamental human rights, to enter EC law and
44thus provide a link between EC law and society.
The third statement, holding out a set of rules for adoption by other 
judicial institutions, has little relevance for EC law. By contrast, 
the fourth dictum is of importance, "they made it possible for the 
world Court to strike out a bolder line in its application of 
International law then, in the absence of such wide reserve powers the 
Court might have found it possible to take". In other words, the ECJ
by dint of GP has great freedom of action, which freedom it can
legitimately utilise to produce "bold" decisions. This statement, if 
correct, gives a possible answer to any criticism of unathorised 
judicial legislation. Several so called bold or dynamic macro case 
decisions of the ECJ will later be examined in depth. While it will
always remain a matter of judgment as to whether any decision
over-reaches its limits and becomes judicial legislation, it is 
important to note that by dint of GP entering the EC legal order, the 
Court acquires a certain amount of freedom of action.
The fifth statement, that GP prevent failure of adjudication through 
non liquet is also applicable in EC law. The sixth, referring to 
classification of nations is irrelevant. The final statement, 
however, is of interest, "Finally they threw out a challenge to the 
Doctrine of International law to sail into new and unchartered seas". 
This, it is believed, is the natural counterpart to item four. That 
gave, or legitimised, the power of the Court. This gives that power a
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definite direction. It stems from an understanding both of the nature 
of GP and the nature of law. As Chapter II demonstrates rules alone 
cannot contain the means, at any given time, to deal with all 
unforeseen situations. General principles can best express this 
abstract side of law and are sufficiently elastic to encompass all 
possible fact situations for any given principle. This means that 
case law involving GP is capable of dealing with unique situations and 
thus, as Schwartzenberger noted may go in a new direction. These
cases may thus help give a definite shape to EC law.
Taking all five relevant statements together it can be said that GP 
have great theoretical potential for EC law, that, through their use 
in case law they are capable of affecting every part of EC law from
the most prosaic to the most vital.
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Section 6
4The Implications of International Law and 
ICJ Practice for EG Law and ECJ Practice
As to the comparative law search the EC has a limited number of 
members states. Furthermore, these states share a common legal 
tradition. In consequence, there is no particular difficulty as 
regards the ECJ’s search for GP from the municpal traditions of the 
MS.
I
Regarding GP from other sources, the search is limited to one legal 
system at a time, usually in a specific area e.g. USA anti-trust law.
With the increase in EG membership, Greece in 1980 and Portugal, Spain 
and Gyrpus proposed, extracting GP may become more difficult but 
overall it is not a problem that should inhibit use of GP in EC law.
■The second problem, areas of law outwith the ambit of the ECJ is of 
little relevance to the EC. In general there are few areas, and these 
of little import, where the ECJ and therefore the use of GP is 
excluded.
1The third problem related to the weakness of the ICJ, the lack of any 
real authority to enforce its judgments, the distrust of its 
judgments (and of the ICJ itself) by states and its lack of prestige 
as an International institution. As to judicial authority, it is here 
that the most radical difference between the ICJ and the ECJ occurs, >
the latter has jurisdiction in all judicial matters over all EC
2'22
87 -
EG law.
relations machinery, manifested in the GP of sovereignty. It should 
therefore be asked if the GP of sovereignty has any disruptive, or 
potentially disruptive, effects on EC law. In theory the answers 
should be no for it is believed that the whole institutional structure 
of EC law was conceived with the idea of inhibiting the power of the 
state vis a vis EC institutions. However, the first 25 years of EC
subjects including states. This fact should be the end of worries 
over this matter and might seem to overcome the last problem of GP in
It has been previously noted however, that the above problem faced by 
the ICJ had a root cause, the backwardness of states’ external
I
existence have provided powerful evidence to show that this idea has 
not been fully realised. The main areas of this dissertation deal
fully with the reasons for this but various factors may be noted here; 
the growing power of the Council; the dubious innovation of the 
European Council; the Luxembourg Accords. All these things suggest 
that the EC, far from advancing, is reverting to a more normal 
inter-state agreement.
Thus, the GP of sovereignty seems a disruptive factor within the
-
Community. If so, it is also a dynamic factor that acts against the 
ECJ and to some extent, as will be seen, is acted against by the ECJ.
•M
'Ï
%I
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CHAPTER IV - NOTES
1. Public International law will be referred to as International law 
tbrougout this dissertation.
2. D.D, Raphael, "Problems of Political Philosophy", (1976), p. 54 
"We may therefore define the state as an association designed 
primarily to maintain order and security, exercising universal 
jurisdiction within territorial boundaries, by means of law backed 
by force and recognised as having sovereign authority".
3. Gerhard Von Glahn, "Law Among Nations", (3rd edition, 1976), pp. 
3-4. Von Glahn gave several definitions of International law, his 
own being that "International law is a body of principles, customs 
and rules that are recognised as effectively binding obligations 
by sovereign states and other international persons in their 
mutual relations". A sample of some other versions he quoted are 
E. de Vattel, "The Law of Nations is the science of rights which 
exist between nations and states, and of the obligations 
corresponding to these rights". Hackworth, "International law 
consists of a body of rules governing the relations between 
states".
Finally, the definition of Abba Eban ex-Israeli Ambassador, it is 
suggested underlines the aptness of the proverb, "there's many a 
true word spoken in jest". "International law is the law which 
the wicked do not obey and the righteous do not enforce".
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one's mind a multiplicity of definitions covering the subject at
Mosher "General Principles of Law and the U.N. Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights" 1978, 27 ICLQ pp. 596-613, which attempts to 
bring individual human rights within the ambit of states which 
have not ratified treaties guaranteeing such rights. GP is the 
vehicle used to support this contention.
concept to require definition. However it is a major point of 
this thesis that SC law and ECJ practice face problems which have 
their origin in International law, eg the problem of sovereignty 
inhibiting progress is faced by both systems of law. By showing 
that International law is moving, however slowly, towards
—
See also P. Jessop, p. 4 "A Modern Law of Nations: An 
Introduction", (1949), "One should always have at the back of
hand in order to prevent oneself from accepting the most obvious".
See also Von Glahn pp. 4-5, The Individual in Relation to
-■iInternational law; George Manner, "The Object Theory of the 
Individual in International Law", 46 AJIL 1952, pp. 428-449.
II
4. An example of the trend is the article by N.K. Havener and S.A.
See also article by G. Manner (fn. 3).
It could be argued that International law is too well known a
affecting individual citizens of states a clear link is
■iestablished between International law and EC law. See later 4
sections of this chapter for further analysis.
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5. See the Vienna Convention of the Law Treaties, 1969. Section 2, 
Reservations on the extent of Reservation; Section 4 Article 34,
"A treaty does not create obligations or rights for a third state 
without its consent.
6. This fact is made clear in many texts on International law e.g. 
J.L. Brierly, "The Law of Nations", (6th edition, 1963), p. 63, 
"Paragraph (c) then introduces no novelty into the system for the 
"general principles of law" are a source to which courts have 
instinctively referred in the past".
Bin Cheng, "General Principles of Law as applied by International 
Courts and Tribunals", (1953), makes a broadly similar statement 
p. 387. See also H. Lauterpacht, "International Law", Volume 1, 
"The General Works", (1970), pp. 75-77.
Havener and Mosher (fn. 4), who collated a variety of sources on 
the point conclude, p. 598 "GP have been overwhelmingly accepted 
as a major source of International law".
7. See Bin Cheng, (fn. 6), Introduction pp. 1-26 for a detailed 
analysis of the meaning of Article 38(c). He lists numerous 
further sources on this point. Further see M. Whitman, vol. 2, 
(1963-1973), p. 90-94. See also F. Kalshoven (Editor), "Essays on 
the Development of the International Legal Order", (1980), in 
particular J.G. Lammers, "GP of Law recognised by Civilised 
Nations", pp. 53-77. See also Lammers p. 53-54 for a
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comprehensive list of sources concerning the meaning of Article 
38(c). An interesting view is that of H. Kelsen who, much against 
the current trend, doubts the validity of Article 38(c). He 
argues Article .38(c) is superfluous, see H. Kelsen, "Principles of 
International Law", (2nd edition), 1966), pp. 539-544.
8. See Michel Virally's article, "The Sources of International law",
pp. 116-174 at p. 144 in Max Sorensen (Editor), "Manual of Public 
International Law", (1968), (hereinafter cited as "Virally").
9. Virally (fn. 8), p. 144.
10. See G, Von Glahn (fn. 3), p. 18, Unlike Von Glahn, the following 
support the natural law view B. Cheng ,(fn. 6), at pp. 1 - 26, W. 
Friedmann, "The Uses of GP in the Development of International
Law", 57 AJIL (1963) pp. 279-299, M. Whiteman (fn. 7), Vol. 1,
pp. 5-8, 21-26 and 90-94.
11. Von Glahn (fn. 3), p. 18. See also Joseph L. Kunz, "Natural Law 
Thinking in the Modern Science of International Law" 55 AJIL 1961, 
pp. 951-958 for a discussion of this topic. See also Von Glahn, 
(fn. 3), Kuntz (fn. 11), Cheng (fn. 6), Friedmann (fn. 10), and 
Whiteman (fn* 7) generally. Von Glahn is against natural law, 
Kuntz is neutral•
12. G.I. Tunkin, "Theory of International Law", (1974), p. 244. See 
also pp. 197-8, p. 202. Tunkin's view is that principles which
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See also Tunkin pp. 195-7, for a survey of various Eastern 
European writers on this point. See also the view of Hans Kelsen 
who "only" considers it "doubtful whether such principles (in
13. Sir Humphrey Waldock, Volume 106 (1962), "Recueil des Cours", 
"General Course on Public International law", p. 39. See also
Law", pp. 54-69, for an analysis of the Customs/GP issue.
14. G.I. Tunkin (fn. 12), pp. 197-8; Waldock (fn. 13), p. 39.
have merely found recognition - albeit generally - in Municipal
legal systems cannot be principles of law in the sense of Article
.38(c) as those former principles cannot be regarded as principles 
of International law. Further the ICJ is only entitled to apply 
principles of law which are also principles of International law 
His reasons for these opinions are based on the fact that Article
.38(1) first sentence exhorts the ICJ to decide disputes "in
accordance with International law" and also on the fact that 
paragraph 1(c) speaks of "the GP of law recognised by civilised 
nations" which he interprets to mean that the principles must be 
recognised by states as "being applicable in International law".
Article 38(c)) common to the legal order of civilised nations 
count at all", pp. 539-540, in H. Kelsen, "Principles of 
International Law" (fn. 7).
Chapter 4, "The Common law of the International Commun!ty-GP of
■I
Î
t
15. See H. Lauterpacht, "The Development of the International Law by 
the international Court", (1958), chapter 9 for examples of cases
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using GP which (as Waldock (fn. 13) p. 58 notes) "may be a little 
ambiguous" (with custom).
16. For further critical comments on the theories of Tunkin see H. 
Waldock (fn. 13) p. 55, pp. 67-68; Virally (fn. 8), p. 147; J.G. 
Lammers (fn. 7), pp. 53-56. Of particular interest is the 
refutation by Lammers (p. 56) of Tunkin's interpretation of the 
sentence "the ICJ whose function is to decide in accordance with 
International Law such disputes as are submitted to it". Article 
38(i) first sentence.
17. R.y. Jennings, "General Course on Principles of International 
Law", pp. 327-600, Recueil de Cours, 1967(11), Volume 121 at p. 
339.
18. Bin Cheng, "The First Twenty Years of the ICJ", The Yearbook of 
World Affairs (1966), pp. 241-257, Comparing the statistics 
overleaf with the cases cited in Cheng's book as involving GP 
shows a relatively small percentage of all ICJ cases involved GP,
Cheng - p. 242,
Contentions and Advisory Proceedings Before the World Court 1920- 
1965.
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PCIJ 1920- ICJ 1945-
No. 1945
%
No. 1965
%
35 100 36 100
19.5 55.7 12 33.3
- — 3 8.3
2 5.7 12 33.3
1 2,9 3 8.3
12.5 35.7 6 16.7
28 100 12 100
1 3.6 -
26 92.8 12 100
1 3.6 —
, work interrupted by War
Contentious Cases submitted 
Leading to Judgment on Merits 
Pending
Found without Jurisdiction 
Found Inadmissible 
Discontinued
Advisory Opinions Requested 
Request Withdrawn 
Delivered 
Refused
PCIJ statute came into force 
1940-45,
19. See Bin Cheng (fn. 6), foreword by G. Schwartzenberger. 
Schwartzenberger stated this in his foreward to Cheng's work,
20. H, Kelsen (fn. 7), pp. 539-544 disagrees with Schwartzenberger's 
implication that the GP will have these theoretical effects 
whether or not the drafters of the clause intended them. He 
argues that the intentions of the framers is relevant e.g. "It is 
doubtful if the framers of the statute really intended to confer 
upon the court such an extraordinary power". (Compare with Ch. VI 
of thesis).
iI
1
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21. Brierly (fn. 6), p. 63.
22. Lauterpacht (fn. 6), p. 75.
23. Lauterpacht (fn. 6) p. 75. See also Brierly, (fn. 6), p. 63, who 
wrote "Its conclusion is important as a rejection of the 
positivist doctrine according to which International law consists 
solely of rules to which states have given their consent".
24. See Bin Cheng (fn. 6), see also Lauterpact (fn. 15'), Chapter 9.
25. B. Cheng (fn. 6), p. 390.
26. W.W. Bishop, "General Course of Public Law", pp. 151-467, Recueil 
de Cours, Volume 115 (1965), at p. 239.
27a Zweigert and Kotz, "An Introduction to Comparative Law", (1977), 
p. 7. "The recognition of such general principles is rendered 
more difficult by the basic differences of attitude betwen the 
capitalist countries of the West and the socialist countries of 
the East on the one hand, and between the developing nations of 
North and South on the other". See also pp. 7-8.
27b The rules of International law governing diplomatic relations are 
the product of long established state practice, state legislative 
practice and judicial decisions of national law. Further this 
branch of law has now been codified to a considerable extent in
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the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Thus it is outwith 
the province of the ICJ. On Diplomatic Law generally see e.g. I. 
Brownlie, "Principles of Public International Law" (3rd Edition, 
1979). p. 345.
28. W. Friedmann (fn. 10), p. 280.
29. Cheng (fn. 6). Waldock (fn. 13), p. 57 concluded also "The Court 
has shown restraint in its recourse to general principles... of 
law". It is contended that a study of the Marshall Supreme Court 
cases also shows this restrained use of GP ~ See Chapters VI and 
Chapter VIII a fuller explanation.
30. Lyndel V. Prott, "The Latent Power of Culture and the 
International Judge", (1973), p. 67. He cites the following cases 
as examples. The relevant defiant States are given in brackets. 
The U.N. Expenses Opinion (France and USSR) : The Corfu Channel 
Case (Albania) : The South West Africa and Namibia Opinions (South 
Africa).
31. L.V. Prott (fn. 30), p. 67. Also see pp. 100-110 where the
reasons for such poor performance are explored. On p. 108 he
quotes the President of the ICJ who stated, "the full 
.potentialities of the present court have not been explored".
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32. Sir H. Lauterpacht (fn. 6), Section 28, pp. 94-98, "The Problem of
Completeness of the Sources of International Law".
33. Brierly (fn. 6), p. 25.
34. Lauterpacht (fn. 6), p. 12. He speaks of International law as
being in "a transient state of immaturity".
35. Lauterpacht (fn. 6), p. 12.
36. A further weakness of International law is the limitation of the 
scope of matters regulated by International law. See again 
Lauterpacht (fn. 6), p. 21. Other deficits of International law 
are the limited scope of the law in general and the lack of 
International Institutions. See again (fn. 6), pp. 11-36.
37. Sir H. Lauterpacht, "The Functions of Law in the International 
Community", (1966), p. 3.
38. Lauterpacht (fn. 37), p. 3. For further information on the nature 
of sovereignty see Chapter VI of this thesis .
39. M. Virally (fn. 8), pp. 144-145.
40. See Chapter V p. 99.
41. Pierre Pescatore, "The Law of Integration", (1974), p. 7.
'42. Jean Monnet, "Memoirs", (1978), see generally part two "A time for 
unity" the chapters on the formation of the EG. As will be argued 
in Chapters V-VI, this was one of the fundamental principles ■Ibehind the EC.
43. See Chapter VI (fn. 126) where former Commission President, Roy 
Jenkins, is quoted "I had no idea of the extent to which I would 
be dependent on influencing national governments rather than 
appealing to European changes".
44. This is a major point for the law of the EC. It is more fully 
dealt with in Chapters V-VIII,
I
4
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: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES - A NEW LEGAL ORDER
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This is done by analysing Article 164 EEC. After such analysis the 
question is asked whether any GP were already present in EC law?
2allotted tasks. They lack the ability to act in all matters not
:s;
CHAPTER V 
“
Section 1 A Restatement of the "newness” of the New Legal Order
.The European Community, somewhat somberly, celebrated twenty-five 
years of existence on 29th March, 1982. It seems almost inevitable 
therefore that the "newness” of the new legal order will have, to some 
degree, been eroded in the minds of many Community subjects. The 
first aim of this Chapter is to re-state, in broad general terms, the 
basic structure and original aims of the EC. The second aim is more
I
specific, to assess the role and power of the ECJ. The final 
objective of chapter V will be to examine the entry of GP into EC law.
sII,What precisely has been created which merits the description of "a new
legal order"? or, to borrow Lord MacKenzie Stuart's phrase, "What is
new about the new legal order"?^ One way of beginning to answer 
.this question is to show what the EC is not. Several arguments have
been advanced to show that the EC is not a state. For example, all EC 
legislative and administrative machinery confine their activity to
specifically included. Further though having armed forces is not a
pre-requisite of statehood it should be noted that the EC has no armed
forces and therefore no direct coercive power.^ The Treaties 
.brought to their logical conclusion and the Luxembourg Accords 
scrapped would not, in the opinion of Lord Mackenzie Stuart, resemble
a federal state,^ Overall therefore, it seems Dagtoglou was correct
Î
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when he wrote, "The EC is neither a superstate, nor a quasi-state, nor 
a federal state".^
In truth, as Chapter IV already noted, the EC is yet another agreement 
between states, in itself a common occurence. Thus it is not the act 
of creation of the EC structure that is original, rather the "newness" 
lies within the Treaties themselves. The EC may be termed a new legal 
order due to the scope, the purpose and the enforcement machinery of 
the Treaties. It is the wide ambit of each of these three factors 
coupled with their collective inter-relationship which, as will now be 
seen, justifies the use of the term "new legal order".
In dealing with these three major aspects of the EC, the logical 
starting point must be the scope of the Treaties. Further, this point 
is also the least complex to illustrate.
At its inception, the EC had six original member states;- The Federal
Republic of West Germany, France, Belgium, Holland, Italy and 
Luxembourg. At present there are ten member states with further
7increases in membership over the next decade almost certain. Even 
with its present membership however, including as it does most of the 
powerful trading nations of Western Europe, the EC comprises the 
world's largest trade area. This, it is contended, justifies the 
first claim of the Treaty having a wide geographical scope.
The second claim, that the EC has a far-reaching purpose, requires for
its justification an examination of the EC Treaties themselves
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and, in particular, the preambles to these Treaties. In fact, it is 
only through analysis of the preambles, that the basic aims of the EC
higher living standards to be achieved through economic activity, a
possible explanation. For this purpose, the following paragraphs set 
out a number of observations as to their nature.
"the common weel", They seem the sort of aims more often found in
religious or philanthropic texts than in inter-state trade
_ 8 agreements,
indeed, any trade at all, there must be peace among European states.
can be found. In short, the Treaties are the means to realise the 
preambles. There are four such aims, peace, prosperity, that is,
m
desire to help the developing nations and finally union, that is, 
unity among the European peoples.
These four aims are, collectively, the purpose of the EC, the basic ^
reasons for which it was founded. As such they require the fullest
■ÎI
The first point is by way of general comment. It is that, all in all, 
they are a remarkable set of aims directed towards what we Scots call
I
The second point to make is that the statements are connected to each 
other, that is, rather than being read as a list, they should be seen 
collectively as inter-related and interdependent. For example one aim 
is to help the Third World. Before any real aid can be given to 
developing nations, Europe itself had to be financially strengthened
and rise from its straightened circumstances of the late 1940's and
■early 1950's. In order to have a flourishing European trade, and
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(Though the presumption that European peace automatically means world 
peace is now outdated, it is obvious that this wider interpretation is 
what the preambles intended).
The third point concerns union. Union is the most complex aim of the 
EEC preamble and the EC as a whole. There are several separate 
statements that can be made as regards union. The first is that it 
could have been left out of the preamble with no apparent loss of 
meaning or purpose for the Treaties. As it exists however and the 
Treaties being legal texts, if it was not inserted as mere decoration, 
then it must have a definite purpose. One possible explanation is 
that it is indeed a form of window dressing, that is, a general 
statement of intent that is not meant to be seen as a serious aim in 
itself. Another explanation is that it was inserted in the preamble 
for a definite, and important purpose. This particular purpose will 
be fully stated and discussed in Chapter VI.
It can be further said of union that it fulfills the purpose of 
binding together, in a written form, all three other aims. This is so 
as the aim of union has the qualities of a circular argument. That 
is, to some extent union among European people must exist, or be 
achieved, in order to allow peace and trade. In turn, peace and 
trade, once achieved may well produce deeper unity among Europeans, 
such unity in turn being the ultimate safeguard of peace between the 
Member States. Finally, if there is peace, prosperity and unity, the 
EC is now in a position to give help to the developing nations. Seen 
in this way, union becomes the key aim of the four. It binds them
'
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together in a cohesive unity.
The fourth point on the nature of the aims of the preambles concerns 
their classification. There are a number of categories that spring to 
mind. Are peace, prosperity, union and the desire to help others, 
values ? Chapter II gave several diverse explanations of values but a 
common part of each definition was that values were ultimate moral 
premises. As such it may be well that all four aims come under the 
umbrella of morals. If so, this would be a rare example of the 
situation where values are directly written into a legal text.
Another classification of the four aims is that they are fundamental 
GP, that is, they are partly values, but at the same time are direct 
links to action. An alternative way of stating this would be to say 
that GP of peace, union, prosperity and helping the developing nations 
are GP very closely linked to their value bases.
A third explanation could be that the four aims are policy statements. 
While, as stated previously in Chapter II, it is believed that GP and 
policies are very similar, this is not to say that everyone must 
support this view. For those e.g. Dworkin, who believes GP differ 
from policies this definition is probably the most acceptable,
9particularly so as the aims have definite political overtones.
From the point of view of clarity of definition, this latter 
classification may be the most acceptable of the three.
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However, as Chapter II noted, it is the case that any single objective
;
definition of values, principles and policies is fraught with 
difficulties and also of doubtful worth. If so then the above should 
be seen as complementary rather than contradictory definitions.
validity, but rather that examination of the cases shows the ECJ 
believes the aims to have legal force *
The fifth point is that, having said that the aims are either values, 
GP or policies, or indeed all three, it is believed that they also
serve the function of explaining and/or justifying the law of the EC.
The explanation part of their function on reading the rules of the 
Treaties seems clear. This leaves justification.
■
Once again this is a subjective matter. Speaking personally, it is 
believed that all four aims have strong moral overtones and as such do 
justify the rules of EC law. As the earlier statement on the aims 
noted, aims that contribute to the "common weel" have moral overtones. I
I
The sixth point to make on the aims is that they also function as 
concept words, that is, they help to express the abstract ideas of 
European Community law.
The seventh statement comes in the form of a question. Have the 
preambles, and therefore the aims contained within them, legal force? 
The answer is an unequivocal yes. As will be seen in Chapter VI the 
EEC preamble has been specifically referred to by the ECJ in various 
cases. This is not to say such action gives the preamble legal
!
1
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Further, a recent article on the legal force of the EEC preamble 
stated unequivocally, "It is widely accepted that the preamble has an 
important significance for interpretation of the Treaty".
Finally, on this point the relevant article, Article 31(2), in the 
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties declares, "for the purpose of 
the interpretation of a treaty, the context shall comprise, in 
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes". Thus the 
real question is this; How much influence the preambles, through 
their interpretation by the ECJ, have had upon the development of the 
EC? This question is answered in Chapter VI,
The eighth and final point concerning the preambles leads directly to
an examination of the Treaties themselves. By themselves, the aims 
outlined in the preambles are too vague to be attained by an 
International agreement. Thus, in order for their wide purpose to be 
achieved, far reaching yet detailed provisions are needed. Thus the 
well known concrete aims of the EC as set out in Article 3 EEC come in 
at this juncture. Though still of a general nature such statements 
are specific enough to give rise to the many detailed rules which 
comprise the Treaties, which in turn allows positive institutional 
action to commence.
The final justification of the treaties being a new legal order is in
the effectiveness of their enforcement provisions. It has been shown
that the EC has a broad scope. In order for the EC to succeed in its 
purpose which is, in its way, unique, enforcement machinery must be 
more effective that it has been in previous International agreements.
I
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representativity, apart from the principle of representation of States
r,. 11were the Commission, the Assembly and the ECJ'
The statement by ECJ judge Pescatore, shows that this has in fact been saachieved. Pescatore wrote that "this was another departure from 
tradition. The EC structure introduced new principles of
■s
:
■
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Section 2 The ECJ
It is this latter Institution, being the main subject of this 
dissertation, that is now examined. There are four major points to 
examine. First, to acknowledge that the ECJ exists. Second, to find 
why it was created. Third, to find what it was meant to do and 
fourth, to examine what it actually does do.
This fourth point is dealt with in Chapter VI. The first three are 
now examined.
"The most remarkable thing about the ECJ is that it is there at 
12all". This statement by ECJ judge Donner, superficially
simplistic, is in fact one of the most profound ever written on the -
ECJ, Until the creation of a court as an Institution, the norm had
been that agreements between states were governed by International
law. The Vienna Convention dictated that the contracting parties
should at all times be free to amend the rules, disputes being settled
by such means as political negotiation, arbitration, the ICJ or an ad 
13hoc commission. The provision of a court for what it is, at base, 
a system of International integration in specific economic spheres is 
more noteworthy, in its way, than the setting up of the agreement 
itself.
There are several possible answers as to why the ECJ was set up.
These answers are probably linked. In such a complex undertaking, to 
ensure any real progress the law involved had to be given greater
The role of the Court can be construed from the provisions set out for 
the ECJ of the ECSC (Chapter IV Articles 31-45) in 1950. The ECJ was
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respect than was usual in inter state agreements. Many potential 
disputes might arise. Authoritative and speedy settlement of such 
disputes was required. The GP of sovereignty, which in International 
law resulted in the ICJ being given little power and also in lack of 
respect for its judgments, had to be dealt with. Finally, the 
tradition of continental Municipal legal systems gave the principle of 
legal control an important place in these systems. This principle can 
be expressed thus, where there is an administrative authority with 
power to take decisions affecting individual interests control of that 
authority is exercised by an independent tribunal.
The transference of the principle to EC law and its realisation in the 
foundation of the ECJ is clear. In fact, study of the Schuman 
Declaration and also the work of legal theorists, for example ECJ 
judge Lord MacKenzie-Stuart reveals the principle of legal control at 
the core of theoretical thinking behind the ECJ.^^
What is the theoretical role of the ECJ and what power has it been 
15given? As in many aspects of EC law these two facets of the ECJ 
are interdependent. A wide ranging role pre-supposes wide power and, 
vice-versa, giving the court, irrespective of the theoretical confines 
of its role, wide powers pre-supposes it will make full use of them. 
Chapter VI examines this apparently simple but practically complex 
point in more detail.
I
I
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to ensure the functioning of the other institutions. There was to be 
separation of powers. The ECJ was not to usurp the functions of the 
other three Institutions. Members of the Court were to have total
,independence. De La Mahotiere wrote that the Court had four
functions, to ensure judicial control of the other institutions and in
the case of damage by them to ensure redress, to ensure that the
Treaties are correctly implemented by the MS ; and to cooperate with
the national courts in the enforcement of the T r e a t i e s . T a k i n g  an
overall view of the Court's role from the above it seems clear that
ECJ Judge Pescatore was correct when he wrote, "the prime function of
17the ECJ was to be the guardian of the law".
I'
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Section 3 GP in EC law,/Article 164 ESC Analysed
..Article 164 has a dual function, it is the major source of ECJ power;
-it introduces GP into SC law. To deal with the former first it should
be noted that it is no easy matter to interpret Article 164 EEC and
18thus define the powers of the Court.
One problem in reaching an agreed interpretation of Article 164 is the
fact that there are four official languages in which the treaty is
written. No one version is thus definitive. It is, therefore, a
matter of subjective judgement as to what Article 164 means. This
19matter has been the subject of an article by Dowrick. After 
examining all four versions he concluded that the English language 
version was "misleadingly constrictive". He said that Article 164 was 
more than a mandate to the ECJ to apply the provisions of the EC and 
the secondary regulations and directives which the English language 
version "the Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation 
and application of this Treaty the law is observed", seemed to 
suggest.
Instead Dowrick considered the French language version which exhorted 
the Court to "assurer le respect du droit" as closer to the true
meaning. An equivalent English version of Article 164 was also given
by Dowrick. This read that "the Court of Justice shall ensure that
20right is done accordingy to law".
Dowrick's cogent analysis clearly points out the major question at 
issue. Should Article 164 EEC, whatever its language, be regarded as
- Ill
a positive or a negative statement? That is, is it to be seen by the 
Court itself and all other EC subjects only as a mandate to apply 
provisions of EC law or as a dynamic statement shaded so as to impose 
a positive duty on the Court to do what it believes is right according 
to law.
A contentious possibility is that the Court may interpret the 
statement one way and its clients interpret it in the opposite way.
Bearing in mind the continental legal tradition best seen in French 
law of active judicial interpretation by use of GP and also the 
dynamic aspects of EC law, it is probable that the ECJ will see 
article 164 much as Dowrick's interpretation of the French language 
version. Chapter VI will show if this theory is borne out in ECJ 
practice.
The second major point of interest in Article 164 is that it is the
vehicle through which GP come into EC law. In this it serves European
Community law in much the same fashion as Article 38(c) in
International law. Save for Article 215 EEC which expressly mentions
GP and Article 173 EEC which implies them, the ECJ is not otherwise
directed to apply GP of law* It is well known that the word "law" in
21Article 164 has been interpreted to mean more than written law.
By this inclusion of unwritten law in such a definition, the law is 
open to many theoretical implications, one of which is the concept GP 
of law. The word "law" in Article 164 can therefore be considered the 
major artery through which GP flow into the body of the EC.
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As with Article 38(c), Article 164 is merely the written confirmation
rather than the initiator of GP in EC laws * It cannot be said that,
had Articles 164, 173 and 215 been differently worded, general
principles would not have entered EC law. The first paragraphs of
Chapter V stated that GP were embodied in the Treaties’ preambles. An
analysis by Van der Groeben has shown that GP are implicit in the body 
22of the Treaty. Further new^GP, misnamed GP of Community law, have
23emerged through the cases. This argument can be summed up by the 
view of Hartley who wrote, "there can be little doubt that the Court
would have applied them (GP) even if none of the Treaty provisions had
4 24existed •
■i
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Section 4 - Conclusions
Chapter IV gave a projected idea of the theoretical importance of GP
to EC Law. Having stated the prime constituents of the new legal
order, and also the point of entry of GP into that order, this can now
be up-dated. As Chapters III and IV showed, the role of GP changes
according to the basic traits of the individual legal system. For EG
law it is believed that as well as GP entering the system through
Article 164, they are already deeply ingrained in the very fabric of
EG law. This is so for two reasons the structure of EG law itself,
the fact that GP are an accepted part of the structure of MS legal
orders. Lord MacKenzie Stuart seemed to echo this when he wrote that,
"from the outset it was envisaged that the treaties would be operated
in accordance with certain basic principles recognised by the Member 
25States". An equally relevant statement was made in 1970 by 
Advocate General Dutheillel de Lamothe who said during an ECJ case, 
these principles "contribute to forming that philosophical, political 
and legal substratum common to the Member States from which through 
the case law, an unwritten Community law emerges
Thus having discovered GP, they are now found to be all around us. It
is almost impossible to state the importance not so much of the
discovery but of its implications. Scwartzenberger’s statement,
coupled with the observations on the aims of the preamble and GP
contained in the treaty mean that GP have a range of possibilities in
EC law from filing gaps to shaping the bases of the law. To misquote
Lord Denning, "GP are like an incoming tide. They flow up into the
27estuaries and up the rivers. They cannot be held back".
i
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Law", (The Hamlyn Lectures, 29th series 1977), p. 14.
2. See case 9/69 Sayag v Leduc (1969) E.C.R. 329, generally and
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1978, p. 629 on. See also pp. 646-647, It is his translations 
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Chamber at the Court of Justice), "Methods of Interpretation as 
seen by a Judge at the Court of Justice", pp, 5-50 at p. 11-12. 
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has shown that the SEC Treaty contains certain substantive norms ||
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Rights and Freedoms. See "Uber das Problem der Grundrechte in der 
europaischen Gemeinschaft in Problems des europaischen Rechts," in 
"Festschrift fur Walter Hallstein", (1969), pp. 226 et sequetra.
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23. See Chapter VI for examples of new GP arising through the medium 
of Community law. See again the quote by Cheng in Chapter II of 
the thesis "It is of no avail to ask whether these principles are 
GP of International law or Municipal law for it is precisely the 
nature of these principles that they belong to no particular 
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I
■I
CHAPTER VI ; THE CONCEPTION, APPLICATION AND FUNCTIONS OF GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES IN THE PRACTICE OF THE ECJ
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_________________SECTION 1 SPIRIT OF THE LAW
The present chapter deals with the main subject matter of this thesis, 
the use by the ECJ of GP of law, and as such constitutes the core of 
this thesis «
These points also indicate one necessity for Chapter VI - the need for
The chapter deals with the following:- how the Court arrives at an 
overall view of its duty, how it transforms this philosophic attitude 
into a form concrete enough to apply to cases, the dynamics of the ECJ 
practice, that is, the practical problems the Court confronts in the
What has preceded in the foregoing chapters is but a preparation for 
what follows. Regarding this chapter, there are several noteworthy
points, its importance to this thesis and to Community law in general, 
the relatively wide scope of subject matter it embraces, and its 
length.
t
a clear and systematic presentation of the material contained within.
pursuit of its duty and the case law (both macro and micro) of the 
Court relating the GP, A methodological point to note is that this 
material follows a definite pattern. It starts at broad theoretical 
generalisations and goes through to concrétisation and subsequent 
transformation of theory into practice in the cases involving GP.
The first part of this chapter deals with the so-called judicial 
attitude or schema which, it is claimed, the Court has in mind before 
it deals with any particular case. This schema is seen as being more
Ï
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intellectual speculation"*^ Further, as Supreme Court Justice 
Felix Frankfurter, noted "judges cannot free themselves from the
chapter that certain judgments of the ECJ can be best explained with
might tacitly admit to a schema of sorts but which denies it follows 
the one that will be outlined here. Such an argument is, of course,
than a crude self-opinionated collective set of prejudices by which 
the Court predetermines a case. In fact, it will be shown to be a
deeply philosophical, highly abstract attitude and construction of the 
mind that, while constantly in mind, is actually applied only 
occasionally and then with subtlety and discretion.
Before going into this subject more deeply, it is acknowledged that 
the Court may well say it has no such attitude at all. However, to 
quote Mann, "judicial interpretation cannot avoid a certain amount of
'..fi
- " ' ï ' i
responsibility of the inevitable effect of their opinions in
2
constructing or promoting the force of law".
Taking these statements together, it could be said that it is the 
legal and moral duty of the judges to attempt to foresee the effect of
their judgments. Further, it is equally their moral duty to promote
such "effects” as they think best for the good of whatever community
they are duty bound to serve. In brief, the judges of the ECJ ought 
3to have a policy. Further it will be shown in the course of this
■J
reference to a consistent ECJ viewpoint.
Of more relevance would be a possible argument by the Court which
I
,unanswerable. It is not claimed that what follows is the attitude of
ÏI
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the ECJ but only that it may be one possible explanation of ECJ action 
involving use of GP in cases since the inception of the Court, that is 
during the last quarter century.
It could be said that the ECJ is in fact several Courts living in one 
body, that is, it may function as the occasion demands as a 
constitutional Court, a private Court and a Court of final appeal. In 
dealing with an assessment of the overall duty of the Court, that is, 
how one subjectively believes the Court sees and carries out its 
definitive role, the Court most closely resembles a constitutional 
Court. This mode of ECJ existence forms the central core, both of 
this Chapter and this thesis. In this sense it is suggested that the 
Court has done more than deal with cases as they arrive. In fact, the 
Court has worked out some sort of philosophical framework or schema 
which it consistently uses when appropriate cases arise with due 
regard to the essential necessity of elaborating the initially broadly 
drafted EC law in the three treaty texts. Due to the fact that the 
Court is collegiate and that no individual judicial opinions are 
published in cases, such a notion is, at best, speculative. 
Nevertheless, as it is believed that such a schema does in fact exist, 
and also that it is of great importance in understanding the work of 
the ECJ with regard to GP, the following pages will try to establish 
this framework.
Before doing so however, it should be noted that, in constructing such 
a framework, the Court is doing no more than its duty. If Dowrick's 
interpretation of Article 164 is correct, then in order to do right
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according to law, the Court must actively seek the spirit of the 
4law. In practice, in a new legal order, this is translated into 
seeking and evaluating the fundamental GP, or indeed the values behind 
them, of EC law.
purpose in the treaties is a result of imperfection in the law as 
written... its roots however go much deeper. They lie in the very
As noted in Chapter III, new ideas or institutions do not arise 
completely out of nothingness. The first point to note, therefore, is 
that the basic idea of some form of European unity is centuries 
old.^
A quote by Mann accurately sums up the situation, "The search for
nature of law as a normative order with real but unrealised and only
5vaguely ascertainable ideals". It is exactly "those vaguely 
ascertainable ideals" that the Court searches for. They are found not
only in the Treaties themselves, but in the manifold fact situations 
that preceded the foundation of the EC.
What were the reasons behind the foundation of the new legal order? A 
comprehensive answer to this question would be interesting but it 
would have to be very extensive and detailed. It is, however, 
possible to give a summary account of historical, political and other 
causes, i.e. ten relevant factors which, combined, offer a 
satisfactory answer. In what follows below, ten reasons are mentioned 
and explained individually. Save for a loose chronological order, no 
other significance attaches to the order of their presentation.
1
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"V.
The second reason is the GP of national sovereignty. More precisely
it is the decline of national feeling among the European peoples and 
the relative impotence of bureaucracies or national institutions to 
re-create such ideas after World War II. To give a fuller explanation 
of this important factor in the creation of the EC, Spinnelli noted 
that during and after the 1914-1918 War, national sovereignty was on 
the upsurge.^ No state, save for the Hapsburg Empire had lost its
the state and crowds came to listen".
institutions were still relatively unstable and, on their own, 
practically incapable of solving post-war difficulties. Nationals of 
these states already embittered against their countries by war thus 
lost further respect for the GP of sovereignty.
■4?
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sovereignty. The result of the war was, in fact, a re-affirmâtion 
among the citizens of Europe in the ideal of the nation state. This 
belief, strengthened and glorified by the twin idealogies of communism 
and fascism reached such a pitch that powerful leaders such as Lenin, 
Mussolini and Hitler "called for the continuation and enhancement of
*
The support of the European people for the GP of national sovereignty 
declined sharply due to the third cause of European unity, the Second 
World War. In this conflict, all states save the United Kingdom and
9neutrals suffered defeat at some stage. Further, among the peoples
of Europe, there had been seen a new phenomena, a large scale ignoring 
of national loyalties in order to fight alongside former enemies.
After the war, despite regaining formal sovereignty, national
I
-
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A fourth reason was that, due to their war enfeebled conditions, the 
national institutions lacked the power and the will to adhere to, or 
promote, the GP of sovereignty. In normal times it is these 
bureaucracies that have a major interest in maintaining this GP.
The fifth reason was the post-war rise of Catholic inspired political 
parties in Western Europe. At the time the Catholics were, as 
Spinelli put it, "the least imbued with a nationalistic point of 
view".
Sixth, the politicians who were then responsible for shaping French, 
German and Italian foreign policy were not exponents of national 
sovereignty.^
The seventh and eighth factors were the states of the USSR and the 
USA. A further result of World War II had been that the centre of 
world politics shifted from Europe towards these two nations. Thus, 
being the new dominant force in the world, their aims and actions had, 
and have, a direct effect on Western Europe.
Soviet actions in Eastern Europe had two distinct effects. They 
encouraged the idea of European unity among Western nations. They 
were a factor in persuading the United States, which adhered to the 
idea of European unity, to offer direct encouragement to Europe in the 
form of the Marshall Plan.
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practical terns) of German sovereignty.
fundamental principles or values contained in the preambles of the 
Treaties in a clearer light, and allow a subjective evaluation to be 
made of them.
S3
The Marshall Plan is the ninth factor. It was intended to be the 
means of re-organising the European economy so as to provide a solid 
foundation for the re-born democracies.
The tenth and final factor was the problem of The Federal Republic of 
West Germany. Some form of European unity provided the solution to a 
variety of problems concerning that state. Unity re-established 
German respectability in Europe and enabled that nation to retain its 
sovereignty but under a definite, and restrictive institutional 
framework. With Germany as part of Europe, both a concerted European
.
Economic Community and European Defence Community became viable.
Finally, as regards The Federal Republic of West Germany, the EC 
allayed French doubts and fears regarding the re-establishment (in
I
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: !While there were many more factors, of greater or lesser importance, 
which contributed to the formation of the EC, the ten factors given 
above may be viewed as forming the central core of historical forces 
moving in the direction of European integration.
.What can be deduced from the above points? In particular, what 
relation do they bear to the preambles of the Treaties? Some comments 
may now be made as regards the causes of the EC, which will show the
H.Î
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The ten fact statements given above should be seen as belonging to two 
distinct groups. The first "group", for want of a better word, 
comprises the first statement. The second, statements two to ten.
The latter "group" is dealt with first.
One characteristic of these fact-situations is that they are all of a
dynamic nature, that is, they arose and crystalised over a short 
period of time. As such they continue to remain fluid, i.e. continue 
to evolve. A further noteworthy fact is that all the problems 
mentioned were short term difficulties requiring immediate short terra 
solutions. Two problems in particular stand out.
There was an urgent need for Europe to rebuild its economic base.
Once this had been achieved, the next challenge was long term; how to
maintain that prosperity. The second problem was peace. It might
seem that peace is not a short term problem but rather a question of 
long term maintenance. However, using the word "peace" as a concept 
word to include not only lack of open warfare but also lack of Cold 
War tension with Eastern Europe and latent hostility and bitterness 
among the European states themselves, it becomes a short term
achievement. Once this tension (a prime cause of war) had abated,
then maintenance of the new situation becomes a long term aim.
Seen thus, for the governments of the Member States, the GP or values
peace and prosperity are taken up as short terra political solutions to
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short term national problems. Once achieved, the maintenance of these 
conditions might be viewed by states as a national rather than a 
supranational task.
The former group, the idea or ideal of European Union corresponds 
directly to the GP or value "union" in the preambles. This can be 
viewed in a distinctly different fashion. It should be noted that 
this group is not in the Treaties’ preambles for any of the above 
reasons. In fact, it is questionable if it was backed by governments 
at all.^^
The term, union, unlike the preceding statements is not a stop gap 
solution to European and world problems but represents a long term 
philosophic idea or ideal. Though the actual words in the EC preamble 
were taken from the UN charter, the factor of union being a GP or 
value makes its precise wording relatively unimportant. Its major 
import (as Judge Donner said of the SCJ), is that it is there at 
all.
Union is a GP of great historical and intellectual depth.
In 1600, the King of France, Henry of Navarre, together with his 
Minister Sully, set up, between 1600 and 1607 a permanent committee of 
the fifteen leading Christian states of Europe. This body was to act 
as an arbiter on questions of religious conflict, national frontiers,
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internal disturbance and common action against the Turks. This, the 
Grand Design was, according to Winston Churchill, the beginning of the 
idea of a United Europe.
In 1798 the philosopher Jeremy Bentham, wrote that European unity is
15positively in the interests of the people. This line has been
broadly followed by intellectuals such as Immanuel Kant, the Compte de
lÔ 3.Saint Simon, and August Compte. Also Proudhon, for example, in 
"Du Principe Federatif" in 1863 prophesied "the twentieth century will 
open the era of federation, or humanity will begin a purgatory of a 
thousand y e a r s " . F u r t h e r  Antone de Saint Exupery stated that 
"Man’s finest profession was that of uniting men".
The twentieth century has seen the continuation of this ideal, 
particularly in the writings, and more importantly, in the deeds of 
Jean M o n n e t . Monnet and other 20th century federalists injected 
this principle .or value into the EC Treaties and the various documents 
that preceded it.
This principle union gives a moral and intellectual base to the EC.
It is the complement of the principles of peace and prosperity which 
give a legal and political base to the EC.
This statement that union is the moral and intellectual base of the 
EC, or (more accurately), that EG law has a strong moral and 
intellectual derivation was clearly understood by the leading 
statesmen of the time. For example, while discussing the Shuman Plan
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with Monnet, the German Chancellor, Adenauer stated, "this project is
19a matter of the highest importance: it is a matter of morality”
f
The President of the United States, Eisenhower, said, "the real
problem's a human one. What Monnet's proposing is to organise
20relations between people and I’m all for it".
In evaluating the history of the EC, it is believed that the 
importance of this moral and intellectual idea is under-estimated by
the European peoples in general and also by many of their government
.officials who took office after the early fifties. It could be argued 
that since the idea of union was not a direct and immediate cause of 
EC formation, it should be discounted. Such an argument, though 
popular, is incorrect. No intellectual idea can by itself become law.
-It requires a political act of will. It is correct to say that the
idea was not the immediate cause of the EC but incorrect to assume
that it therefore has little relevance to the developing Community.
■
Seen as a GP or as a value it is of little point to try and give a
1
definitive exposition of union. It is submitted however, that it has
the following characteristics. Union attempts to do the maximum good
21for the maximum number of people. Union stands for two basic
interrelated concepts, union among states and union among peoples. It
is submitted that, as the philosophers quoted previously wrote (or
implied) the attainment of union is the highest ideal of humanity.
This is so as the realisation of this GP or value would constitute a
definitive step beyond International law which, as Chapter IV noted,
'
is at present mainly concerned with relations among states. It would ■ :
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it clearly encapsulates the universal, that is, it goes beyond 
national boundaries.
in fact be the realisation of the phrase gena un summus (we are one 
family). If so then it would, it is hoped, change the way citizens of 
one state think of citizens of another state. From seeing fellow 
human beings who belong to a different state as strangers and 
potential enemies we may come to think of them as fellow members of a 
trans-national society. The implications of such a change in human 
perception are so vast as to be almost frightening. At the very least 
peace and renewed efforts to eliminate poverty would result. Further 
such a community would serve as an example to the outside world that 
sovereignty is not the only GP worthy of consideration when deciding 
how to live.
Thus the GP is concerned both with the good of the individual and the 
state. (The state however, in order to conform to the concept, must
■g
weaken its GP of sovereignty.) Union therefore is a GP or value, 
basically moral and to a lesser extent legal and political. Further
Overall therefore, it is a GP which has the power to inspire not only 
acceptance but positive action on its behalf by all European citizens.
The GP of union, it is submitted, is recognised and given its true
• :weight, as regards its importance to the EC by the ECJ. There are 
several reasons to support this view. First, as stated, the GP or 
value of union is the moral and intellectual backbone of the law.
Second, it is the only fundamental GP or value of the preambles that
:g
3:;
5
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notions of peace or general prosperity or helping the developing world
Having stated that the Court sees its duty as giving support to the GP
ECJ will consider the individual its most important potential client. 
Rather it is believed the ECJ sees its highest loyalty as being to the 
EC (as an entity) itself. This is so as the Court is guardian of the 
Treaties, that is, its duty is to protect the Treaties not try to 
prematurely apply their highest, as yet unrealised ideals.
the judge can consistently apply to fact situations* It seems 
impossible, in any practical sense, for the ECJ to apply the abstract
22in a case. As this chapter will demonstrate, it is possible to
I!
apply union in a practical form. By doing so, as Chapter V showed, 
all the other preamble principles are indirectly upheld.
Third, it is contended that no other principle, borrowed from any 
legal system, so perfectly fits the idea of guardian of the law. By 
upholding the value of union, the Court thus fulfils its primary
■-
constitutional function of protecting the law, and thus the EC itself,
It is this basic attitude, protection of the Community by protection 
of union that the Court brings to cases.
i':
union it should be noted that this statement does not mean that the
'I,
I
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Section 2 - Integration
Having argued that the ECJ has, as its primary duty, the upholding of 
the GP or value of union, it can now be demonstrated as to how this 
mental, abstract philosophy can be transformed into action. Union 
could well be seen to be a value rather than a GP for it is suggested 
that it is too broad to be used in the majority of fact situations, 
that is, for most cases the terms of its applicability are, in any 
practical sense, indefinable. The solution is to use instead the GP 
that is most closely associated with this value, that acts as the 
bridge between union and the Treaties. The GP that, on study of the 
Treaties and of the concept union, best performs this role is the GP 
of integration. If integration is seen as the correct principle to 
use, then it becomes, in effect, the key concept of the new legal 
order. As such it requires the most searching analysis.
This is done in the following manner. First, a general analysis of 
integration is given. Second, the question, what is the level of 
support that is given in theory and practice by the ECJ for this GP? 
is answered. In the course of this, the concept itself is further 
explained.
Before undertaking these tasks, however, the query implicit in these 
statements must be answered. Does the ECJ actually support 
integration at all?
There seems ample evidence to show that it does. Many writers on 
European Community law have made an examination of ECJ case law over
I;
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long periods of time and have come to roughly similar conclusions.
Bredimas stated, "It has acted as an integrating institution as well
23as the only integrated one". Prott wrote, "This court seriously
,values its role as an integrator, and that where several solutions may
be juristically possible, it continuously chooses the decision that
24will operate to enhance the Community’s integration". Opperman’s 
.investigation of ECJ jurisprudence revealed, "evidence of the
inclination of the European Court to act as a factor of integra­
lstion" The writings of Scheingold and Axline also confirmed the 
pro-integration attitude of the ECJ.^^
Possibly more relevant are the writings of the judges and advocate
generals. Examination of the works of Donner, Kutscher and Pescatore 
and also Advocate General Lagrange, an author of the Treaties, show 
that integration has been a priority of ECJ case law. ^ As 
Kutscher noted "The Court's methods of interpretation and its decided 
cases can be described as leaning in favour of integration". I
.What is integration? A general definition is given by the Oxford 
.English Dictionary which says that "integration is the combination of 
.parts into a whole" and "union" is a whole resulting from the 
combination of parts or members". As regards Community law,
integration is a fundamental GP of the new legal order derived from 
.the Treaties themselves. It is dynamic in that it requires constant
movement towards a goal. As a GP integration, being implicit in the 
.Treaties , is the essence of the spirit rather than the letter of the ....
■:
■ i
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Possibly, the major point about integration is that, as a GP, it must 
defy any attempt at total and exhaustive explanation. Thus, for EC 
law instead of attempting to define integration it may Instead be more 
accurate to say that, given a certain core of meaning to integration 
(stated above) it has, radiating out from this core, many shades of 
meaning of which each, or indeed all, is or are relevant at some point 
in EC existence.
The second analysis, of how much support the ECJ gives to integration, 
is structured after this fashion, that is, integration is split for 
this purpose into three overlapping categories of meaning, political, 
economic and defensive. Both individually and collectively these 
categorisations become, at times, the ultimate aim of the Community 
and also the means to an ultimate EC aim.
The survey that follows, dealing with the level of support the ECJ 
gives to political, economic and defensive integration deals with 
approximately the quarter century of ECJ existence, that is, its 
statements reflect theory and practice over that period of time.
By including some political content in the meaning of integration, can
it be assumed that the ultimate aim or purpose of the EC is that it
28culminates in some kind of Federation of European States? As the
previous chapter stated, both Lord HacKenzie Stuart and Professor
29Dagtoglou doubted that this was the case. It is contended that 
their arguments, that if all Treaty provisions were fulfilled, no
federal structure would exist are correct in so far as they go, but 
fail to take account of all the implications within the Treaties. As 
the heart of the EC seems to be dynamic progression, it appears a 
logical assumption that when the EC has reached one goal the forces 
that were present to achieve this end would inevitably continue to 
exist and cause the Treaties to be altered so as to become the basis
33aincluding, for example, Hallstein and Behr. In particular, the
of a United States of Europe. The fact that no definite shape for the 
political future of Europe is outlined within the Treaties is 
immaterial. It is of importance only that the Treaties contain 
the germ of the basic political idea.
These thoughts are clearly present in the writings of two of the most 
authoritative figures connected with the EC, Jean Monnet and Advocate
General Lagrange. Monnet wrote, "I have never doubted that one day
this process will lead us to the United States of Europe; but I see no
31point in trying to imagine what political form it will take".
Advocate General Lagrange made this explicit statement, "The
objectives of the Community Treaties are economic but their aims are
political. The expectation has been that economic integration will,
in time, increase the degree of continuity of interest to the point
that the creation of a federal organisation within the Community
becomes necessary. Such an organisation would come into being by
expanding the powers of existing institutions and founding new ones,
32or their combination".
Further support for this view comes from many other individuals
I:
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view of Judge Pescatore is worth quoting, "this has no sense or 
driving force unless it is to evolve towards a greater political unity 
of Western Europe".
The views of some other judges on political integration, culled from
speeches of the judges during the swearing in of a new judge or on the
departure of a judge, were analysed by Feld. He believed, on this
evidence, that the majority of the judges favoured political
integration. In particular he noted that, "Mr Catalano stressed that
35what is important is the creation of a European jurisprudence" and 
also that Professor Donner, "In several of his speeches ... emphasises 
the constitutional role of the Court
A further argument given by Feld upholding his view of judicial
support for political integration was that the ages of the judges
meant that they personally had experienced the horror of inter-state
European conflict and might well be in favour of a unified Europe as a
37bulwark for European peace.
1From all the above statements, the one by Pescatore in particular, 
seems to sum up the argument over the political content of
integration. Without a political aim, whether implicit or overt, the 
EC is a structure with little real purpose. If so, then the definite 
and powerful political aspect of integration should mean that, in 
theory, if the ECJ is active in upholding integration in general, part 
of its allotted role must be the maintenance of political integration.
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The methods the ECJ uses to maintain political integration are stated 
in further sections of this chapter.
A further meaning of integration is of a different nature, economic 
38integration. As opposed to the previous definition of 
integration, the boundaries of economic integration are clearly set 
out in the Treaties. They are the establishment of a customs union, 
freedom of movement for persons , services and capital and common 
policies in selected fields. These are what could be designated the 
practical limits of integration, that is, here rights and duties exist 
and the legal order begins so that such rights and duties are assured. 
It is this sphere of integration, economic integration, that concerns 
the vast bulk of EC cases involving GP. Such cases do not see the ECJ 
putting on its constitutional hat.
The major point of interest in economic integration, as regards this 
dissertation, is whether economic integration is the aim of the 
Treaties or the means to that aim. It will be shown both here and 
further on in this Chapter that the confusion between various groups, 
that is the political leaders of states, institution representatives, 
the ECJ, and the people of Europe as to what are the aims of the 
Treaty leads to serious difficulties for integration. To some extent 
this has already been shown in Section 1 of this chapter.
The suggestion is advanced that economic integration is primarily the 
means by which political integration is achieved. At this point in 
time however, and possibly ever since the inception of the EC, for all
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practical purposes economic integration is now the aim in itself.
There are various reasons why this has happened.
In reality, the process of using economic means to achieve a political
aim is not, in practice, as simple as the theory suggests. As
Pescatore noted "Economic integration has not always led us by natural
progression to political union. The historical precedent usually
cited in that connection - that of the German Zollverein - was
39probably an accident in history".
A further factor is that in the EG Treaty, as has been noted, the aim
of political integration is not clearly stated. Instead vague phrases
40of intent e.g. "an ever closer union" are substituted. While 
reasons for such draughtsmanship are readily explicable, the clear 
line of reasoning, economic union to achieve political union, is 
broken. Thus the means have now become the aims.
Superficially, it might seem that, as the thing to be achieved is now 
both simpler and less abstract, progress towards economic integration 
should be relatively smooth. In fact the Community is characterised 
by its lack of progress. There are three main reasons for this state 
of affairs. Firstly, if peace and prosperity for Europe are seen by 
states as short term goals rather than long term values, despite 
obvious minor shortcomings, it is suggested that such goals have been 
achieved. Thus peace and prosperity, two major factors for inter­
state co-operation have expired. This leads directly to the second 
cause of Community sonambulism. It is that the remaining reasons for
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nation state co-operation which are union, helping the Third World and 
the maintenance (as opposed to the achievement) of peace and ;
prosperity are weak. Union, to the member states is an abstract 
concept of relative unimportance, the other two aims or GP, the 
maintenance of peace and prosperity and helping the Third World can be
achieved in a variety of other ways, in particular by independent 
state action. Further, other more powerful perennial GP's,
Isovereignty, individual financial and political state interests, havenow re-emerged. Thus as Bredimas noted in 1978 "the spirit of the
Treaty is more supranational than the present attitudes of the
40governments of the MS."
■ :6r;
In practice, the will of the Member States to co-operate in EC
economic development is at times, absent. As Sallust noted, "paucis
41carior est fides quam pecunia". (Few do not set a higher value
on money than on good faith)
The third weakness of so-called, "pure economic integration" is that 
despite its lack of overt political aims, it is inevitable that 
economic integration has political consequences. These being of an 
uncertain nature means that the EC is moving at an uncertain pace 
along a political road that leads to an unknown destination.
Therefore it may well be that some, or indeed all Member States, do 
not wish to make progress. If this view seems overly speculative, it 
is relevant to recall the view of Karl Deutsch who wrote,
s
"International organisations have often been seen as the best pathway 
for leading mankind out of the era of the nation state."
I
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Economic integration is thus, at present, the aim of the Community.
noted that in the mid-sixties integration was not proceeding as
Treaties of Rome and Paris a development of European integration
started which has achieved much. But this development has today 
43exhausted itself". Such lack of progress has continued to the
"Economic troubles leading to political and social weaknesses at home 
were driving governments into more nationalistic attitudes ... States
As the last few paragraphs noted it is not proceeding smoothly. It 
could be asked if it has ever developed without hinderance? Hamson
smoothly as had been hoped. In 1971 Dahrendorf stated, "Within the
present day. It is so well known as to be commented upon by the press 
in unequovical terms. The leader, on 12th April 1981, of the Observer 
read; "The European Community is dying the slow death of inertia. Its
‘ï!involuntary asassins are a motley crew, nationalism, bureaucracy, 
dogmatism, and vested interests".
More authoritative views on this subject not only agree with the
newspaper's assessment but describe the situation in equally dramatic 
language. The 1980 Report on the European Institutions read,
were less willing to heed the Commissions advice or let it administer
policies in the European i n t e r e s t " . T h e  President of the European
Commission wrote, in April, 1982, "It may be that the Community is 
traversing the most difficult period in its history - for never in all 
its twenty-five years have the winds of crisis blown so hard".^^
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The previous section on the ills of economic integration has stated 
much that is of relevance in a further part of this chapter, Yet it 
is given here first for two reasons; to preserve the continuity of the 
explanation of integration as political, economic and defensive; to 
pave the way for an important definition, which has never previously 
been given, of integration. This category - defensive integration - 
will be dealt with in the section on ECJ case law. Its basic 
explanation however, is now given.
It is contended that the third, and totally subjective, categorisation 
of defensive integration is a legitimate part of the meaning of 
integration. By defensive integration, integration is seen 
simultaneously as the means to an aim and the aim itself. It operates 
thus; throughout Community history whenever economic integration, and 
consequently political integration, has slowed down or run into 
difficulty, the ECJ has, by re-stating the basic fundamental 
principles, i.e. the spirit of the law, brought into play defensive 
integration. Its aim in doing so was not to push the EC in a new 
direction politically or economically but simply to keep it going, to 
keep the momentum of integration alive until the legislative 
authorities produced fresh initiatives of EG policy. At such low 
points in EC existence, the means becomes the aim whilst 
simultaneously still being the means to the aim; that is integration 
not for the sake of politics or economics but integration for the sake 
of integration.
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To sum up, integration as a total concept is the concrete expression 
of a moral ideal. While being the means to the aim of political union 
as a good thing for the peoples of Europe, it is for all practical 
purposes the means to economic union and on occasion the aim itself 
for the EC. Its content includes political, economic and defensive
.
integration. Legally speaking, it is the duty of the ECJ to give its
.
full support to integration in all these shades of meaning.
This last point, that is the legal duty of the ECJ to promote 
integration cannot be emphasised too strongly. To avoid any possible
a
doubt on this point, the explicit statement by the ex-president of the 
ECJ, Judge Kutscher, is given. He stresses that integration is a
legal principle and not a whim of the judiciary, "The Community judge 
must never forget that the principles establishing the EEC have laid 
the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe 
and that the High Contracting Parties were anxious to strengthen the 
unities of their economies and to ensure their harmonious development 
(Preamble to the EEC Treaty). The principle of the progressive
i:
integration of the Member States in order to attain the objectives of 
the Community does not only comprise a political requirement; it 
amounts rather to a Community legal principle".
Of equal importance is the succintly delivered opinion of Supreme
Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, "Upon no functionaries is there a
47greater duty to promote law". Thus for EC law it could not be 
made plainer that it is the legal duty of the ECJ to actively promote
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what they regard as constituting the law of the EC, It is suggested
that it has been clearly shown that law includes the GP of integration
in all its various aspects
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Section 3 - Integration as a positive act
The previous section gave an explanation of the concept embodied in 
the word integration. Further, it showed that the concept had a wide 
scope which the ECJ, if it is to uphold integration, must encompass. 
The aim of this section differs• It will state some problems faced by 
the ECJ in attempting to actually apply this GP in the cases. The 
majority of these problems can be traced to the many subjective (and 
emotive) meanings of integration.
The legal duty of the ECJ is to uphold the GP of integration. Stated 
thus, the phrase appears explicable and the task straightforward.
That is, grammatically speaking the sentence is a simple construction 
of subject and predicate and overall has a clear meaning. Further the 
actual task which the ECJ has a legal duty to perform seems relatively 
straightforward. In fact, as will be seen further on in this chapter, 
the task is one of the most complex problems ever faced by any legal 
tribunal. The former statement, the apparent ease of intelligibility 
of the phrase is herewith discussed. The words "uphold the GP of 
integration" require precise explanation as they are capable of 
misinterpretation. There are four main situations regarding this 
phrase that should be clarified.
First, the principle of integration is an implicit rather than an 
overt GP, that is, in cases the GP of integration will rarely receive 
a direct mention. Rather the use of the principle has to be deduced 
from an overall examination of a case or series of cases,
the GP of integration are seen in Chapter VII,
A fourth point about the phrase that requires explanation are the
is to promote integration" is its simplicity. It is stated thus, and.
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Second, the concept of integration is not an active consideration in 
many SC cases. Further in these cases that do involve GP, which is 
where the concept of integration might apply, it will only be
considered in the small number of cases in which the Court feels that
■it may be relevant. Such cases, where the GP of integration has a 
direct influence on the Court, could be seen as involving some 
constitutional aspect of EC law. These may be termed macro cases.
Examples of macro cases are examined in a later section of this 
chapter.
Third, it should be noted that integration is a GP and not a rule. As
such it does not apply in all or nothing fashion in every case in
which the Court thinks it relevant. It could be said that the
attitude of the Court that has been postulated could be seen as
analogous to the view of Plato in the Republic. Plato held that the
48greatest good is the good of the city. The ECJ views the greatest 
good as being that of the EC, as an entity. Such a view if applied in 
the rigid form of a rule would become, at worst, a form of tyranny, at 
best government by judges. By keeping in mind the fact that 
integration is a GP, with all that that entails, such a situation 
should be avoided. The consequences of too rigid an application of
reasons for having chosen this form of words to encompass the supposed 
attitude of the Court. The key to the phrase "the object of the ECJ
I
g
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it is believed, thought of in this way by the ECJ, in order to allow 
the words to be transformed into positive action in actual cases. In 
other words, it is kept simple so as to be kept workable.
It should be noted that it is extremely difficult to construct a 
phrase that contains the essence of what any one person or group 
believes to be the spirit of the law. The general problem in this 
regard was well summed up by Schermers when he stated, "each society 
subjectively decides what principles it considers to be compelling and 
each society changes this notion slowly but continuously. A
49definition of these principles is, therefore, very hard to give".
The truth of this statement, with regard to EC law was highlighted by 
Ruber who, in the course of his dissertation, noted that twenty 
different authors gave twenty different definitions of key concepts of 
European law.
A selection of the fundamental principles of EC law, that is these
principles that various authors consider constitute the spirit of the
law is now given. Louis cited as fundamental, "those GP which emerge
from the very nature of the treaties; the principles of equality,
51unity, freedom and solidarity." Schermers favoured as "compelling
legal principles" these stemming from the common legal heritage of 
52Western Europe. Toth and Hilf both took as their choice
53fundamental rights and freedoms.
The basic problem with all the above definitions, whatever their 
respective merits, is their wide range and loose definition. From the
147
point of view of the ECJ requiring a workable schema, having a half 
dozen or so fundamental principles, which may also continuously be 
changing from year to year and case to case, has two major 
disadvantages; the difficulty of actually keeping in mind and applying 
all such principles in an actual case; and the danger that, as Virally
noted, of so many fundamental principles ending up being employed as
-, 54so many rules.
The phrase stating that the object of the ECJ is to promote
integration avoids the above problems. The phrase and the schema it
incorporates is based on an understanding of the nature of GP, in
particular their constantly changing weight or importance vis a vis
each other in different fact situations. For EC law, only integration
should be regarded as a constant fundamental GP. All other GP's are
not to be applied too rigidly i.e. not to be applied as all or nothing
rules. As regards each other all GP have equal weight and one or more
GP assume greater weight, (that is they temporarily acquire
fundamental status) only when, according to the circumstances of the
case they act to ensure the stability or promotion of the principle of
integration. The case of Defrenne v SABENA (the second Defrenne case)
55which will be examined later, illustrates this situation. This 
case involved two GP, legal certainty and integration. As will be 
shown later the GP of legal certainty was overtly the fundamental GP 
relied upon by the judges, whereas in fact the most influential GP in 
the case was the implicit GP of integration, i.e. legal certainty 
acquired fundamental status for this particular case in order to 
uphold the perennially fundamental GP of integration.^^
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Section 4 - Interpretation
In what has thus far preceded this present section, emphasis has been
laid upon the relative freedom of the ECJ judges. Equally, it has
been noted that it was the legal duty of the Court to act in the
fashion stated. This section combines both these themes. It deals
57with the interpretation of the law.
Judicial freedom and judicial duty come together in that, in order for 
GP to be used at all by the Court, a certain amount of judicial 
discretion in the interpretation of the law is almost a pre-requisite.
Equally important it must be seen that the Court uses a method, or 
methods, of interpretation of the law that meets the requirements of 
the particular case in question. A further fact to note is that in 
discussing interpretation of the law, the final step is made from the 
abstract philosophic notion of union to actual application of a GP to 
a particular case. The basic situation is well put in the statement 
by Schermers, "The actual application of the Treaties and of Community 
acts depends to a large extent on the interpretation which is given to 
them. The only authentic interpretation is that by the Court of I
Justice"
The object of this section is to determine the following: the methods
of interpretation the ECJ adopts in general; of these which, if any, 
is most favoured and why. Finally it is noted where GP originate, how 
they are found and how they are translated into EG law.
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It is undoubtedly the last method, the teleological approach, that for
analytical tool applied by the Court has been the functional 
method." The reasons for this are as follows.
In general, there are four main methods of interpretation used by the
ECJ: the literal approach; the use of historical background;
59systematic interpretation and teleological interpretation.
- 
■^ïî
The literal approach is that, when the text of a provision is clear
■I
and compelling, and apparently meant to cover cases such as the one in
question, the Court of Justice will not depart from it.^^ The
historical background method of interpretation follows the .continental
judicial t r a d i t i o n . T h u s  the ECJ can use preparatory documents of
secondary Community legislation, such as debates in the European 
62Parliament. Customs nomenclature is another legitimate aid to 
63interpretation. As to systematic interpretation, here the Court 
makes use of the system of the Treaties. The place an article
'
occupies in a particular Treaty chapter is relevant as regards 
interpretation. Also, the introductory articles setting out the 
purposes of the Communities help to interpret other articles.^
Finally, there is the teleological approach. This uses interpreta­
tions based on the purposes of the Community Treaties
the Court is the most popular and widely used method in interpreting
Community law.^^ As Bredimas, for example, concluded "the major
I
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Firstly, the other three methods of interpretation mentioned, literal 
interpretation, historical and systematic interpretation, all have
them.
Thus literal interpretation, which it might be argued is the second
69problems. For example, freedom of movement for workers or the 
right of establishment may be curtailed under ordre public. This 
translates as public policy in the English language version. Yet the
73languages." For example, in Rutili v Minister of the Interior, 
regarding the concept of l’ordre public the translator "felt
certain weaknesses. The systematic approach, it might be argued is
68not weak as such but is of limited application. As to historical
background, as the travaux préparatoires of the Community treaties are
Isecret and therefore unavailable to the Court, this method accordingly suffers. Literal interpretation in Community law is bound up with the 
problems of language. Unlike the Treaty of Paris, which was drawn up 
only in French, the Treaties of Rome are equally authentic in all 
Community languages and so is all secondary legislation made under
. •
nKDSt important method of interpretation, has produced many
European Convention on Human Rights has it as public order, a version
70Lord MacKenzie Stuart opines as more appropriate. As Lyon-Caen
has said "Its role is so extensive that the concept itelf has lost all
71precision" The case of Stauder v Ulm also illustrates the problem
72of language as regards the official texts.
A further language difficulty is over the pronouncements of the Court 
itself. "The Court has to use words which are intelligible in all
a
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constrained by the official text of the Treaty to speak of conduct 
which might constitute "a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to
public policy" when public order would have been more
j  ^ . 74 appropriate .
A second reason is that both the Treaties and subordinate legislation
refer to a number of important concepts but leave them undefined. In
other words, for the Treaties to have practical consequences such
definitions must be found by the Court. The best known example of
this is Article 215, paragraph 2, EEC which explicitly speaks of
"general principles common to the laws of member states". Further,
75the words "civil and commercial matters" are ambiguous. They are 
to be found in both the title and the opening article of the 
"Convention on Jurisdiction and in the enforcement of Judgements in 
Civil and Commercial matters". These words, since they govern the 
whole field of application of the Convention are of crucial 
importance
The third reason is the different approach towards interpretation 
necessary where, as is fairly frequent in EC practice, the Court is 
called upon for the first time to pronounce upon a problem, as against 
interpretation within a mature legal system. In the latter, for 
example, under English law, whanever Parliament produces a Statute to 
codify common law, practitioners consult the pre-codified law in order 
to understand the Statute. With the Treaties "one starts from 
scratch".
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The fourth reason is of a pragmatic nature but still of great
importance. As Dr Ehlermann, Director, Deputy Financial Controller of
the Commission stated, "The conditions in which Community law was, and
is prepared, are hardly conducive to careful drafting. This is true
not only of the Treaty negotiations in Val Duchesse, but also of the
78ahorse trading which takes place all the time in the Council".
Thus for these reasons, the ECJ will avoid a minute textual analysis. 
It thus looks to the purpose of the text in disputes - the 
teleological approach.
The teleological approach seeks out the object of the disputed 
legislative text and tries to give practical effect to it. Thus in 
seeking a solution to a problem, the Court will choose one that makes 
things work rather than one that brings them to a halt.^^^ This 
action must be clearly understood. In seeking the object of the text, 
the Court therefore seeks the spirit of the law. As stated 
previously, "spirit" is merely another synonym for fundamental 
principles. The Court thus looks for principles, such principles 
constituting the first link in the chain of judicial reasoning in the 
appropriate cases.
What are the consequences implicit in the use of the teleological
approach. The first and most important is that it gives to the Court
a greater amount of freedom in the making of decisions than any other
method. This, in turn, means that more stress must be laid upon the
79ajudge as an individual and thus upon his individual influences.
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The fact that ECJ is collegiate however, means over extensive study in
79bthis particular area is unrewarding. In turn, this also means
that further refinement by legal theorists of the teleological
80interpretation process is of little value. The ECJ itself, for
example, is anxious to protect its freedom in this respect. As
Kutscher stated, "The Court of Justice of the Communities shares with
the national courts a reluctance to give, in its judgments, general
rulings on the problems of interpretation. It explains the rules and
also indicates which methods it is using in the process, but it does
not express an opinion on the basic question of the methods of 
81interpretation".
The second major consequence is this - Pescatore wrote of teleological
interpretation that, "Here it is concepts such as custom union,
equality of treatment and non-discrimination, freedom of movement,
mutual assistance and solidarity, economic interpretation and finally
economic and legal unity as the supreme objective, which have provided
the decisive themes of a large number of judgments dealing with the
82problems posed by the implementation of the Common Market". If 
the word "concepts" in the above statement is substituted for the more 
accurate phrase GP then, in plain language, teleological interpreta­
tion means that GP provide the basis of any purposive judgment.
Having stated that GP are at the base of teleological judgments 
(either overtly or by implication), it still remains to be seen where 
the GP come from and, once found, how they are transplanted or applied 
in EC law.
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Where are the GP to be taken from? There are five sources, which 
together constitute the reservoir of GP. These are the laws of the 
Member States; laws of the non-Member States; the Treaties of the EC; 
Public International law and GP as a source in their own right.
By far the most Important and widely used source is the laws of Member 
S t a t e s . B o t h  civil and administrative principles are used.^^
In general, greater use is made by the ECJ of administrative 
principles. National laws are invoked as and when the need arises.
Laws of the non-Member States are rarely called upon but are 
nevertheless of importance. Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty are 
largely based on United States monopolies and restrictive practices 
law. US law has been referred to in disputes concerning these 
articles. As Chapter III noted, it has been observed that the EC 
resembles the USA of the 1820's as regards business law and state 
boundaries. Possibly recourse to US law should be more frequent as 
this law contains many valuable analogous cases.
The EC is composed of three treaties. This fact comprises the third 
source of general principles. In a few decisions parallel principles 
from the other treaties have been drawn.
The penultimate source is Public International law. It is a definite 
source of GP, but one condemned by most commentators and regarded as 
of little i m p o r t a n c e A t  best. Public International law is seen
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as of use only in exceptional circumstances. However, recent 
judgments by the ECJ on fundamental rights may change this situation. 
The ECHR is now an accepted source of fundamental rights. Thus all 
treaties adhered to by the Member States must now be similarly 
regarded. Possibly other principles can be taken from such treaties.
The final source of GP is not GP from X system of law, but GP as a
source of law in their own right. The ECJ has felt free to rest its
reasoning on GP as such. As Bredimas noted, "Occasionally one finds
the Court referring to "General Principles" applicable even in the
87absence of a text referring to them". In Walwereke v High
Authority, the Court stated, "We must include the GP of law in the 
rules relevant to the application of the Treaty", without making it 
clear to what principles it was referring to.^^ This practice, it 
must be stated, is the exception rather than the rule. Usually the 
Court will state the principle explicitly.
What criteria are needed for a general principle to be recognised as
part of EC law? In what way does the ECJ extract, refine and apply
the general principle of law? Briefly stated' the process is as
follows:- to establish the existence of a general principle, a
89comparative analysis is carried out. This is undertaken by the
staff of the ECJ.^^^ If this process successfully establishes a
general principle, the ECJ elaborate on a synthesis to derive a
detailed rule from it. This rule is then applied to the facts of the 
90bcase.
I
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The main method used to shape national concepts to EG purposes is
91critical comparison* It is unnecessary for the principle to be
unanimously accepted in all Member States. Nor need it be accepted in
a majority of states or even that it represents the lowest common
denominator of the national solutions. Bredimas states that merely
the basic elements in a GP that can be built up into a rule of EC law 
92are looked for. Toth phrases the requirement somewhat differently,
'What is required is that a principle should be widely accepted and
I
should provide a solution which is, if measured by the methods of
"evaluative comparative law" the most appropriate and judicious of all
comparable solutions, taking into account the particular objectives
93and nature of Community law" The former criteria seems to
emphasise the requirements of EC law, the latter the GP. Where the
general principles in the national laws are contradictory and no
common meaning can be found then according to Bredimas ’"the ECJ will
evaluate the differences, reconcile them and shape them according to
Community p u r p o s e s . T o t h ,  however, states, "It is nevertheless
clear that there is no general common principle where the national
laws vary to such an extent that it is impossible to extract from them
95a truly common meaning of a legal concept."
% 
qIf a general principle exists in one Member state, but is not 
generally known in others, "In such cases, a principle of national law 
can only be adopted in Community law as a new and independent concept 
of the latter and not as a general principle of law, with a new and 
independent meaning of its own..."^^ If so, is this not close to 
judicial legislation? Toth states "In some cases even the fact that a
f
f
157 -
principle is universally recognised in the Member States may not lead
not".99
to its incorporation into community law, namely where this could be
achieved only by what would amount to genuine legislative activity on
97the part of he European Court." Is the previous situation not 
closer to legislative activity than the latter? I
'3
■;IFinally, a GP would not be used in EC law where the point in question98is covered by a rule (or a GP applicable in EC law).
The above opinions show a marked diversity in some areas as regards
what constitutes comparative law analysis by the ECJ. The two authors t
quoted are both competent, up-to-date and authoritative, yet neither
can be seen as a final authority on comparative law. This is due to 
the fact, as Bredimas notes, that the "Court has not so far furnished
expressly any explanations on the conditions of its recourse to GP but
'
limited itself to declaring that a certain principle existed or
It is suggested that this is a deliberate policy on the part of the 
Court. The reasons behind it are discussed fully in the following 
sections of this chapter. However, this fact means that comparative 
analysis has limitations as a tool by which to judge the work of the 
ECJ. If no lead is given by the ECJ, exactly how a GP came into EC 
law will always defy exhaustive analysis.
I
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Section 5 - Why the ECJ Is not a government of Judges 
The previous sections of this chapter have theorised that the Court, 
in its constitutional role, has taken the following steps. First the 
Court found what it believes to be the spirit of the law, union. 
Second, having found union the Court found a method of applying the GP 
or value union to the nearest GP relevant to EC law, integration.
Sections Five and Six deal with the problems that hinder the Court in
the performance of its duty. These problems may be divided into two 
sets of obstacles.
These two sets of obstacles both function as checks on judicial
activity but each creates a distinct problem area for the Court. The
first set of obstacles consists of the normal legal and closely 
related extra-legal restrictions to be found, in an analogous form, in 
every other legal order. They are discussed in this section. The
second set of obstacles are of a more insidious nature. They
originate not from law but from the relatively primitive relationship 
of states with international institutions. These latter obstacles are 
ultimately a more serious restriction on judicial activity than the 
former set of restrictions. They are discussed in Section 6. As the
public concrétisation of both sets of obstacles is made known by the
phrase "government by judges" a separation is required of the two 
problems. Further an exact analysis of the phrase "government by 
judges" with reference to its relevance to the second set of obstacles 
is required. "Government by judges" is not analysed for the first set 
of obstacles as it is believed that the phrase has, in this area, an 
accepted or known core of meaning. More importantly, it is conceded
i
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In fact, the overall case load of the ECJ is not too heavy. As Lord
is.
that the first claim is a valid one and that the checks on ECJ power 
are necessary. The exact extent of such restrictions is, of course, a 
subjective matter but, as long as commentators upon law agree that the 
basic core of judicial restrictions does prevent government by judges, 
then their function has been effective.
The various restrictions of a legal, and also closely related extra 
legal nature, upon the ECJ are stated as follows.
In speaking of the Court promoting integration, it is easy to forget 
that the Court can speak only through its case l a w . H e r e  there
is a double restriction on ECJ activity. First, only cases involving 
GP will have the GP of integration as a possible complicating factor. 
Second, cases involving the exercise of a great amount of judicial
discretion are comparatively rare.
■"is
MacKenzie Stuart noted "Busy as the Court of Justice is, litigation
involving Community law is more frequently to be found in national
102courts and tribunals". If so then in absolute terms the number
;iof GP cases is not excessive, as they only constitute a percentage of 
a low overall number of cases.
Secondly, not all EC law is within the ambit of the ECJ. Bredimas 
points out, "The accusations and fears of Government by Judges are 
unwarranted and far fetched. There are fields in which it has no 
competence whatsoever; for instance it does not rule over conflict of
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laws, it does not apply Commun!ty law to the facts of the case in
103preliminary reference.
Thirdly, it must be remembered that the Court only has the 
jurisdiction granted to it by the t r e a t i e s . T h u s  the argument 
should concern the extent of ECJ authority. Emotive talk of govern­
ment by judges gives the impression that power derives from the whim 
of the judiciary.
From the point of view that the ECJ is the judicial, and not the
legislative or executive arm of the Community, the fourth point is the
most important of all statements in this section. It is that the
entire Community structure is based upon a complex system of checks
and balances, specifically designed to ensure that no single
institution achieves an undue concentration of p o w e r . T h i s
doctrine should, in theory, be well entrenched into the EC structure
as it is a fundamental principle in many Continental legal systems,
these same systems of e.g. France, Germany, Italy providing the basic
structure of Community law. Further to take an analogy from US law
the fascinating thing about the Supreme Court has been that it blends
orthodox judicial functions with policy-making functions in a complex
mixture. "And the Court’s power is accounted for by the fact that the
mixture is maintained in nice balance; but the fact that it must be
maintained in such a balance accounts for the limitation of that 
..107power.
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The fifth factor begins the extra-legal checks upon judicial misuse of 
power. Despite their abstract nature, it is contended that, in 
practice, they provide a restriction upon judicial activity as 
powerful as any other mentioned in this dissertation. The fifth check 
is that ECJ cases are observed by a great number of people and groups• 
Lawyers, academics, EC staff, individual citizens, business companies.
other EC institutions, members of national governments, national 
newspapers, and specialist legal and business periodicals all report,
109maximalist conception of the European construction". The point 
of the fifth factor is not that the ECJ is swayed by public opinion,
view.^^^ If so, any derogation of duty or clear breach of legally 
defined judicial activity would be seen, and commented upon, by a 
variety of sources. Such breach of power, whatever the legal
Ï
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comment upon, or observe ECJ decisions. Examples of comment
upon cases are as follows. Mann, an academic, wrote of the Cafe Hag
case, "The Court disregarded the clear wording, the intended effect,
108the true meaning of the Treaty of Rome". The French newspaper.
Le Monde, wrote of the ERTA case, "This case belongs to the category 
of political cases ... it is a mythical elaboration revealing a
nor that it decides a case, as the newspaper report clearly shows, to 
curry public favour but that it performs its duty in full public
consequences, would ensure that the Court would lose a good measure of
public confidence and s u p p o r t . I f  so, then this point is a real
check on judicial mis-use of power for as Salust said, "Qui male agit
112odit lucem", (the evil doer bates the light).
■
The sections on the actual EC action, and the ideas behind it, will 
provide a full explanation of this statement by Prott*
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The sixth check on judicial government is also extra-legal. As
opposed to the previous check which was of an external nature this one
stems from internal factors, from the Court itself. It is that, as
113Bredimas concluded, "the Court seeks to avoid conflict". Prott 
goes even further than this in his conclusion. He believes the
Court, "conscientiously seeks to meet the expectations of its
. 114 audience . "1
Such statements should not be misinterpreted, that is they should not 
be taken to mean that the Court will act to please public opinion.
■'Æ;
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The fact, if Bredimas and Prott are correct, that the Court will try 
to meet the expectations of its audience, coupled with the rest of the 
points made in this section, provides an important statement with 
which to end this section. It is that the Court cannot pull the EC in 
a direction it does not wish to go. The Court is, in the end,
controlled by the wishes of the other EC Institutions and by the 
aspirations of the EC as a whole.
:x:,K
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Section 6 - Extra-Legal Barriers to Integration
The arguments in this section have already been partially explained 
previously in this dissertation. They are now given in full with 
additional arguments and premises. There are several reasons for so 
doing. First, the arguments are extremely important in understanding 
the dynamic and extra legal nature of the opposition that the ECJ
faces in the performance of its duty as a Constititional Court. As
such, they must be fully stated if ECJ counter action, to be explained 
later in this chapter, is to be understood. Secondly, the previous 
accounts of such arguments have deliberately ommitted material that 
has full relevance only in this section. Thus, for clarity, it is 
Intended to restate all arguments in full even at the expense of some 
repetition.
It is suggested that the EC is based upon twin foundations; on people 
banded together in various groups, in particular states and EC 
institutions; on fundamental GP that provided (and continue to supply) 
the fundamental reasons for the actions that established the EC and 
gave impetus for its continued progress towards I n t e g r a t i o n . A  
major dynamic factor that disrupts this progress towards Integration 
is the lack of cohesion between various groups, in particular states 
and the ECJ, in their attitude towards fundamental GP. Previous 
sections dealing with immediate EG pre-history and integration roughly 
sketched the causes of this diversity. This section examines how a
state assesses (and re-assesses) the GP of integration and
sovereignty; how the ECJ assesses these fundamental GP; the problems 
that arise for the ECJ as a result.
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Thus the first area of discussion involves a state and the GP's of
117integration and sovereignty. An analysis of immediate Community
pre-history showed that it was established in an era when sovereignty
had little support from states and their subjects. An interesting
analysis by Spinelli however, concluded that support for integration
118by states leading to European union was of a temporary nature.
In fact, if Spinelli is correct, the decline of enthusiasm for
integration actually began before the EC was created. He wrote, "The
train of events which had forced the leaders of the six countries to
attempt a policy of supranational integration began to slow down with
119the death of Stalin". A fact that lends credence to Spinelli's
words was the failure to establish a European Defence Community.
Such events suggest that the GP of sovereignty is, to the European 
nations, a perennial fundamental GP, which, from the early fifties, 
they had began to re-assess in a more favourable light.
The second factor follows directly from the above. Despite the 
upsurge in the popularity of sovereignty before the creation of the 
EC, that Institution was nevertheless established. Further, four 
internal institutions were also created to direct the EC on its chosen 
path. This sets up the second premise that these institutions, and in 
particular the ECJ, will come to hold individual views on GP and 
sovereignty.
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made. First, that the Court, by virtue of being a judicial organ, is 
a relatively stable institution and, of all Community institutions, 
the one most free from external influences. It is also the nature of
law the GP of sovereignty is in the ascendance.
How does the ECJ, as opposed to the MS, see the GP's of integration 
120and sovereignty? Before suggesting an answer, three points are
.-■3 
121a court in general to be of a fairly conservative disposition.
These facts should mean that any views on any principles examined by
the ECJ, once formulated, should remain constant over a long period of 
122time. Second, whether or not the other institutions, and in
particular the Commission, might hold similar long term views on 
principles , the day to day political role they play in running the
I
»
.Community must present an’obstacle towards an adherence to, or ' 
enforcement of, basic principles of EC law.
The third point, following on from the above, is that the Court 
becomes the institution that holds the conscience of the Community, an 
uncomfortable political stance. Bredimas wrote "By its functional 
interpretations it has remained the most faithful instituion to the 
spirit of the architects to the treaties"
It is suggested that, as stated previously, the ECJ upholds
.integration. As a consequence, it opposes sovereignty. This view is 
re-enforced by the opinion of Lauterpacht who believes that 
International institutions act as brakes upon the power of
123sovereignty. He notes, however, that at present in Internatinal
124
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The consequences of the above facts are as follows.
sovereignty, Is a direct contradiction to the situation in
S
J
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The Court and the Member States have directly opposing views on 
sovereignty and integration. In particular if the EC, as an 
International institution, is meant to advance it must simultaneously 
grow in strength and this can only be at the expense of the GP of 
sovereignty. For example as Kutscher noted "so far as the Community
1 
::
Treaties are concerned the principle that limitations on the 
sovereignty of the contracting states are, in cases of doubt, to be 
interpreted narrowly does not a p p l y " . P u t  simply, the ECJ, if 
it wishes to advance integration, must weaken the GP of sovereignty.
This situation, where the Community will grow at the expense of
International law, where sovereignty is a d v a n c i n g . T h u s  it 
would seem that there might be a struggle between the ECJ and Member 
States over the GP’s of sovereignty and integration. Much will
depend, if this analysis is correct, on how far the Member States will 
be willing to weaken the GP of sovereignty to advance the common good, 
European integration.
At this point it should be noted, once again, that states have a
,major influence on the EC. As former President of the Commission, Roy
Jenkins, wrote, "I had no idea of the extent to which I would be
dependent on influencing national governments, rather than appealing
to European changes ... I realised it was an illusion to believe that
126one could rely primarily on appealing to the people of Europe".
I
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This talk of struggle between groups might seem far fetched and
outwith the ambit of the Court. However at this juncture the view of
Judge Donner is given to show that the discussion is based on fact
rather than fantasy. Judge Donner noted that by instituting a Court
of Justice law was introduced to govern the Treaties. By introducing
law "Lawyers were called up to undo what was done in the century 
12 7 abefore”. i.e. to undo national sovereignty. His statement on
sovereignty is unequivocal, "It is one of the main intellectual and 
legal obstacles to overcoming an antiquated and unhappily propogated 
state system for the purpose of creating political entities 
commensurate to the needs and possibilities of our time ... Only a 
deep conviction that the values to be upheld and the aims envisaged 
are indispensible to human society is equal to the endless debate with
the entrenched forces of prejudice, self conceit and 
1 97hconservatism".
Equally relevant is the point that the Court plays a part in the 
struggle. Support for this view comes indirectly from the writings of 
American political scientists. Speaking of US Courts Murphy and
'
Pritchett wrote "Political scientists have sought more and more to 
develop an approach to the judicial process which would give the 
activities of the Courts new meaning by placing them within the 
mainstream of political r e l a t i o n s h i p s B e c k e r  made the 
provocative statements that "Effective Courts, properly run are a 
political weapon of some magnitude" and that "the Supreme Court
Ï
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exercises a unique and unparalleled influence of political leader­
s h i p " . While not going as far as Becker in his claims for the 
Supreme Court it is contended that the situations produced by the new 
legal order require a new view of the ECJ - as a participant in the 
political struggles both among institutions and between institutions 
and states. Seen from the perspective it is submitted that the 
activities of the Court to be discussed in the following section will
The ECJ, it is suggested, sees the spirit of the law in a different 
light. The EG is a long term institution concerned with a deep moral 
issue, the good of the people of Europe. The economic base of the EC 
is the vehicle in which to achieve this.
I
become clear.
To re-iterate the basic situation, at any given time states and the
ECJ each draw from the EC the GP and values they consider to be the
-spirit of the law. For some Member States, the spirit of the law, or
essence of the EC is that it is, or was, the short term solution to 
short term political and economic problems. Such problems having now
been overcome, the EC is concerned with maintenance of peace and
‘
relative economic prosperity. Further, the main thrust of the EC is
i
not, and never has been, moral and universal, but served as an
appendage to national, political and economic aims. As such, the good 
of the EC must in most instances be secondary to national interests.
I
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The statements above to the effect that there is a deep divergence 
between the aims and opinions of the ECJ and the Member States, and 
possibly also other groups as well, is one of the most interesting but 
least discussed aspects of European Community law. The overtly 
political nature of such matters is the probable justification. It 
was discussed here for two major reasons; that the lack of cohesion 
between the foundations of the EC leads to definite consequences; that 
the ECJ is aware of, and has actually acted in a deliberate manner to 
meet this extra legal opposition. This latter statement, that the ECJ 
has adopted a course of action to counter threats to integration is 
dealt with in the sections on case law. This leaves the claim that 
the weight attributed to various GP’s by certain groups, especially 
states, have definite consequences for the ECJ and for EC law in 
general.
It is contended that there are three main consequences for the ECJ 
which can be classified in this manner. Actual disobedience by a 
state of an ECJ decision it feels goes against some important national 
interest; a general atmosphere of lack of trust of the ECJ; specific 
accusations against ECJ conduct e.g. government by judges.
The first, anti-ECJ action is pardoxically the least serious due to
deliberate policy of the Court in prevention of such instances by the 
means to be outlined in the latter part of this chapter and the fact 
that, unlike International law, the entire EC structure is
Î
its relative infrequency. This results from two factors; the
S’s
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sophisticated enough to prevent, or at least dissuade, continual 
outright anarchy.
A case where a judgment has been ignored is Commission v France (the 
sheep meat case).^^^ In September 1978, the ECJ ruled that French 
controls on imports of lamb from the UK were in violation of free 
movement of goods (Articles 9-37 EEC),
The second, and extremely serious consequence, is a general atmosphere
of lack of trust of the ECJ by its clients, in particular by MS, This
means that ECJ lacks the necessary freedom to fulfill its function.
Further, not only is the Court itself inhibited, other institutions
may be unwilling to make use of the Court to clarify the law and rely
instead on drafting minutely detailed rules. An analogous situation
was recently seen in the United Kingdom where an attempt to reform the
drafting of legislation failed for this reason. The Renton Committee
on the preparation of legislation concluded that legislation drafted
in a simpler fashion was beneficial to United Kingdom needs but was
impractical as Parliament was simply not prepared to trust the 
129judges. Again, as justification for the inclusion of this whole 
debate within the confines of an essay on law the words actually used 
in the Renton Report, "Lack of trust" show that politics is a part of 
law.
The third and most obvious consequence of disharmony among groups 
caused by diverse interpretation of principle is various direct 
accusations against the ECJ, The statement by Bredimas is an accurate
171 -
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evolved a policy to deal with its critics, it must in the first place
account of these charges, "sometimes when it delivers a functional
judgment, challengers speak of a political judgement driven by the
desire to reach a certain conclusion, whilst for a literal judgement,
they argue that the Court did not give in to political pressure i.e.
that it was objective. Moreover, on the process of filling gaps by
130interpretation, they accuse it of government by judges".
Taken together, these three consequences have a further and most
-
important result, they endanger the independence of the ECJ. Yet as a
recent report on the European Institutions noted, "The main condition
of its (the SCJ’s) effectiveness, now and in the future, is in the
maintenance of its perfect independence from government and other
131Community institutions". Seen against the following statement of
Bredimas, there is real cause for concern for judicial independence.
"Although the Court is relatively the most independent institution of 
the Communities, one should not forget the pressures exercised on it: 
influence of the Member States manifested through the Council, 
indirect influence of powerful pressure groups. These influences 
nowadays are not even dissimilated".
-
Having demonstrated the danger to integration, and indirectly to the 
Court itself, it remains only to raise two further items. First, it 
should be asked if the Court itself is perceiving the situation in the 
way described. If, as the coming section may show, the Court has
be aware of them. While not claiming that the view of one judge 
necessarily represents the whole Court, the quote by Lord MacKenzie
■'li1
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Stuart is highly illuminating, "I suspect that if one could truly see
into the minds of the critics of some of the Court’s more discussed 
decisions, the disagreement is less with the decision than with the
and disagrees with them.
aims and purposes of the Treaty itself ... you may not like the chosen
path, but that does not absolve the Court from following it ... There
is a failure to make the essential distinction between the Treaties on
the one hand and the law which must be observed in their interpreta-
133tion and observance". In short the Court Is aware of its critics
»Having stated that the accusations of government by judges stem from 
fear, both of judicial usurpation of the GP of sovereignty and 
promotion of the GP of integration, it is nevertheless necessary to 
explain fully the nature of such claims and test their validity. In 
jurisprudence it must be the case that any claim will be dealt with on 
its own merits. The dubious nature, if any, of the claimant or the 
reasons behind the claim are irrelevant. Thus the phrase "government
by judges" is examined and possible judicial action constituting 
government by judges is scrutinised. It is suggested that this
phrase acts as a concept phrase for all possible accusations against 
the ECJ.
What does the phrase "Government by the Courts" mean? The concept
within the expression is from the case law of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, the expression itself from an article by Bondin.^^^
Dumon gives a comprehensive account of the conditions needed for the
Court to realise the phrase in practice. He stated that, "Government
. :
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positive law, that is to say from the legal system as a whole, its
The counter arguments against the charges are as follows.
by judges is realised if the Courts exceed their proper task; if they 
ignore, infringe or brush aside the rules of the law which it is their 
duty to respect and apply, if they base their judgements on their own 
social and ecomomic views or those of the parties to which they belong 
... if their judments stem from "choices" and from policies which have 
not been decided by the political authorities or those with power to 
amend the constitution or to legislate - and which do not emerge from :
spirit and development and general or other principles".
■;'?q=;:;v
In general, the fine distinctions needed to differentiate between law
■
and politics are difficult to make in any practical sense. Of course,
there are extreme cases where it can be said that "here is a political
act". However, in the great majority of cases the law/politics
distinction is blurred. This argument is advanced by several legal
theorists. As Kelsen, for example, stated, "every law applying act is
only partly determined by law".^^^ Bredimas is even more explicit,
"In the last analysis, the distinction between legal and political
issues is a fallacy: every dispute has political and legal
137aspects."
Thus the accusation of government by judges must have some truth as 
the political aspect of judicial activity can never be totally 
eliminated. Equally, for the Court to avoid such claims would mean 
its refusing to handle cases involving an element of discretion. Thus
Î'
s
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the question of government by judges cannot be satisfactorily 
resolved, that is, it cannot be objectively upheld or refuted. It
will always be a matter of subjective judgment. Perhaps the most 
sensible statement on this emotive issue was that by Schermers, "In ■»
Continental legal theory, a decision by a Court, even of a Supreme 
Court, only decides the case at issue. Courts are to apply the law
.and not make it. When rules are required, they should be made by the 
legislature. In practice, however, the system is not as strict as one 
might think ... In practice, the cases of the ECJ are quoted as 
precedents which - though not formally binding - are important sources 
of law. The extent on which the the case-law of Courts is needed as fi-3;|
an additional source of law depends on the legislation involved; the |J
'I
more general the legislation the more scope the Courts have for making
■Isupplementary rules, through interpretation. In the EEC, the 
principal legislator, The Council, hardly operates and the secondary 
legislator, the Commission, has insufficient power to fill the gap.
. riThe legislation, therefore, is broad and incomplete with the result
138that the case law of the ECJ is relatively important".
139Bredimas and Dugard also argue the practical viewpoint. They 
State that "The Court quickly realised that the Community can only 
survive by constantly expanding to meet new conditions by a continuous 
interaction between law-finding and law-making for which there is no 
neat division of these powers". Boukema also argues that the tendency 
for the Court to legislate is not incompatable with democracy.
■
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To sum up, it is true that, in carrying out its duties the ECJ, to
some extent, legislates. Equally, it must be pointed out that this 
judicial legislation is, in fact, an unavoidable consequence of an 
imperfect legal order. Whether or not the judiciary overstep the mark 
is a subjective question. It is suggested that due to the fact that 
the Treaties are highly political instruments at an early stage of 
development, much so-called judicial legislation is unavoidable. 
Perhaps Hallstein summed up the situation best when he wrote of the
EC, "we are not in business (economic integration), we are in 
politics".
There is also a further observation to be made here. It is that the 
question, whatever its answer is of lesser importance in EC law than 
in other systems of law. This viewpoint was argued by Kutscher when 
he wrote, "This question touches on the relationship between case law
and legislation and the principle of the separation of powers. The
question, however, loses some of its importance when the laws have not
been adopted by a directly and democratically elected Parlia- 
142ment....
Finally on this subject, the opinion of Pescatore is given. He wrote,
"the Court has been careful not to exceed its role as a judge ...
There has never been any question of setting up any form of government
.
by the courts, to use a perennial expression"
i
,y
176 -
Section 7 - Macro Gases - The Van Gend en Loos Case Analysed 
The following paragraphs deal with the preliminary questions that 
arise before ECJ macro cases are discussed. The first such question 
is why do macro cases arise in Community law? It is contended that 
macro cases arise as a natural consequence of the establishment of a
I
.new legal order. Chapter III, dealing with developed systems of 
Municipal law, noted few if any macro cases in any or all legal
systems. The one major exception was the legal order of the United
,
States. There, several macro cases were found, the Marshall cases.
■
It was suggested that these had arisen as a direct consequence of the 
relative immaturity of United States constitutional law as regards 
trade and commerce. If this was so, then EC law, being a new legal 
order at an early stage of development, macro cases are to be expected 
at this early period in EC development.
■I
I■:4
The second question is what, in EC law, constitutes a macro case? At
this point it is important to give a terminological explanation
related to the uncommon use, in a legal context, of the terms "macro”
and "micro” in what follows below. These terms are common in texts of
economics and one may assume their conceptual function in such texts 
.is known. It may be argued that the nearest corresponding terms in
legal texts may be "fundamental" for macro and "non fundamental" for
micro. Terms like fundamental which are used in a legal context have 
.a well established meaning in legal discourse. Indeed these terms
have already been employed in this thesis to define GP in EC law. In 
order to clearly separate the categorisation and classification of 
individual cases involving GP from the definition of GP as such in EC
39B421
- 177
law, the terms macro and micro are used to categorise and classify 
individual cases. Further, it is submitted that the terms fundamental 
and non fundamental do not correspond precisely to what the present 
author has in mind for making specific distinctions between individual 
cases. With this in mind the terms macro and micro, and there is no 
reason why new terras may not be introduced as long as their use and 
function are clarified, are preferred.
In order to clarify the important distinction between definitions of 
GP and categorisation of individual cases, the definition of GP is 
reiterated. Many authors have defined GP in terms of their belief 
that, in looking at GP as a %Aiole, some GP are more fundamental than 
others. This thesis too has adopted a definition of fundamental and 
non fundamental GP. Only two GP have been regarded as fundamental, 
namely the GP of integration and any other GP which may be deemed 
essential for subsequently promoting or strongly defending the GP of 
integration. This definition of GP is, it is submitted, both more 
flexible and more intellectually complex (though more practicable) 
than all previous definitions which rely on fixed categories of GP.
Each individual macro case concerns the GP of integration and may 
possibly concern the second category of GP as well. Each micro case 
concerns only a GP or GPs which do not, in the particular fact 
situation, substantially promote or strongly defend the GP of 
integration. Thus it cannot automatically be assumed that any given 
GP save the GP of integration will be classified as fundamental in any 
given case designated as macro. Further, in any case designated as a
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micro case, no GP is to be looked upon as fundamental in that 
particular case. The GP of legal certainty is used to illustrate the 
above. Thus, the GP of legal certainty may be classified as 
fundamental in a macro case only if that particular GP is a major 
factor in substantially promoting or strongly defending the GP of 
integration in that particular case. If, in that same macro case, the 
GP of legal certainty is only of minor consideration for the Court, 
then it should not be seen as a fundamental GP in that particular 
macro case. With regard to micro cases, the GP of legal certainty 
will not be regarded as a fundamental GP in that case even if it is an 
object of major consideration by the Court, because the facts of the 
individual micro case are such that the question of substantially 
promoting or strongly defending the GP of integration simply does not 
arise. The circumstances which, when taken together, constitute a 
case being recognised as a macro case are now given.
As there is of course no objective answer to the question of what 
constitutes a macro case what follows is a subjective opinion. There 
would, for this particular legal order, EC law, appear to be four 
requirements. First the case must involve, implicitly or explicitly 
the GP of integration and possibly also a further GP or GPs which, 
with regard to the individual fact circumstances of that particular 
case strongly promotes or defends the GP of integration. Second, the 
case must have some sort of constitutional significance, that is, the 
legal question at issue should have definite consequences for EC law 
as a system. Possibly this somewhat loose requirement could be better 
put by requiring that the issue in question should affect the central
mus
The final preliminary question to be answered is why are only a 
handful of macro cases examined? There are several reasons for so
179 -
core, or the constitutional spirit, of EC law.
.Third, the issue(s) of the case should be of direct interest to one or
more MS. This could arise where a state, whether or not directly
involved in the case would be interested in, and affected in some
significant way by the outcome. For example, in Defrenne v SABENA
the outcome, of course, affected all states but only two states not
directly involved in the case actually showed concern as to its 
144 
outcome.
.The fourth and final factor is that the case should be controversial.
.Again this is a difficult-tO“define qualification. Possibly it would
arise when the question to be decided and/or the repercussions
.r-
resulting from a particular decision, would touch upon a GP or GPs 
fundamental to one or more MS,
For a case to be considered as a macro case the first two factors 
t be present. The last two factors may be present.
......................
doing. First, it is believed that relatively few macro cases
145
exist. If so, it is difficult to see how complete coverage would
add to the arguments taken from a representative selection of cases.
:Second, the actual cases chosen are well-known examples of macro cases
146
not obscure hand picked cases. Third, not all cases chosen fit in
with the theories presented; due to the nature of GP almost any case
180
involving GP is capable of wide ranging subjective interpretation so 
little is to be gained in any case from deliberate "fixing" of 
examples.
.In general, this section will show the complexity and difficulty of
the task of the judge in doing right according to law in cases 
involving fundamental GP by outlining eight major areas of analysis.
First, how the chosen case qualifies as a macro case; that is what are 
the special features the case possesses in order to be seen as a macro 
case. Second, the methods the Court adopts to appease, and/or counter 
its critics. Third, it will be shown what the Court actually does (in 
a positive sense) in the cases. Fourth, the use made of GP in the 
cases will be illustrated. Fifth, it will be questioned whether the
4:1ECJ has used a schema or plan. Sixth, it will be asked why macro 
cases were and are seen as important for EC law. Seventh, it will be 
shown into which category of integration, political, economic or 
defensive the actions can be classified. Eighth, it will be examined 
whether the ECJ has remained constant in its adherence to the 
fundamental principles outlined in the cases and to its policy.
To avoid unnecessary repetition, the following schema is used. One 
case is analysed to illustrate all the above major points. Other 
cases are then analysed selectively to illustrate one or more 
particular points. Finally, an overall evaluation of all macro cases 
discussed is given.
Î
%
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The first case to be analysed, which will deal with all the major
147a
points , is that of Van Gend en Loos. It could be said that this
case is the most famous and possibly the most important in all EC case
law. For example, Pescatore, called Van Gend "a fundamental decision,
one of the most forceful rulings of the Court, which remains fresh and
147b
vigorous as the day it first came out". As such, it is a natural
choice for the most extensive examination.
The facts of the case are as follows: Article 12 EEC states, "Member
States shall refrain from introducing between themselves new customs
duty on imports or exports or any charges having equivalent effect and
from increasing those which already apply in their trade with each
other". In Holland, the firm of Van Gend en Loos imported into that
country a substance "aqueous emulsion of urea-formaldehyde". Under a
pre-treaty customs classification, this product bore 3 percent import
duty. After the implementation of the Treaty by Holland, there was a
re-classification resulting in the duty being increased to 10 percent.
Van Gend en loos appealed against this increase to the Tariefcommissie
invoking the provisions of Article 12. Tlie Tariefcommissie, using the
procedure of Article 177, put the following question to the ECJ,
"Whether Article 12 of the EEC Treaty has direct application within
the territory of a Member State, in other words, whether nationals of
such a State can, on the basis of the Article in question, lay claim
147c
to individual rights which the court must protect."
Van Gend, it is suggested, is an excellent example of a macro case.
As the facts of the case showed, there were at stake several factors
182
of importance to EC law from a constitutional point of view; direct
application of a Treaty article, which Lord MacKenaie Stuart called "a
148
novel and unique feature of EC law". ; protection of the individual 
right of Community citizens; the duty of Member States in the above 
situation.
A further test of a macro case was also passed. Normally, only the
parties to the action before the national court and the Commission
submit written observations. In Van Gend, in addition to these
submissions, the governments of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany
also submitted written observations. Thus as Lord MacKenzie Stuart
149
noted, "interest was considerable". Not only were three of the six
signatory governments agreed upon what was to be done, but also "at
least one of the other governments also would have concurred if it had
at that time been taking an interest in what was happening in the
150a
Community's Institutions".
It is a subjective matter as to whether the issues raised in Van Gend
were controversial. However, reading the submissions of the Member
States gives a possible answer. They were to the effect that Article
12 imposed an obligation on Member States. That if a Member State
failed in that obligation, the Commission could take proceedings
against that offender under Article 169 but there, all governments
agreed, the matter ended. As Pecatore noted "The (original) question
150b
stems from a typically national attitude". Such a clear stance by
the Member States on what, for EC law, was an important issue seems to 
indicate that the matter was of direct and immediate concern to them
183 I
and, therefore, that a particular answer might be controversial. 
Further, this viewpoint is strengthened by, as Advocate General Roemer 
noted, the large measures of competence retained by the Member States 
during that transitional period.
As to whether fundamental GP were raised in the case, the answer is 
given in the section on use of GP.
.How does Court appease its critics? There are four main measures the 
Court uses to appease, or more accurately, to counter the attacks of 
its critics. These methods may be divided into negative and positive 
methods. The first counter can be classed as a negative measure. The 
Court, as a previous section noted, is legally able to give judgments 
which have some measure of political integration. It was mentioned 
there that there were relatively few macro cases. This is due to the 
fact that the Court does not seek to make political statements. It 
pursues the negative course in as many cases as possible. Thus the 
Court has a deliberate policy of inaction. Though it has been argued 
that the ECJ has a duty to promote integration, it does not do so 
through attempting to see constitutional issues in every case. ;|
The second measure is also negative; where the Court does make a 
.statement which has a measure of political content, it is made in a 
less dynamic and fulsome manner than critics may suppose. In the 
Van Gend en Loos decision the Court did not take all the steps 
advocated by the Commission as a necessary and logical consequence of 
direct effect, that is, the Court did not say that a provision which
I
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is entitled to direct effect must, therefore, also prevail over any
national law. Thus it seems the Court, even in this so called dynamic
integration decision, appeased its audience. Stein puts this bluntly,
151
"Clearly the Court exercised judicial restraint "The strong
opposition from the Member governments and its own Advocate General
may have convinced the Court that its ruling affirming the "direct
effect" principle in broadest terms was "sufficient for the day" as 
152
far as it went".
A further explanation of this point is made later on in this section 
where defensive integration is discussed.
The third device used by the ECJ is also negative. In the opinion of
Bredimas and Prott, the Court seeks to satisfy its critics by,
irrespective of what statements of GP are made, slanting the actual
153
decision in favour of the state or fudging the issue altogether.
This seems a bold statement yet the opinion of Bredimas is
unequivocal. She wrote, "Whenever there is a danger, by adopting a
bold position to displease the MS and compromise the desired
evolution, it (the Court) adopts the following technique, it gives a
conservative answer to the facts of the case in question in order to
154
make the propounded principle acceptable".
The fourth part of the Court's appeasement technique is positive. It 
is to make use of the teleological method of interpretation and GP, 
the technique being that the Court deliberately seeks to use these 
methods and GP in constitutional, and more pragmatically.
185
The Van Gend case provides a good example of the amorphous aspect of
principles. Hams on, in a long and, in the main, critical analysis of
Van Gend, believed that, "The end product of Van Gend en Loos is
certainly very questionable", but concluded the decision was, in the
158
end "justifiable". Thus Hamson is reduced to using a subjective
providing a shield against damning criticism, use of GP makes it 
difficult for any comprehensive agreement to be reached on the
4
■Ï
controversial cases whenever possible. A reading of the case makes it
:4;
clear that it was by no means certain that this mode of interpretation
155
was the obvious one to use. However, the attitude of the Court on
this matter is shown by the lucid statement of Judge Pescatore, "The
Court based itself essentially on considerations drawn from the
objectives of the Community, from the structure of the Institutions,
and from the general system of the Treaties. It expressly placed 
.considerations drawn from the "spirit" and the "scheme" of the Treaty
before those arising from the wording, thus making it clear that the
wording can be clearly understood only in the light of the system and
156
the objectives of the legislation".
■
term "justifiable" rather than a scientific wording such as, "the 
decision was incorrect", or "the decision was correct". As well as
,reasoning process of the case and the ultimate decision that follows.
For example, Hamson, a respected academic, on'analysing the case came 
to one conclusion. Lord MacKenzie Stuart, an ECJ judge, on the other 
hand examines both the case itself and Hamson's analysis and disagrees 
with him, stating "the choice taken by the Court ... is justifiable by 
the logic of the decision itself". Though Lord MacKenzie Stuart,
186
national power, he was not dogmatic in his choice of doctrine for
160
attaining this end".
'.s
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going by what has been said above, may be mistaken in seeing the 
decision as being upheld by logic, the main point still remains, that 
two respected authorities can disagree in a case involving GP.
It should be noted that this behavioural pattern of the ECJ, 
appeasement, is not original. It is to be seen in the cases of John 
Marshall. For example, in the case of Gibbons v Ogden, the Court did
not flatly hold that the commerce power was exclusive, that the state
158
had no residium of power over commerce across state lines.
Friedmann said that because of the Federal licensing law "the thrust
.of the case was ambiguous and its full potential was veiled". He went
on to make the interesting statement that, "perhaps the Court wished 
159
it that way". Further Felix Frankfurter, when writing about
Marshall stated, "Uncompromising as was his aim to promote adequate
If these views of Friedmann and Frankfurter are correct, then they 
have several important repercussions for EC law. First, it is 
suggested that the ECJ judges are well aware of the work of the 
Supreme Court and, as will be seen in their cases, make use of their 
methods of appeasement.
Second, the establishment of this policy of appeasement by the Supreme
Court and the ECJ's awareness of the actions of "its closest legal161
relative" make this observation more credible. At first sight,
such an idea that the Court appeases is hard to comprehend, yet it is
'
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suggested the idea is correct.
Third, having stated the validity of the ideas, the historical 
precedent demonstrated may show that appeasement of states is an 
approach that is both credible and complex and deserves study by 
academics.
The third major point to be answered is this, what, in a positive
sense, did the Court actually do in this case? This question is of
a more factual and objective nature than the others, though there is
still room for subjective opinion. Its answer is best supplied by
firstly quoting what Lord MacKenzie Stuart called the classic words of 
162a
the ECJ. "The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish
a Common Market, the functioning of which is of direct concern to
interested parties in the Community, implies that this Treaty is more
than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the
contracting states. This view is confirmed by the preamble of the
Treaty which refers not only to governments but to peoples, it is
also confirmed more specifically by the establishment of institutions
endowed with sovereign rights, the exercise of which affects Member
162b
States and also their citizens".
From this base the Court drew the conclusion "that the Community 
constitutes a new legal order of international law, for the benefit of 
which states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within 
limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member 
States but also their nationals. Independently of the legislation of
188
Member States, Community law, therefore not only imposes obligations
on individuals but also intended to confer upon them rights which
become part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not only
where they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of
obligations, which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon
individuals as well as upon the Member States and upon the
162c
institutions of the Community".
It is contended that the Court is saying the following. By stating
that the EC exists, it is in fact establishing the right of the
Community to exist as a new legal order. Then it begins the task of
protecting the newly-defined Community by attacking sovereignty. As
Stein noted, the Belgian, Dutch and German governments appearing in
the case all took the position most solicitions of national 
163
sovereignty. By its decision, the Court attacked sovereignty in
two ways. In the particular instance, by replacing the international
law concept of the self-executing Treaty by the direct effect
principle with the result that, as Stein noted, "the norms of EG law
have progressively the status of quasi federal law in the national 
164
legal systems". Second, in more general fashion, by declaring the
existence of the EC and protecting that legal order by its actions.
Thus as Pescatore stated, the creation of a new legal order, "is the
consequence of a democratic ideal, meaning that in the community ....
governments may not say any more as they are used to doing in
164b
international law "L'Etat c'est moi". Further the Court clearly
sets out the hierarchy of integration, that is, that the means of 
integration (which are economic) are there in order to advance the
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aims of the Community (which are political). Finally, it deals with 
the actual issue of the case by upholding the doctrine of direct 
effect.
The fourth point, actual use of GP, as opposed to the previous section
where the decision to use GP was discussed, is perhaps, for this
paper, the single most fascinating aspect of the Van Gend case. It is
so, because it is maintained that the case could be seen as the first
example of the use of values. Whatever its legal standing, it is a
fact that the case was appreciated by the ECJ at the time, as being of
great importance for EC law. Thus for this case, not only fundamental
principles, but their underlying values were called upon. The words
actually used by the Court, "This view is confirmed by the preamble to
164c
the Treaty which refers not only governments but to peoples" are,
it is suggested, within the ambit of the previous analysis of the
spirit of the law and thus constitute GP and underlying values. This
point, that the ECJ refers specifically to the preamble (which not all
legal theorists believe constitutes part of the treaties) and more
specifically to "people" supports the argument that the ECJ has
understood, and supports, the full implications in the GP or value of
union, that it is meant to bring the peoples (not just governments) of
Europe closer together. As Pescatore stated "the Community calls for
164d
the participation of everybody".
To reiterate, in what is perhaps the most important case in EC law, 
the judges, in their opinion, felt that fundamental GP and values were
best suited to express their decision. Further the GP and values were
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taken, not from the Member States, but from the Treaties themselves.
In doing so the Court provided a clear example of the importance they, 
as opposed to the Member States, attached to the preamble and, in
particular, to the value "union".
Point five is as follows. This judgment, having such depth and 
complexity, seems hard to understand unless viewed from the 
perspective that a great deal of intellectual effort has taken place 
previously in the ECJ to provide a schema. The Van Gend case is the 
clearest example of this schema in use. A point that might strengthen
I
I
this contention was that the opinion of Advocate General Roemer was 
.disregarded. It is normally the case that the Court pays great heed
(in general), to the opinion of the Advocate General and that these
165
opinions are usually of formidable logic. The fact that on
.analysing the case, the Court decision seems of greater depth than the
opinion of the Advocate General could again give a clue to preparatory
analysis on the part of the Court. As Hamson stated, "It has not, I
think, been sufficienty noted that the Court's decision was upon the
"conclusions contraires" of its Advocate General, the person to whom
it turns for impartial and considered advice upon the law which is its 
166
duty to apply".
A further opinion which strengthens the theory that the ECJ judgment 
was one of great intellectual depth was that of Stein who concludes, 
"It is safe to say, with the benefit of hindsight, that had the Court Ifollowed the governments, Community law would have remained an
167
abstract skeleton".
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contention of considerable force, must have had considerable
168a
Pescatore also was well aware of the force of these opinions. He
Pescatore called it, "the fundamental judgnent ... which forms a
169
turning point in case law". This section, building on the base
I
Thus, the Court in going against this opinion and also the opinions of 
three Member States which taken together produce, as Hamson noted, a
confidence in its own intellectual appraisal of the law of the EC.
wrote "The Court did not follow the course which was suggested to it
168b
with great authority". Seen in this light, a preparatory analysis
.tested against the facts in question is, it is suggested, the most 
likely explanation for the depth of the Court’s judgment, and the 
confidence the Court had in seizing the opportunity to make it. As 
Pescatore stated "The important thing is to see what are the motives 
underlying this decision. The reasoning of the Court showed that the
I'M
I
judges had "une certaine idee de l'Europe" of their own, and that it 
.is this idea which has been decisive and not arguments based on the
168c
legal technicalities of the matter".
Point six is this. Several times in the previous paragraphs the case i
of Van Gend en Loos has been referred to as important. Judge I
that the case has an importance for EC case law is directed towards a 
subtly distinct point. Why did the case have such an effect, in a 
dynamic sense, upon EC law, and upon Community integration in general? 
The answers here, it should be noted, have no connection with any 
action by the ECJ. As a previous section stated, the ECJ is limited 
to giving judgments. The reception, save in a legal sense, by the
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rest of the EC of such judgments is outwith its control. The first
part of the answer can be found by analysing the work of Hams on. In
his criticism of the decision of Van Gend en Loos, he noted "In 1963
the Community was not developing as rapidly and as happily as the
170a
founders had expected". Taken in conjunction with the statement
given earlier on political troubles in EC law that disrupt 
integration, it is suggested that the EC decision, taken when there 
was an absence of normal institutional integration measures, had an 
accelerated impact. To given an analogy, where there is darkness the 
light of a candle assumes an unnatural degree of brightness.
The second part of the answer is a direct development from the above.
From a political and pragmatic survey of the state of the EC and its
institutions in the early sixties and also by reading the deeper
implications of Hamson, it could be that the other institutions
welcomed the ECJ decision as it stated what they themselves wished,
but for political reasons could not legislate. Such a statement may
seem strange but it is contended that is a perfectly valid argument
for these reasons. First, as Murphy and Pritchett suggest a Court may
170b
be seen as an inherent part of the political structure. If so
%then it is natural for EC institutions to pass on their problems to 
the Courts or, more passively, to allow the Court to solve a political 
problem. Second, in the opinion of Karl Duetsch the above scenario 
already happens in an EC MS. He wrote, "at times there has been a 
tendency in the Federal Republic of West Germany to pass difficult 
political problems to the Court, and particularly to the 
Constitutional Court, so as to avoid the stresses and strains of
I
t
193
170c
handling them through the legislative and executive institutions."
Third, a recent EC matter, it is suggested, fits the pattern of the 
Institutions allowing the Court to be used to solve a knotty political ■
problem.
A further aspect of point six, the relative importance of a case is
3
In January 1983, the Common Market fishing policy was, once again, in
disarray. A European MP, Kent Kirk (a Danish fishing boat owner) had
declared that he would provoke an incident by fishing in UK
territorial waters, specifically in order to bring the issue before
the ECJ. Thus it seems that here the Commission/Council interface has
again failed to produce the required legislation, and the Court,
entirely outwith its wishes is to be used as an arm of the 
171a
legislature. If so, then as in Van Gend and Costa there are many
who will welcome this light in the darkness.
A second aspect of this proposed case is that it is of great relevance 
to various states, especially the United Kingdom and Denmark. Thus 
the case becomes, again outwith the ambit of ECJ action, a politically 
controversial macro case. In fact, whatever the Court decides will, 
in some way, be politically and economically unpalatable for a Member 
State.
.
The whole issue is an excellent illustration, even after twenty five 
years of practice, of the muddled and troubled process of legislation
in a new legal order.
'
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that it helps to explain the importance of the ECJ in EC law and
practice. Becker gives an excellent definition of judicial importance
(which he terms judicial level of significance). It is the sum of
relative judicial influence (or power) plus relative judicial 
171b
impact. Previous analysis on this theme has shown that the ECJ
has relatively wide power. Combining this factor with the 
"importance" or import of decisions such as Van Gend it can be seen 
that the ECJ has a high level of significance.
The seventh point in Van Gend is to analyse whether the decision most
closely resembles political, economic or defensive integration. Its
critics and even its supporters seem clear on one thing, namely that
172
the case is one of dynamic political integration. It has already
been argued here that the Court is legally entitled to make decisions 
which have a political integration content, despite what its critics 
may say to the contrary. It is, however, argued that the decision is, 
in fact, one of defensive integration. The reasons for this are as 
follows :
Previous sections gave definitions of political and defensive 
integration and the circumstances best suited to a particular 
decision. In brief, political integration is a long term aim that 
really begins to happen, if at all, only at the later stages of 
integration. It then acts to take the EC in a new direction.
Defensive integration is a short term aim which happens when the EG 
reaches a crisis point, or drastic slowdown in the continuing process 
of integration. It then acts to keep the EC going. It has no further
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aim of its own. A careful reading of the actual wording of the 
statements by the Court together with an analysis of the situation as 
regards the progress of integration in the early sixties, to my mind, 
clearly puts the so-called dynamic integration case of Van Gend en 
Loos into the category of defensive integration.
Point eight deals with continuity, that is, is the ECJ consistent in
its application of what it regards as fundamental principles? This
question is answered unequivocally by Hamson and Pescatore. Hamson
wrote that the principles set out in Van Gend en Loos have been
developed in subsequent cases with a "high degree of consistency and
173
logical coherence". Pescatore stated that Van Gend en Loos "forms
174
the starting point for a line of judgments of supreme importance".
175
He cited Costa v Enel, and Neumann as examples. Further a more
recent case, Simmenthal, provided a clear example of ECJ 
176a
continuity. Pescatore wrote "the Simmenthal Judgement sums up the
development by drawing the final conclusions from the logical sequence
176b
opened by Van Gend en Loos."
The facts in Simmenthal were reference to the Court under Article 177 
of EEC Treaty by the Pretore di Susa (Italy) for a preliminary ruling 
in the action pending before that Court between the Italian Finance 
Administration and Simmenthal on the interpretation of Article 189 of 
the EEC Treaty, and, in particular, on the effects of the direct 
applicability of Community law if it is inconsistent with any
provisions of national law which may conflict with it.
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The Court ruled, "A national Court which is called upon, within the
limits of its jurisdiction, to apply provisions of Community law is
under a duty to give full effect to those provisions, if necessary
refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision of
national legislation, even if adopted subsequently, and it is not
necessary for the Court to request or await the prior setting aside of
176c
such provisions by legislative or other constitutional means." I
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Section 8 - Costa v ENEL
In Costa V ENEL the facts were as follows. In Italy an Italian
nationalisation law was adopted, after ratification by the government
177a
of the EEC Treaty.
MF Costa, a lawyer practising in Milan, claimed he was not under an
obligation to pay 1 ,925 Lire as demanded by the ENTE NAZIONALE PER
L'ENERGIA ELECTTRICA (ENEL). He objected to this before a JP claiming
the law of 6 December 1962 nationalising the electrical industry in
Italy was contrary to certain EEC articles. Costa demanded and
obtained a preliminary reference both to the Italian Constitutional
Court and the ECJ under Article 177 EEC. The Justice of The Peace in
Milan requested a preliminary ruling on the question of whether the
EEC Treaty permitted such a nationalisation law. The Italian
government however, intervened submitting that the request for a
177b
preliminary ruling was "absolutely inadmissable". Its reasoning
was that the Italian Court could not apply the Italian law approving 
the EEC Treaty, and thus, could not ask for a preliminary ruling, 
since the nationalisation law was of more recent origin. If this 
latter law violated the EEC Treaty then the Commission should act 
under Article 169 EEC. The Italian Court had no choice, under Italian 
law it had to apply the more recent law.
The ECJ disagreed with this argument. It stated, "the executive force 
of Community law cannot vary from one state to another in deference to 
subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardising the attainment of the
198
objectives of the Treaty set out in Article 5(2) and giving rise to
discrimination prohibited by Article 7" ... "The obligations
undertaken under the Treaty establishing the Community would not be
unconditional, but merely contingent, if they could be called in
177c
question by subsequent legislative acts of the signatories".
The case of Costa v ENEL is the complement of Van Gend en Loos. As 
the issues are so similar, the statements to be made as regards points 
one to eight, if given in full, would involve needless repetition.
Thus only selected points will be examined and these in a 
comparatively brief manner.
The case is, of course, a macro case that is, the major legal issue,
primacy, is of great importance to EG law and affects all states.
Further the states themselves took a direct interest in the case even
though only one, Italy, was directly involved. As to whether the
issue was controversial Lord MacKenzie Stuart (writing in the late
seventies) warned that the situation in Costa v ENEL should not be 
178
overdramatised. However, it is probable that Pescatore was more
accurate in his assessment when he wrote, "The Court was requested by
179
an Italian Court to deal with an "explosive" preliminary question".
Having established that Costa v ENEL was indeed a macro case and, 
therefore, one which admits of all the ramifications of "government by 
judges" it should be questioned whether the Court acted to appease its 
critics. There is support for the view that it did indeed act in this 
way. The appeasement consisted of two distinct actions or more
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accurately one inaction and one action. The inaction,was noted by
Bredimas who claimed that while the Court proclaimed the primacy of 
.Community law, "it did not come to grips with the substance of the
180
case, viz nationalisation of the Italian Electric Industry," This
is, of course, a subjective assessment but a survey of the case does
seem to bear out her contention. Secondly, the Court chose to use a
broad interpretative method and GP and/or values. As Pescatore
states, "Here again the arguments are drawn from a fundamental
181
analysis and a view of the Treaty drawn as a whole".
What did the ECJ actually do (in a positive sense) in the case? In
brief, it enforced or upheld the GP of primacy of EC law over national
law. The GP of primacy is too well known to need more than a brief
explanation. The main idea behind primacy is the unity of European
law. The European Community has a legal system that is common to
several states. National law is relevant to one state only. There
must, to safeguard the Community system as a unitary legal order, be a
clearly defined hierarchy between Community law and national law. As
Pescatore noted Costa v ENEL was, and is, the leading judgment on 
182
primacy.
It is possibly more relevant to note the timing of the Costa judgment. 
It was this factor that gave the judgment its true significance. 
Pescatore wrote, "the full significance of this judgment can be 
appreciated only if it is borne in mind that it was given shortly 
after a judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court which had 
declared itself in a manner unfavourable to the pre-eminence of the
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here which is relevant to both cases. No matter how deeply the cases 
of Van Gend en Loos and Costa v ENEL are examined and the list of 
actual pronouncements made by the court scrutinised for dynamic 
political instance or initiative, it is contended that they say
MacKenzie Stuart noted, the arguments of the critics of the Court
185
should in reality be directed against the Treaties themselves.
The eighth point, the Court's consistency in its adherence to
183
Community law".
With the establishment of the doctrine, or GP, of primacy the Court
has thus completed the work began in Van Gend, that is two major GP
which underpin integration, direct effect and primacy, have been
184
established in EG law.
.Further points are very similar to points made in Van Gend and are
,thus passed over without comment. This leads, therefore, to the 
.question was Costa a political, economic or defensive integration
decision? It is once again contended that the case resembles, most
.closely, the model of defensive integration. The reasons are similar 
to those in Van Gend. Further, an additional point should be made
■ Ï.R
nothing, either individually or collectively, that is either not
explicitly written into, or that cannot, in a clear logical fashion,
,be deduced from the Treaties and preambles. If this is so, then, as
-p.:
I
fundamental principles is again answered positively. Pescatore 
,confirmed that the "same theme has been taken up in several 
186
judgments."
j?
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Section 9 - Defrenne v SABENA
The case of Defrenne v SABENA illustrates two points in 
187a
particular. The appeasement by the ECJ of its critics; its use of
GP in doing so. Second the case demonstrates the mental "set" of the 
ECJ with regard to integration vis a vis other GP, that is, its use in 
this case of its schema.
In Defrenne v SABENA the facts were as follows: The case concerned an
action between an air hostess and her employer SABENA S.A. over 
compensation claimed by her on account of discrimination in terms of 
pay as compared with male colleagues who were doing the same work.
This resulted in the Cour du Travail, Brussels referring, under 
Article 177, EEC, two questions to the ECJ.
The first question asked whether Article 119 of the Treaty introduced
"directly into the national law of each Member State the principle
that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work and does
it, therefore, independently of any material provision entitle workers
to institute proceedings before national courts in order to ensure its
187b
observance and if so as from what date?"
The second question asked was "has Article 119 become applicable in
the internal law of the Member States by virtue of measures adopted
by the authorities of the European Economic Community (if so, which,
and as from what date?) or must the national legislature be regarded
187c
as alone competent in this matter?"
:
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The Court ruled; "The principle that men and women should receive
equal pay, which is laid down by Article 119 may be relied on before
188a
the national courts". The application of Article 119 was to have
been fully secured by the original Member States from 1st January,
1962 and by the new Member States from 1st January, 1973. "Even in 
those areas in which Article 119 has no direct effect, that provision 
cannot be interpreted as reserving to the national legislature 
exclusive power to implement the principle of equal pay since, to the 
extent to which such implementation is necessary, it may be achieved 
by a combination of Community and national provision.
Except as regards these workers who have already brought legal
proceedings or made an equivalent claim, the direct effect of Article
119 cannot be relied on in order to support claims concerning pay
188b
periods prior to the date of this judgment".
Before examining the two points in detail, it should be noted that 
Defrenne v SABENA conforms to macro case specifications. First, the 
case once again concerned, in the main, the GP of direct effect, which 
affects all EC MS. Second, Member States not directly involved in the 
case were also interested in the result of the case for both the 
United Kingdom and the Irish Republic put forward an argument against 
the direct effect of Article 119. Finally, the case was controversial 
in that a particular decision would cause resentment by some states. 
This was clear from a reading of the statement by Advocate General 
Trabucchi who noted; "the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the 
Irish Republic both of whom appear to be peculiarly sensitive to what
203 -
188c
might be called the cost of the operation". Î
It is believed that the ECJ deliberately appeased its critics in this
case in the following manner. It limited the direct effect of Article 
.119 to the judgment itself and subsequent EC law. Thus it was not 
made retroactive.
It is, of course, a subjective matter, but a reading of the entire
case, and in particular the statement of Advocate General Trabucchi
makes a strong argument, legally speaking, for retroactive effect. In
particular Trabucchi, after giving the argument of the United Kingdom
and the Irish Republic against the direct effect of Article 119 stated
unequivocally that; "Arguments of this kind, however pressing on the
188d
grounds of expediency, have no relevance in law". Further, he
,followed up this remark with a most convincing precedent; "This Court
did not deem it necessary to alter its interpretation of Article 95
which, in Germany, resulted in a large number of applications and 
.created difficulties for the fiscal courts. The Court declared "This 
argument is not by itself of such a nature as to call in question the 
correctness of the interpretation (judgment of 3rd April 1968 in case 
28/67 Molkerei-Zentrale Westfalen v Hauptzollamt Paderborn (1968) ECR
■ l88i  ^ ---------------------------------------------
at p.153)."
Further, an analysis of the work of Hamson confirms this opinion. He 
wrote; "It is an odd result. The interpretation ... is such that 
the Court is compelled to claim and to exercise a dispensing power 
which is, I believe, not known to any modern Court of any of the
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Member States" ..."Such a function does not appear to have been
190
allocated to the Court of Justice by Article 164" ..."the Court has
decided to sever the legal world - the world in which it operates -
191
from the world of what are called real or actual events."
Finally, Bredimas also came to similar conclusions, she wrote that
this case was "a clear example" of her theory of judicial appeasement
given earlier in this section. She concluded the Court "gave heed to
the observations submitted by the governments of Ireland and the 
192
United Kingdom".
Why did the Court follow what it must have known was, legally
speaking, a controversial course? The answer is, it is believed, that
it deviated from its expected course regarding Article 119 in order to
avoid what it saw as a greater evil. The statement by Schermers is an
accurate assessment both of the problem and the solution chosen;
"featuring that this would lead to monumental economic disturbances -
the Court of Justice chose to extend the protection of legal certainty
193
to an illegal situation". More concisely, Hamson labelled the
194
consequence of any other ECJ decision "chaos". The recognition of
state interests thus became a crucial factor for the ECJ to consider. 
This, it should be emphasised, is a legitimate factor for the Court to 
take into account. Lord MacKenzie Stuart has made this clear; 
"Moreover, although we are dealing with a Community and its 
progressive integration, we must not forget that we are also dealing 
witn independent Member States, each with its own national interest.
It is only realistic to recognise that the Community legal order, to
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be effective, must also accommodate legitimate national 
195
requirements".
If the above is correct, then the Defrenne case is a prime example of 
the ECJ bowing to the will of states. It is, in fact, the exact 
opposite of the government by judges theory favoured by ECJ critics. 
Here the wide scope of GP is again used to conceal the decision­
making process and thus to forestall the wrath of critics. In direct 
contrast to Van Gend, here the critics purely from the legal point of 
view should be, not states but knowledgeable European practitioners 
e.g. Hamson.
The case reveals exactly how the ECJ's attitude operates. Once again,
it is maintained that the decision, disagreeing with the Advocate
General not on a major legal issue but on a vital practical issue,
best be seen as being the result of a deep, predetermined conviction,
defensive integration. Here defensive integration acts not to pull
the EC through an existing dangerous situation, but to prevent one
happening. Many theorists prophesied that chaos would be the result
196
of retroactivity of Article 119. Thus integration is threatened
and in turn union would also be threatened and therefore integration 
becomes a consideration in the case. In order to uphold the perennial 
fundamental GP of integration, the ECJ elevates the GP of legal 
certainty to fundamental status. In this instance, in the case of 
Defrenne v SABENA legal certainty is the explicit GP but in reality it 
is merely the concrete expression of the Court's adherence to the 
implicit GP of integration.
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A final point of interest in this case is the actual use (as 
distinguished from what was previously discussed, namely the decision 
to use) of GP by the Court.
A reading of the case illustrates one major facet of GP; their great
flexibility when used as a tool to accomplish a task. This
characteristic was noted by Schermers, who restricted himself to the
mild comment that; "This is indeed an illustration of the wide scope
legal certainty may have and an example of the vast discretion the 
197
Court exercises". More appropriate perhaps might be a statement
by the French jurist, Salleilles; "One wills at the beginning the
198
result, one finds the principle afterwards."
1'I
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SECTION 10 - THE ERTA CASE
In ERTA the case turned on the validity of a deliberation of the
Council relating to the negotiation of an agreement with third 
199
states. The Council had tried to withdraw its work from the
jurisdiction of the Court. Its reason was that the deliberation in
question was a political consideration between states, and as such,
outwith the ambit of judicial control. Pescatore termed this "an
attempt to introduce into the Community the idea of an act of 
200a
state."
The Court again disagreed with the above argument by the Council. It 
stated; "Under Article 173, the Court has a duty to review the 
legality of "acts of the Council .. other than recommendations or 
opinions" ..
"The objective of this review is to ensure, as required by Article 
164, observance of law in the interpretation and application of this 
treaty."
"It would be inconsistent with this objective to interpret the
conditions under which the application is admissible so restrictively
as the limit the availability of this procedure merely to the
200b
categories of measures referred to by Article 189."
What is so exceptional about this case that caused Winter to designate
it as even more daring and dynamic than Van Gend en Loos and Costa v
201
ENEL; or in other words, why is ERTA a macro case?
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The first factor which gives the clue is that, as in other 
"exceptional" cases such as Van Gend and Defrenne, the Court went 
against the opinion of the Advocate General, here Dutheillet de 
Lamothe. The Advocate General had largely concurred with the opinion 
of the Council that there was no breach of Treaty obligation in the 
present case. He stated that the appeal should be declared 
inadmissible. It was also noted by the AG that an extensive 
interpretation of the treaty-making power of the Community would 
amount to law-making in the manner of the Roman Praetors and that such 
an operation would go far beyond anything the Court has ever done in 
the way of audacious treaty interpretation.
The Court's reaction to this was cool. As Winter noted; "It can
hardly be said that the Court was impressed by the admonition of
202
M. Dutheillet de Lamothe,"
The second and third factors, interest to EC law, interest to EC 
institutions and Member States with possibly controversial 
consequences can be clearly illustrated by setting out the positions 
of the opposing institutions. The Commission represented the interest 
of the Community and its institutions, claiming that the principle of 
attributed power should not be applied with the utmost strictness in 
the field of the Community's external powers in an area with so many 
international aspects as transport. The Council by contrast, favoured 
a narrow definition of the Community's external power and sought to 
protect the sovereignty of the MS in the foreign field from an 
allegedly illegal limitation by the Community.
209
These factors contained in the respective positions; Community 
interest; wide versus narrow definitions of law, sovereignty and the 
fight between the Community and the states over where power shall lie 
are the consistent themes that run through all "dynamic" or macro 
cases. Bearing in mind the attitude of the ECJ on such issues, the 
methods which were used to arrive at their decision are readily 
explicable.
This case, despite being a so-called daring and dynamic example of
judicial activity, is also an example of counter measures against
states. This was done by, once again, the deliberate choice of the
ECJ to employ the teleological method of interpretation and the major
employment of GP and or values in its reasoning. Thus, despite the
arguments being concerned with rules, the judgment, to a great extent
is based on principles. As Pescatore noted; "In the same vein (as
Costa V ENEL and Van Gend en Loos) in ERTA the Court developed its
conception on the contractual power of the Community in its relations
with third states, starting from a consideration of the legal
personality of the Community in conjunction with the general
objectives defined by the fundamental provisions of the Treaty and the
requirements of the effectiveness of Community Law. The specific
rules applicable to these negotiations were similarly deduced from a
consideration of the general system of powers in relation to external 
203a
relations."
For example, in examining whether there was a Community competence in 
the external field in the sphere of transport, the Court first laid
%
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the basis for its rejection on the GP of attributed competence; "One
must turn to the general system of Community law relating to the
agreements with non-member states ... regard should be had to the
whole system of the Treaty no less than to its specific 
203b
provisions."
As regards use of principles, two points emerge. First, as Winter
notes it is not universally recognised that principles needed to play
204
such a major part in the reasoning of the Court. This lends
support to Van Gerven's contention that the Court prefers principles 
205a
to rules. The second point is that the ambiguity of the GP is a
potent factor in practical decision-making. As Winter stated;
"Proponents of the Council's view would consider that the "general
system" or the "whole scheme of the Treaty" is apt to suggest their 
205 b
view." Thus, by use of GP the reasoning process is effectively
shielded.
The method of appeasement used by the ECJ in this case was far from
subtle. As stated, Bredimas has put forward the theory that the Court
gave a conservative answer to the facts of the case in order to make
206
the principle acceptable. The ERTA case was mentioned by her as a
major example of this theory in action. She wrote; "In the ERTA case
this dichotomy can be clearly detected. Following the statement that
the Commission has the power to negotiate International transport
agreements, it was held that, on the facts of the case the Council
should continue undertaking negotiations because the Commission had
207
not taken the appropriate steps in time,"
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the case, it is submitted, shows that the Court in fact said far more 
than this. As such the decision must be seen as a political
the decision could forestall a potential crisis, not applying here.
:
Into what category, political, economic or defensive integration does 
.the ERTA case fit? In general the case is a prime example of the 
struggle, within the legal framework of the Treaties, among the 
Institutions with the states as interested spectators. Equally the 
actual decision was a prime example of a long term policy judgment.
Winter concluded his article on the ERTA case with a remark which
r::!r
.reveals deep insight into the far-reaching implications of the 
judgment, "the Court's judgment in this case may well augur favourably 
for the possibility of enhancing the Community stature as an 
autonomous legal personality in the sphere of international relations.
It seems to constitute one battle won over those who are loth to see
the Community assume its proper dimensions and gain significant legal 208
power."
ERTA is thus a rare example of a decision of political integration. 
Clearly it is not a decision coming under the previously outlined 
scope of defensive integration; that is, there was no external crisis 
resulting in a need for basic re-statement of EC aims. A reading of
.integration policy statement, the final excuse, as in Defrenne that
212  -
Section 11 - Macro Gases - Conclusions
Having made the bulk of comments on the ECJ and its handling of macro
cases within the cases themselves, it remains only to re-emphasise the
!following major points.
First, the cases seen as a whole showed a strong element of 
continuity. That is, judicial decisions on constitutional law 
conformed to what the Court considered fundamental GP constituting the 
spirit of the law. It could be stated therefore, that Koopmans was
I
correct in his assumption that; "The actual climate of European law
209
appears to favour the evolution of stare decisis". Further, it is
argued that the Court was correct to be consistent in its judgments.
Such action is for the good of the Community in that it upholds the GP 
.of legal certainty. Further from the Court's own viewpoint, use of
its power in this manner safeguards such power for the future. As
Koopmans concluded; "If a Court's "awesome power" is not used with a
210
minimum of consistency, its importance will rapidly vanish."
Second, use by the Court both of GP and values in the macro cases, 
clearly showed the Court emphasised the spirit rather than the letter 
of the law. Such practice reserves for the Court the power to 
determine the future content of EC constitutional law. It should be 
noted, however, that this apparently wide power is curbed by the need 
for consistency in judgments.
.Third, it is suggested that, by its deliberate emphasis on the 
"people" of Europe in Van Gend en Loos, the Court upholds the idea
.1982) that; "For the moment, however, and for the years to come the
- 213 -
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that the Community is more than an agreement among states. That is,
it repudiates the idea that the Community is run by, and for, the 
,benefit of states and their institutions and interest groups.
«Fourth, the macro cases introduced the GP of primacy and direct 
effect, the twin pillars upon which the GP of integration rests, into 
EC law. The effect of such action has been analysed in many books and 
periodicals.
The fifth point is a comment on the political content of ECJ action in 
macro cases. it is suggested that the Court has done no more than its
legal duty in such cases. Further, its actions amount to no more than 
the establishment of a firm base for EC constitutional law. The
following statements are possible reasons as to why the actions of the 
ECJ have gained an exaggerated importance. The natural administrative 
difficulties in starting a new legal order ensure that a 
disproportionate amount of work falls to the Court. The unfortunate 
failure to resolve such difficulties and the appearance of new
problems lead to the situation described by Koopmans. He wrote (in
EC, with their weak political tradition and their defective
legislative machinery, could scarcely do without this "awesome power" 
211
(of the Court)." These problems, totally outwith the control and
responsibility of the EC, tend to give EC case decisions a political 
importance in the eyes of EC institutions and subjects.
I
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SECTION 12 - MICRO CASES
Due to the aforementioned importance of Section 12 in itself and due
to the thesis as a whole, eight points will be noted before going onto 
the classification of GP and analysis of cases.
The first point is to give an explanation of the concept micro cases. 
Speaking generally, micro cases are cases where the political and
situation. Thus the specific definition of micro cases is that micro
39A42K
%
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It might seem that the main force of this dissertation is exhausted
now that the macro cases have, in the main, been dealt with. However
in reality a more important aspect of use of GP by the ECJ is now
dealt with, the micro cases involving GP.
-
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also to the need for this section to be seen in its proper 
relationship to the foregoing sections dealing with macro cases, and
i
constitutional issues raised by macro cases are absent, that is where
the main area of importance to all concerned with the case is the
212point or points of law at issue. A more precise definition of
micro cases and their interaction with GP may be given by using some
analysis of Schermers as a starting point. Schermers wrote that one
could distinguish three groups of GP, compelling GP, regulatory GP and
GP native to the Community legal order. Further, he noted that
213compelling GP were subjectively decided by each society. Section
3 of this chapter suggested that GP could be clearly categorised as 
fundamental GP and all other GP. Further for Community law the only 
compelling or fundamental GP was integration, along with any other 
principle or principles that upheld integration in any particular fact
:
 _
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cases are all cases that deal with GP other than compelling GP.
It should be noted that it is purely a subjective matter for the ECJ,
MS, institutions and individual EC citizens to decide whether any
particular case is a micro or macro case * Further not all parties
214need agree on the definition of any one particular case. It 
should also be noted that the micro and macro cases distinction is
not, and is not meant to be a total separation of such cases. That is,
some micro cases will have macro elements and some macro cases will 
have micro elements.
Having stated what micro cases are the second point may now be
broached. It is that this section will not be a complete record of
every GP used by the ECJ. Nor will it cover all cases that deal with
the selection of GP that are given. It is argued that such extensive
analysis would produce little more information relevant to this thesis
than can be gained from a selective study of cases. Further as new GP
constantly enter EC law the worth of such work is doubtful. As
Kutscher noted "the number of principles ... which the Court has at
215its disposal when interpreting the law is almost incalculable".
The third point to be made follows closely upon the above. It is that 
no attempt will be made to speculate upon which GP that have not as 
yet been used by the Court, ought to be used in future cases.
a
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The fourth point picks up again the analysis by Schermers noted in
point one. Schermers (and others) attempt to force GP used in EC law
into definite categories which have fixed weight vis a vis each other,
that is they enforce on GP a definite hierarchy* This practice is not
followed in this section for the following reasons. Chapter II noted
that the weight on any GP vis a vis each other depends on the fact
situation not on pre-determined theory. In that chapter it was stated
that for EC law even the GP of integration, because it is a GP and not
a rule, cannot always outweigh all other GP in all actual and
potential fact situations. Finally the statement by Hartley is given
to show that rigid clarification by weight is mistaken. Referring to
a particular GP in EC law that has its origin in national law, which
in most national classification systems is pf light weight, he said,
when speaking of a particular EC fact situation , "national provisions
are more likely to have more weight than other GP. Further GP need
216arise only from the constitution of one MS",
To sum up this important point, classification of GP into a rigid
weight system shows a lack of understanding of the true nature of GP,
Point five argues that it is of little relevance to note from which
Member States or Member State GP used by the ECJ eminate. Bredimas
wrote "Indeed it is difficult to establish a definite influence of a 
217certain MS", Thus, as Bredimas noted, such analysis yields 
little positive evidence. Further even if it did show x state or
states was influential this would mean little, for while many GP
- 217 -
derived from national sources are greatly similar in SC law, there is 
no necessity for the Court to make such a direct adaptation. Also 
worthy of consideration is the fact given by Usher that "for the most 
part the national concepts used by the Court are more general in
218
Finally the view of Lord Mackenzie Stuart is given. His statement, it 
is submitted, goes some way to explaining such judicial reticence. It
nature". Finally, the ECJ may adopt a GP from national law 
keeping the meaning that GP had in municipal use almost unaltered but 
then use it in a new way for a new purpose.
Equally relevant is the statement by Warner on what the comparative 
process is not. He wrote "The comparative process does not consist in
a competition between the MS each striving to transfer as much as it 
can of its own law into the common system".
It should also be noted that the court itself has no inclination to■
devote its time to explaining where GP were taken from and what
importance (if any) this fact has for EC law. As Mann said "only
rarely has the Court elaborated its reference to a GP of municipal
1
f
. :is also, it is believed, equally applicable in the fields of academic
research. He quotes Lord Porter who stated: "The human mind tries, 
and vainly tries to give a particular subject matter a higher degree 
of definition than it will admit". Lord Mackenzie Stuart then goes on 
to plead for the simpler approach stating "However much one may admire
,the intellectual capacity to define a concept out of existence, a
II
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judge is unlikely to find in such a result the assistance he 
222needs". In short the Court, it is suggested, sees this task as 
relatively unimportant. Further paying undue attention to national 
law concepts might call the GP of primacy of EC law into question.
Point six continues from point five. While, as stated, it is of 
little value to over-analyse points of origin of GP, it is relevant to 
find all possible sources of GP, i.e. the reservoir of GP and how such 
GP are adapted to fit the needs of the Community legal order. This 
has already been done in section 4. Further it is also relatively 
important to note the number of ways GP can enter the particular case. 
This will be done in passing during the course of this section.
Point seven deals with the hierarchy of cases, that is, it attempts to 
find whether certain cases are more important than other cases. If 
so, they should receive more attention than other cases involving GP. 
Such a question can, of course, only produce a subjective answer. For 
example with regard to the major themes of this thesis individual 
macro cases are worthy of deeper study than individual micro cases. 
Subjectively, and perhaps objectively speaking, there can be little 
doubt that the single macro case of Van Gend, for example, is more 
important for EC law than any micro case. The statements in the 
section dealing with that case, especially those of Pescatore and 
Stein make clear that they regard Van Gend as a case of major import 
for EC law. However it will be shown later that, collectively 
speaking, the micro cases are more important for the long term future
— 219 —
development of EC law than are all macro cases, even when seen 
collectively.
Unlike the macro cases, the individual micro cases have no deep 
political points. Their range of influence is limited to the legal 
issues raised by that case. The intellectually provocative handling 
of GP by the Court, to a large degree is absent.
Of greater relevance than individual micro cases are various groupings 
of micro cases. For example where there is little or no law e.g. 
competition law concerning provisional validity of agreements between 
undertakings, a GP may be an important, or perhaps the most important 
factor in settling a specific fact situation. A series of such cases 
provides an opportunity to study both how the case law develops and 
how the ECJ attempts to define the meaning of the relevant principle 
or principles through the cases. Such a series of cases is examined 
in Chapter VII.
This point is concluded with some theoretical observations taken, in 
the main, from Chapter II. No series of cases can totally define a 
GP. The number of potential dissimilar fact situations to which one 
GP can apply is almost infinite. The relevance of a GP to any case 
may vary from being a minor consideration among others to the major or 
only source of action depending on the actual fact situation.
Point eight concerns the fact that section 12 uses a classification 
223system for GP. It lists some of the arguments for and against
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use of such a system. The main arguments against employing a system 
are these: First, most people when creating such a system endow it
with a subjective hiearchial order e.g. that the GP of legal certainty 
and all GP coming under it are, for EG law, fundamental GP. This 
goes against the previously stated opinion that GP have a constantly 
evolving weight vis a vis each other. Second, no system can ever be 
complete. While this is a fairly obvious danger it is still 
comparatively easy, once the work is completed, to reply too much upon 
the system and fail to keep up to date with any developments of 
established GP or any new GP that arise in practice.
Third, no system is ever free of some degree of overlap between 
headings and, in some cases, there may be wrong or disputed 
classification of a particular principle or principles.
The major arguments for classification are, it is contended, that 
principles do fall into loose natural groups. Also it is possible to 
construct a system without loading it with a hierarchy of importance.
A more minor, but still important point is that a well thought out 
system speeds the task of listing, and retrieving when wanted, every 
GP that comes before the Court. On balance therefore it is worthwhile 
to employ a classification system.
As to the system used in Chapter 12, it is, as stated, a loose 
classification of GP into various groups. Principles that do not 
naturally come under any group are listed individually. Some 
principles e.g. legal certainty and fundamental human rights are given
Î
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a dual role - as head of taxonomic groups, as GP in their own right. 
For the sake of clarity all GP serving as group headings are 
underlined in the synopsis that follows. Further the system attaches 
no importance to the order in which the material is presented.
Finally as to the system used in this thesis it must be pointed out 
that it is based, in the main, on the system used by Schermers, this 
system being, in the opinion of the author, both comprehensive and 
comprehens ib le .
«
j
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SURVEY OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Legal Certainty
Specific Time Limits
Acquired Rights
Non-Rectroactivity of Legislative Acts
Legitimate Expectations
Use of Understandable Language
223
Fair Application of the Law
Equity, Natural Justice and Fairness
Proportionality
Good Faith1 0 .
Solidarity1 1 .
Fundamental Human Rights12 .
The Right to be Heard13.
Non Bis in Idem14.
Freedom of Trade Union Activity15.
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16. Equality or the Prevention of Discrimination
17. Unjust Enrichment
18. Force Majeur
19. Legitimate Self Defence
20. Estoppel
21. Community Preference
22. Res Judicata pro Veritate Accepitus
23. Cessante Rations Legis , Cessât et Ipsa lex
24. Continuity of the Legal System
25. Unity of the Market
:II
'I
■
principle so general that it cannot really be ascribed to any
226particular national source". As such it ought to be of
227importance to Community law. Hartley for example believes it to
the ex-President of the Court of Justice said of legal certainty "The 
principle that vested rights must be respected and that all laws must 
not be retroactive provides the basis of legal certainty in all the
legislation of the MS, that in exceptional cases they may be adapted
to a certain extent .
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Before starting to analyse the twenty-five GP listed it should be 
noted that, while using actual ECJ cases as the major, and most 
authorative, source of reference material the work of various eminent 
authors on GP in EC law, Hartley, Mertens de Wilmars, Schermers, Toth 
and Usher is used as a secondary source.
1. Legal Certainty
The concept of legal certainty springs from the need for the
application of the law to a specific situation to be predictable. The
GP of legal certainty has been seen as having great importance for all
legal orders. For example Schermers designated it as "a principle
225underpinning any legal system", while Usher noted that "it is a
:E
be the most important GP of Community law.^^^ Mertens de Wilmars,
legal systems of the MS. It may be said that the case law of the 
.Court of Justice has adopted those principles as they stand, whilst at 
the same time it should be recognised, and is recognised in the
, 229
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The principle has many concrete applications within Community law.
Usher stated, "it is now often used as a means of interpreting
Community acts in such away as to ensure their validity rather than as
230a criterion to determine their validity". Further, "the modern
use of the principle of legal certainty often conflicts with
lawfulness, that is, the two GP's are weighed against each other in a
. • 1  u 231particular case .
In order to illustrate the GP of legal certainty within the EC some 
cases involving the concept are examined.
232In the Bosch Case the facts were as follows. In 1903 Bosch
granted Van Rijn the exclusive rights to sell all its products in the
Netherlands market. To protect the exclusive rights of sale, both of
Van Rijn and all other agents similarly bound Bosch concluded with
each national purchaser, within the framework of a sales contract that
"Except with our written permission Bosch products may not be exported
233abroad either directly or indirectly”. During 1959 and 1960 de
Geus imported Bosch products into the Netherlands from Germany. The
254
German sellers were bound by an undertaking not to export them abroad.
The court ruled that "In general it would be contrary to the general
principle of legal certainty - a rule of law to be upheld in the
application of the Treaty - to render agreements automatically void
before it is even possible to tell which are the agreements to which
235Article 85 as a whole applies".
_L.y:
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236lïi Portelange v Marchant the facts were as follows. On 1st July
1961 Smith Corona Marchant granted to Portelange exclusive sale and 
distribution rights in Belgium and Luxemburg on certain of their 
products. When Smith Corona Marchant made a new product, electric 
copying machines, these were included, by implication, in the 
contract. On 6th October 1966 Smith Corona Marchant repudiated the 
contract soley with regard to the copying machines.
The above sequence of events resulted in a case where the following 
arguments were expounded. Smith Corona Marchant pleaded in Court that 
the agreement was void under Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty. 
Portalange maintained that even if the agreement was contrary to that 
article it had provisional validity since it had been notified to the 
EEC Commission within the time limit laid down by regulation Nol7/62 
and the Commission had not yet taken a decison under Article 85(3).
The ECJ was asked for a ruling by the Tribunal de Commerie under
Article 177 EEC "How are Article 85 of the EEC Treaty and the
implementing regulations adopted under it to be interpreted as regards
the effects of the provisional validity acknowledged in the case of
agreements which have been notified in due time to the Commission of
the European Communities, before the commencement by the latter of
237the procedure provided for in Article 9 of Regulation Nol7?".
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The Court said - "it would be contrary to the general principle of 
legal certainty to conclude that, because agreements notified are not 
finally valid so long as the Commission has made no decision on them 
under Article 85(3) of the Treaty, they are not completely 
efficacious.
Although the fact that such agreements are fully valid may possibly
give rise to practical disadvantages the difficulties which might
arise from uncertainty in legal relationships based on the agreements
238notified would be still more harmful".
Thus the ruling was that Agreements referred to in Article 85(1) of 
the Treaty, which have been duly notified under Regulation No 17/62, 
are fully valid so long as the Commission has made no decision under 
Article 85(3) and the provisions of the said regulations.
The facts of the Brasserie de Haecht v Wilkin-Janssen
239Case facts were as follows. In 1963 Brasserie de Haecht
concluded contracts with Wilkin-Janssen who undertook to exclusively 
obtain supplies of beer, liquors and soft drinks from de Haecht. In 
consideration of the above agreement de Haecht loaned Wilkin-Janssen 
furniture and a sum of money. When Wilkin-Janssen failed to honour 
their exclusive purchase obligation, de Haecht (in 1966) went to the 
Tribunal de Commerie of Liège for repayment of the loan, return of 
the furniture and payment of damages. In May 1967 the Tribunal de
229
Commerie referred a preliminary question on the interpretation of 
Article 85 to the ECJ. This was answered by the Court in its 
judgement of 12 December 1967.^^^
The ECJ in answer to the preliminary questions of the Tribunal de 
Commerce stated in 1972.
"There is, therefore, room for distinction in applying Article 85(2), 
between agreements and decisions existing before the implementation of 
Article 85 by regulation No.17, hereinafter called old agreements and 
agreements and decisions entered into after that date, hereinafter 
called new agreements.
In the case of old agreements, the general principle of contractual 
certainty requires, particularly when the agreement has been modified 
in accordance with the provisions of Regulation No.17, that the Court 
may only declare it to be automatically void after the commission has 
taken a decision by virtue of that Regulation.
In the case of new agreements , as the Regulation assumes that so long 
as the Commission has not taken a decision the agreement can only be 
implemented at the parties' own risk, it follows that notifications in 
accordance with Article 4(1) of Regulation No.17 do not have 
suspensive effect.
EES
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cannot however, absolve the Court from the obligation of deciding on 
the claims of interested parties who invoke the automatic
nullity".
legal order the relevant question has been thus phrased by Schermers, 
"Can a time limit be invoked as a general principle of law when no
Whilst the principle of legal certainty requires that, in applying the 
prohibitions of Article 85, the sometimes considerable delays by the 
Commission in exercising its powers should be taken into account, this
In general it could be said that the importance of the GP of legal
certainty was and is deary recognised by the ECJ. Equally it should 
be noted that, as the Second Brasserie de Haecht Case shows, the
;
principle of legal certainty has not degenerated into a rule that 
automatically applies in every instance, that is, the principle has 
limitations. To quote Schermers "... legal certainty is not a 
compelling legal principle which must be safeguarded at all costs.
The Court rather regards legal certainty as a desirable end but as one 
which can be outweighed by more momentous legal rules or even by
i
■considerations of a more pressing economic or practical
. . 242character .
2. Specific Time Limits
The first subheading under legal certainty is specific time limits.
As Schermers noted "Time limits and periods of limitation serve to 
ensure legal certainty. Uncertainty about the possibility of acts :
being annulled or of the state of inaction being changed is terminated
243on the passing of the prescribed time limit". For the Community
i
£
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express provisions have been made?"^^^ This question has been 
discussed several times by the Court, The following cases are given 
as examples.
In the Steel Subsidies Case the relevant considerations of the Court 
245were as follows.
"It follows, however from the common purpose of Articles 33 and 35 
that the requirements of legal certainty and of the continuity of 
Community action underlying the time limits laid down for bringing 
proceedings under Article 33 must also be taken into account - having 
regard to the special difficulties which the silence of the competent 
authorities may involve for the interested parties in the exercise of 
the rights conferred by Article 35".
"Thus it is implicated in the system of Articles 33 and 35 that the
exercise of the right to raise the matter with the Commission may not
247be delayed indefinitely".
In the Riva Case the Commission charged a levy after an eight year 
period had p a s s e d . Riva submitted that such action was contrary 
to the GP of legal certainty. The Court held "The absence of 
provisions relating to the barring by time of the powers of 
organisations competent to draw up estimates of their own authority of 
the quantities and periods for which undertakings are subject to the 
duty to contribute to the equalisation scheme is explained by the 
desire of the legislature that in this respect the principle of
distributive justice should prevail over that of legal
 ^  ^ . 249certainty .
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Other relevant cases that came before the court were those of Premiums
250for Grubbing Fruit Trees, Lorenz and the Pfutzenreuter Case.
Of particular interest are The Quinine Cartel Cases and the Dyestuffs 
251Cases. They are excellent examples of how the ECJ continually
develops its use of a GP in similar fact situations. The Quinine
Cartel Cases concerned the fact that "the provisions governing the
power of the Commission to impose fines in cases of infringement of
the competitoin rules did not provide for a statute of 
252limitations". In the Quinine Cartel Cases Chemiefarma was fined
for acts committed between four and six years earlier and attempted to 
invoke such a Statute. The Court refused to apply the Statute and 
held "In order to fulfill their functions of ensuring legal certainty 
limitation periods must be fixed in advance".
"The fixing at their duration and the detailed rules for these
applications come within the powers of the Community Legislature'
253"Consequently the submission is unfounded"
In Buchler v Commission the relevant ECJ statement was, "The applicant 
complains that the Commission did not take into account the fact that 
proceedings in respect of the alleged infringement are barred having 
regard to the period which elapsed between the date of the acts and 
the initiation of the administrative procedure by the Commission".
"The provisions governing the Commission’s powers to impose fines for 
infringement of the rules on completion do not lay down any period of
233
limitation. In order to fulfill their function of ensuring legal , 
certainty limitation periods must be fixed in advance. The fixing of 
their duration and the detailed rules for their application come 
within the powers of the community legislature". "Consequently the 
submission is u n f o u n d e d " . Boehringer Mannheim v Commission 
Consideration 5 , 6 , 7  repeated considerations 5, 6, 7 of Buchler.
The next set of cases watered down this declaration. As Schermers
noted "This may have been too strong a statement. A statute of
limitations is not only a regulatory measure; in extreme cases it does
provide an element of justice towards the people concerned and may
255therefore be a compelling legal principle. In the Dyes tuffs
Cases the Court repeated its previous ruling (quoted above) but in 
ICI V Commission, added this sentence "Although in the absence of any 
provisions on this matter, the fundamental requirement of legal 
certainty has the effect of preventing the Commission from 
indefinitely delaying the exercise of its power to impose fines, its 
conduct in the present case cannot be regarded as constituting a bar 
to the exercise of that power as regards participation in the 
concerted practices of 1964 and 1965".
"Therefore the submission is unfounded"^^^
257 . . 258In Francolor v Commission and Casella v Commission the
considerations 37, 38 and 25, 26 respectively, merely repeated ICI v
Commission considerations 49 and 50,
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Hoechst V Commission stated "Although the provisions governing the
Commission’s power to impose fines in cases where Community rules have
been infringed do not lay down any period of limitation, the
fundamental requirement of legal certainty has the effect of
preventing the Commission from indefinitely delaying the exercise of
259its power to impose fines"
In ACNA the relevant considerations were 31, 32, 33
The matter ended when the Council regulation on limitation periods was 
enacted. Though the reasons for such ECJ action in Dyes tuffs must 
remain speculative it is believed the action was motivated by the 
desire of the ECJ to generally appease its clients. This policy is, 
it is believed, present in micro as well as macro cases.
An example of such practice was given by Allen in his analysis of the 
261Dyestuffs Cases. He noted that, following the decision of the
Commission in the Dyestuffs Cases the UK government submitted an "Aide
262Mémoire" to the ECJ summarising its views. This view can be
summed up as a most restrictive view of antitrust jurisdiction. As
Allen stated it made "a sharp contrast with the submission of the
263Advocate General". However, it represented, again in the words
of Allen, "a declaration by an important future member of the European 
Community"
This "Aide Mémoire" had, it is suggested, a great influence on the 
decision of the ECJ. As Allen wrote "The Dyestuffs Gases were the
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first situation upon which the Court could have squarely confronted 
the problem of jurisdiction over foreign corporations.
Unfortunately .... the Courts judgment might be regarded as
265anticlimatic, for the Court may have taken the easy way out".
3. Acquired Rights
A second subheading under legal certainty is acquired rights, This is 
a GP holding that cases must be decided according to the law as it 
stood at the time of its application. Its relationship to legal 
certainty is that it is inherent in legal certainty that acquired 
rights be respected. Schermers and Toth note that the GP of acquired 
rights bears a close resemblance to the GP of protection of legitimate 
expectations.2^^ The major difference is that legitimate 
expectation is based on subjective considerations and can exist even 
while lacking a right, an acquired right can only arise from the 
explicit provision of positive law.2^^ Some cases dealing with this 
GP are now given•
The Klomp Case had as Schermers noted "to decide about the regime of
privileges and immunities which had been modified in the intervening
period between the events which led to the case and the discussion of
26 8the case in Court"
The Court held "the procedure provided for by Article 16 of the 
Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the ECSC, which was 
applicable at the time when the dispute arose and the provisions on
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In Algera the Court held, "It emerges from a comparative study of this 
problem of law that in the six member States an administrative measure 
conferring individual rights on the person concerned cannot in 
principle be withdrawn, if it is a lawful measure; in that case, since 
the individual right is vested, the need to safeguard confidence in 
the stability of the situation thus created prevails over the
principle is generally acknowledged, only the conditions for its 
application vary.
i
preliminary rulings for interpretation of the Treaties establishing 
the EEC and the EAEC have an identical objective namely to ensure a 
uniform interpretation and application of the provisions of the 
Protocol in the six Member States. In accordance with a principle 
common to the legal systems of the Member States, the origins of which 
may be traced back to Roman Law, when legislation is amended, unless
:the legislature expresses a contrary intention, continuity of the
legal system must be ensured. Accordingly the Court has jurisdiction
269to give a ruling on the request for interpretation".
.-'1
interests of an administration desirous of reversing its decision.
This is true in particular of the appointment of an official.
If on the other hand, the administrative measure is illegal, 
revocation is possible under the law of all the Member States. The 
absence of an objective legal basis for the measure affects the 
individual right of the person concerned and justifies the revocation
I
of the said measure. It should be stressed that whereas this ;
I
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.... In agreement with the Advocate General s opinion, the court 
.accepts the principle of the revocability of illegal measures at least
within a reasonable period of time, such as that within which the
decisions in question in the present dispute occurred"
.In the Simon Case it was stated by the Court "If the administrative ----------
authority becomes aware that a certain allowance has been granted as a 
result of a wrong interpretation of a legal provision it has the power
In the Herpels Case it was held, "Although the retroactive withdrawal 
of a wrongful or erroneous decision is generally subject to very
272as regards the future is always possible"
The Fifth Reinarz Case had the following relevant considerations by
shall not be less than the amount which the person concerned would
to amend the previous decisions.
Even if in certain cases in view of vested rights withdrawal on
grounds of unlawfullness does not have a retroactive effect it always
271takes effect from the present" I 
.strict conditions, on the other hand the revocation of such a decision
the Court, "Article 99 (3) of the ECSC Staff Regulations which comes 
.under Title VIII concerned with transitional and final provisions,
provides that the amount of the resettlement allowance due to 
.established officials under the old ECSC Staff Regulations who 
.terminate their service after the new Regulations come into force
I
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have received under the provisions of Article 12 of the former ECSC 
General Regulations.
A transitional provision issued on the transaction to a less generous 
system does not normally seek to give employees greater rights than 
they would have had under the system which is revoked.
nature and cannot have retroactive effect . The 2nd Racke Case
I
Such a provision cannot therefore be interpreted as allowing a
combination of the more favourable method of calculation of one system
273with the more favourable salary scale of another". I
4. Non-Retroactivity of Legislative Acts
Non-retractivity of legislative acts is a GP which in Schermer's words
274"promotes legal certainty" Its basic premises have been clearly
stated by the ECJ. In the Gervais-Danone Case it was held "A ^ .
regulation adopted under Regulation No. 97/69 is of a legislative
held "A fundamental principle in the Community legal order requires 
that a measure adopted by the public authorities shall not be 
applicable to those concerned before they have the opportunity to make 
themselves acquainted with it".
.Further the Neumann Case made it clear that regulations cannot enter 
.into force immediately unless specific reasons for doing so exist.
"This wide liberty granted to the authors of a regulation cannot,
however, be considered as excluding all review by the Court,
particularly with regard to any retroactive effect. An institution 
■
5
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cannot, without having an adverse effect on a legitimate regard for 
legal certainty, resort without reason to the procedure of an 
immediate entry into force.
"... any interval between the publication and the entry into force of
the regulations might in this case have been prejudical to the 
277community".
The Post Clearance Recovery Case continued ÏÏCJ observations on this 
GP. There it held "Although procedural rules are generally held 
to apply to all proceedings pending at the time when they enter into 
force this is not the case with substantive rules. On the contrary, 
the latter are usually interpreted as applying to situations existing 
before their entry into force only in so far as it clearly follows 
from their terms, objectives or general scheme that such an effect 
must be given to them.
This interpretation ensures respect for the principles of legal
 ^ .. 279certainty ... .
In the Mrs P Case it was stated, "According to a generally accepted 
principle a law amending a legislative provision applies, save as 
otherwise provided, to the future effects of situations which arose 
under the previous law. Thus an amendment to Article 27 of Annex VIII, 
which moreover reflects an alteration in the attitude of the law 
towards the divorced wife, must, save as otherwise provided, apply
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.from the time of its entry into force to all divorced wives of 
„ 280
:deceased officials".
The transitional protective measures authorised by the decisions of 
30 October 1969 would not have been capable of attaining their
Legal force should begin from the publication day of the act in
question. The Exportation des Sucres Case made this clear. There it 
was held that, in the absence of relevant reasons for retroactive 
effect a regulation published on 2 July 1976 had to apply from that 
date and not from 1 July when it was to have entered into force.
It should be noted that retroactivity is not automatically rejected in 
all instances by the Court, Circumstances where the Court may choose
to uphold retroactivity were compiled by Schermers and are as
■ 282
"I
follows
First there is the situation where "pressing economic reasons demand
283retroactive legislation". An example of this is the alteration
of EC agricultural prices after revaluations and devaluations.
Schermers stated that the Court "has always accepted that such 
.adjustments have retroactive effect as from the date of the parity
change". He cited this First Rewe Case where it was held that
"Until a system of aids for German agricultural producers was
established it was necessary to avoid any interruption in the 
.maintenance of the level of agricultural prices existing in Germany at 
the time of the revaluation of the German Mark.
I
Second, retroactivity may be acceptable to the ECJ in order to ensure
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objectives fully if they had not been applicable from the entry into 
force of the new parity of the German Mark.
It was thus proper to fix at this same date the point when the 
protective measures authorised could take effect. The decision of the 
Commission of 30 October 1969 and those of 31 October and 3 November
.1969 which supplemented it are consequently not invalid to the extent
285to which they have retroactive effect".
continuity in legal relations. Here the choice for the Court is which 
is the lesser of two evils, allowing the creation of a gap between two 
regulations or legal uncertainty caused by the retroactivity of the 1new regulation. Relevant cases are First and Third Remunerations
Adjustment Cases, the Fifth Roquette Case, the Maizena Case and the
286Second Tunnel Refineries Case. Schermers, citing the Second
Tunnel Refineries Case stated that "the Court accepted retroactivity
in order to restore a situation upset by the annulment of a previous 
287rule of law". Further he thought the decision was correct
rectroactivity being, in his opinion, the lesser of the two evils
 ^  ^ ^ 288 stated above.
Third, retractivity may operate where financial compensation charged
or paid to alleviate currency instability problems can be established 
only at the end of the relevant period of time. The pertinent case
being the IRCA Case where it was held "with regard to monetary 
compensatory amounts, the fact that the factors necessary for their
Ï:4'
1
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calculations are only determined after the period during which the 
.said amounts have become applicable is frequently inherent in the 
system itself, and cannot therefore be considered, on such grounds, as
giving the rules a retroactive effect".
Federal Republic of West Germany. There it is called 
Vertrauensschutz. According to Hartley it is a GP that serves as a
expectations worthy of protection can be established only on the
which a prudent economic operator can be considered justified in 
relying on the continued existence of a promise or an advantageous
i|
A further ECJ concern over retroactivity is that the legislator who
makes decisions on retroactivity consequently exercises a high degree 
290of discretion. The Neumann Case made it clear that this
discretion must be subject to judicial review.
5. Legitimate Expectation
The GP of legitimate expectation is, as Schermers puts it, that "the
law should not be different from what could be reasonably 
292expected". The principle is taken from the legal orders of many
.states, the major derivation being from the administrative law of the
I
foundation of a rule of interpretation as well as a ground for
293annulment of a Community measure. He states however that it is
most often used as the basis of an action for damages for
294non-contractual liability. Some relevant comments on the GP are
made by Toth. He stated "the principle does not by its very nature 
.lend itself to mechanical application ... The existence of legitimate
3
merits of each individual case. It is determined by the extent to
243
legal provision or situation even though he must be aware that the law 
creating that situation or is underlying premises, have, or are about
comply with it is an 'infringement of the Treaty or of any rule of law
I
295to be, altered. Some cases dealing with this GP are now
examined.
The Second Toepfer Case included the following relevant S
296considerations. "The applicant also claims that the regulation
at issue constitutes a breach of the principle of the protection of 
legitimate expectation". "The submission that there has been a breach 
of this principle is admissible in the context of proceedings 
instituted under Article 173, since the principle in question forms 
part of the Community legal order with the result that any failure to
■f
%1
relating to its applications" within the meaning of the article
quoted". "Neverth 
297substantiated".
eless the submission has not been
I
In Lucchini v Commission the Court declared, "Secondly, the applicant 
states there has been an infringement of general principles of law, in 
particular of the principle of legitimate expectation and that of the 
prohibition of discrimination. The Commission, it claims, has failed 
to fulfill its legitimate expectations by adopting temporarily a 
permissive attitude towards other undertakings guilty of the same 
actions and putting aside this conduct with regard to Lucchini. The 
applicant claims that the Commission also discriminates against it in 
relation to those undertakings, more precisely with regard to the 
additional charge for small quantities".
I
I__
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"It is necessary to observe first of all that a concession on the part
of the authorities cannot make an infringement legitimate still less
justify making that infringement more serious . The fact that the
Commission may have shown some laxity as regards alignment not on
specific price lists but on a basic price formed by the minimum price
in no way justifies selling at prices lower than the minimum prices or
the failure to take into consideration extras for that quality or
quantity. Moreover, it has not been shown that producers in other
Member States benefited from a concession enabling them not to charge
298the extras for quality or quantity".
The GP of protection of legitimate expectation will not automatically 
be the major consideration in each case it is relevant to. As the 
Luhrs Case showed considerations of public interests may be of more 
immediate importance.
"It follows from the stated circumstances that Regulation no.348/76
was adopted pursuant to an overriding public interest which required
299that the rules adopted should enter into force immediately".
In fact Waelbroeck has shown that even where public interest is not a 
relevant factor the protection of legitimate expectation is, as 
Schermers stated "possible only under strict conditions.
Waelbroeck’s examination of ECJ case law led him to distinguish six 
conditions which must be fulfilled before legitimate expectation can
- 245
insuffle ient"'.
305cited the CNTA case as an example.
be upheld "(1) the commercial operation for which protection is
claimed must be irrevocable, (2) the legal rule which caused the 
expectation must definitely lead to the result expected, a chance is 
not enough, (3) the benefit for which protection is claimed must be a 
forseeable result of the previous rules, unforseen collateral rules 
are not protected, (4) the protected interest must be worth protection 
(5) the change in legislation should not be foreseeable at the moment 
when the operation for which protection is claimed was performed, (6) 
transitional provisions of the new legislation must be
Î
■i
A noteworthy feature of the use the ECJ had made of this GP is pointed 
out by Mertens de Wilmars. He wrote that the GP, in the MS, had only
■I
been applied by the Courts to individual administrative 
302measures. In EC law this theory has been extended to
.legislative measures - or at least to some of them - in particular "in 
the area of the organisation of the agricultural markets". He
gives as the reason for this the fact that within the agricultural 
system "a number of measures intended to guide or encourage traders, 
although adopted in the form of a regulation, are, from the economic 
point of view so sectoral or specific and limited in time that their 
effects are very similar to those of an individual d e c i s i o n " H e
.£■4
I
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6. Use of Understandable Language
The final principle under the umbrella of legal certainty is use of 
understandable language. The case of Farrauto dealt with this point 
"The national Courts of the Member States must nevertheless take care 
that legal certainty is not predjudiced by a failure arising from the 
inability of the worker to understand the language in which a decision 
is notified to him".^^^
As well as the above the Court has also made use of the words "legal
clarity" this being "imperative" where uncertainty may lead to the
307application of "serious sanctions" The Court held in the First
Conservation Measures Case that "This obligation to introduce 
implementing measures which are effective in law and with which those 
concerned may readily aquaint themselves is particularly necessary 
where sea fisheries are concerned, which must be planned and organised 
in advance, the requirement of legal clarity is indeed imperative in a 
sector in which any uncertainty may well lead to incidents and the 
application of particularly serious sanctions".
7. Fair Application of the Law
A second principle that functions as a group heading is that of fair 
application of the law. This principle it is suggested, could equally 
well be a value concept. As such it is in most instances too general 
by itself for concrete application and is broken down into the 
following four categories.
- 247 “ ’4;
,First, equity, natural justice and fairness; second, propertiona1ity;
third, good faith; and fourth solidarity.
8. Equity Natural Justice Fairness 
.Equity, natural justice and fairness are three separate though clearly 
related GP. Due to this relative closeness they are brought together 
under one heading. All three principles are recognised in many 
municipal legal orders. Equally all three principles have a place in
Community law. For example in the Walt Wilhelm Case the Court
309 ireferred "to a general requirement of natural justice". The
Luhrs Case showed that the Court takes the view, as regards
i
interpretation of a text that natural justice demands the 
interpretation least onerous for the individual
i
1
a
In the Luhrs Case the Court held. "Thus the appropriate answer is 
that in view of the uncertainties inherent in Regulation no. 348/76, 
natural justice demands that for the purpose of converting the tax on 
exports into national currency the exchange rate which at the material 
time was less onerous for the taxpayer concerned should be applied."
"In view of the foregoing it does not appear feasible within the
framework of the existing rules to satisfy the requirements of natural
justice in possibly a few special cases, since provision can be made
for such requirements only by the Community legislature through
appropriate hardship clauses (Harteklauseln) of the kind found in
311German revenue law and in that of other Member States".
"Si
Ï
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This is not to say however, as Schermers has noted, that the Court
will always regard upholding the rights of the individual applicant as
312fulfilling the requirement of natural justice.
In Zerbone the Court held "If the burden or advantage represented by
the compensatory amounts for the person paying or receiving them were
displaced in time there would be added to all the inconveniences
already existing and resulting from the absence of fixed parities a
new inconvenience arising from the fact that during the period
elapsing between the date of import or export and that of payment the
trader would unfairly have to face an uncovered balance with loss of
value or would profit quite as unfairly from a delay in payment with a
313consequent advantage over his competitors."
9. Proportionality
The second subheading is proportionality. According to Schermers,
315this GP is related to the GP of equity. The roots of the GP of
proportionality are extensive. It arises both from the Municipal law
and International law. Lord MacKenzie Stuart notes an equally valid
origin of proportionality, he wrote it was also derived from universal
good s e n s e . T h e  particular legal order that has closest
association with it is , according to both Mertens de Wilmars and
317Hartley, the Federal Republic of West Germany. There it is
called Verhaltnismassigkeit and is regarded as underlying certain 
provisions of the German constitution. Toth is of the opinion that
proportionality also has roots in certain provisions of Community
. 318law.
, J
■I
in the exercise of their powers the Community institutions should 
always act with the utmost care and should avoid imposing upon
:,:4S*
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Within the EC legal order the GP of proportionality lays down that the 
.Community institutions and the national authorities may impose upon
Community citizens only such obligations and restrictions as are 
.strictly necessary for the particular public interest purpose to be
attained. Hartley believes that proportionality is particularly
important in the sphere of economic law since this frequently involves
imposing taxes, levies, charges or duties on businessmen in the hope
. . .  319of achieving economic objectives. Mertens de Wilmars wrote that
.from the economic point of view the rule embodies two concepts 
fundamental to the mixed economy systems .... the principle that the
I
intervention of the authorities might be subsidiary in nature and that
.there must be a connection between an intervention threshold and the
320safeguard of individual liberties. Further he noted that
"Articles 5 and 57" ECSC reflect these ideas.
The principle of proportionality has a wide application. Some
.examples are as follows. As Toth states "The principle requires that
commercial operators burdens and charges which are manifestly out of
322proportion to the object in view." Proportionality "requires
that action of the institutions in response to a wrongful act of 
Community subjects , should be proportionate to the gravity of that 
act. Further it may invalidate retroactive authorisation by the f
323Commission of protective measures to be taken by a Member State,"
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the cases of Fédération de Belgique v High Authority and
326Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v EVGF. They both state that
The use of proportionality involves a precise judgment on the part of
the ECJ in all these matters. The Second Schluter Case gives an
324 ---------------------example of this. Here the Court held "in exercising their
powers, the Institutions must ensure that the amounts which commercial 
operators are charged are no greater than is required to achieve the 
aim which the authorities are to accomplish; however, it does not 
necessarily follow that the obligation mist be measured in relation to 
the individual sitution of any one particular group of operators.
Given the multiplicity and complexity of economic circumstances such 
an evaluation would not ony be impossible to achieve, but would also 
create perpetual uncertainty in the law.
iAn overall assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of themeasures contemplated was justified, in this case, by the
exceptionally pressing need for practicability in economic measures
which are designed to exert an immediate corrective influence; and
this need had to be taken into account in balancing the opposing 
325interests .
The Second Schlüter Case can, it is believed, be seen as an example 
that bears out Hartley’s opinion that proportionality has a particular 
importance in the sphere of economic law. As to the other examples of 
proportionality in the cases, the following cases are of interest for 
various reasons. Both Hartley and Usher agree on two points regarding
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the former is of some interest as the first example of the GP of
proportionality in EC law. The latter case was of greater importance.
As Hartley stated "It was in the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft
327case that the concept first made an impact on EC law". In the
former case the relevant statement of the Court was... "in accordance
with a generally accepted rule of law such an indirect reaction by the
High Authority to illegal action on the part of the undertakings must
328be in proportion to the scale of that action".
As Usher wrote they said little more than "the punishment must fit the 
329crime
The opinion of A.G. Dutheillet de Lamothe in the latter case gave a
definition of proportionality which, again in the opinion of Usher
330gives that GP "its real importance in Community law". The AG
said "citizens may only have imposed on them, for the purposes of the
public interest, obligations which are strictly necessary for those
331purposes to be attained".
The final example of proportionality in this section is the Skimmed
Milk Powder Cases 332 It is , in the words of Martens de Wilmars, a
classic example of the breach of the principle of 
333proportionality". In order to reduce the problem of surplus
milk products the Council made the grant of Community aid in that 
sector subject to the obligation to purchase, at a fixed price decided 
by the Council, certain quantities of such products from intervention
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334view of the Court. It declared the regulation invalid.
consequences of use of GP spoken of earlier in this chapter. As
the First Hoogovens Case
i
agencies. The price was felt to be too high and a number of feedstuff
producers contested the validity of the regulation. Their argument 
was that while the obligation to purchase was comparable with the 
Treaty, the obligation to buy at such a high price was in breach of 
the GP of proportionality. In essence it constituted a discriminatory 
distribution of the burden of costs between the various agricultural 
sectors and moreover the fixing of the price at that level was not 
necessary to attain the desired objective of disposing of the skimmed 
milk powder. This lucid definition of what constituted a breach of
■ '‘'-'Ithe GP of proportionality in this fact situation was at one with the '
1A last point to note on proportionality relates to the theoretical
r-Ô
Hartley states "the most striking thing about proportionality is that 
it leaves a great deal to the judgment of the court".
10. Good Faith
■
The third subheading is the GP of good faith. It is present in many 
legal orders. For EC law it is that the actions of the Community 
institutions, both in administrative and in contractural spheres must
always be carried out with due respect to the principle of good faith.
■The principle has been upheld in several ECJ cases eg Lachmuller and
336
i
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interests have been rejected or infringed and furthermore any review 
of the legality of the decision would be hampered.
In the present cases the letter of dismissal did no more than notify 
the applicants, without giving any reasons of the administration
In Lachmuller the Court held "the conduct of an authority in 
adminstrative as in contractual matters, is at all times subject to an 
observance of the principle of good faith.
The contracts at issue, which come under administrative law, are 
subject to observance of this principle and the fact that they were 
provisional or temporary does not exempt them from this requirement. 
Consequently the contested decisions of dismissal must, in order to 
terminate those contracts, be justified on grounds relevant to the 
interests of the service and there must be nothing arbitrary 
about them, such, for example as the need to dispense with the 
services of an unqualified servant or of one occupying a post which 
has been abolished in the interests of the service.
I
■|
:S
The statement of the grounds on which an administration measure is 
dictated by the public interest must be made in terms which are 
specific and capable of being challenged for otherwise the official 
concerned would have no means of knowing whether his legitimate
i ' ' :
4
337intention to terminate their contracts".
In the First Hoogovens Case the Court held ".... the competent 
authority can withdraw an exemption with retroactive effect only by
■
Î1
i
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taking into account the fact that the beneficiaries of the revoked
decision could assume in good faith that they would not have to pay
contributions on the ferrous scrap in question and could arrange their
338affairs in reliance on the continuance of this situation".
Analysis by the Court then confirmed that Hoogoven could not 
reasonably have made such an assumption.
11. Solidarity
The GP of solidarity is the final subheading in this group. It has
been taken by the ECJ to imply the following for MS: that it is the
duty of MS to take account of the consequences which their acts might
have for other members. The Rediscount Case and the Premiums for
339Slaughtering Cows Case are relevant as regards this GP.
The Rediscount Case stated that "The solidarity which is at the basis 
of these obligations, as of the whole of the Community system, in 
accordance with the undertaking provided for in article 5 of the 
Treaty, is continued for the benefit of the States in the procedure 
for mutual assistance provided for in Article 108 where a Member State
is seriously threatened with difficulties as regards its balance of
 ^ ,,340payments.
In Premiums for Slaughtering Cows the disturbance of the balance 
between advantages and obligations flowing from Community membership 
was seen by the ECJ as a "failure in the duty of solidarity accepted
255
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by Member States by the fact of their adherence to the
_ „ 341Community .
I
This case again stresses the point that, in binding themselves to a 
Treaty the Member States accept not only rules but principles inherent 
in the rules.
12, Fundamental Human Rights   ---
The GP of Fundamental Human Rights is the final taxonomic heading.
The basic GP of fundamental human rights as such is dealt with more 
fully in the next chapter. However, other major rights under this 
principle are listed here in order to complete classification. They 
are (13) the right to be heard; (14) non bis in idem (15) freedom of 
trade union activity.
13. The Right To Be Heard
In the Hoffmann la Roche Case the Court held "Observance of the right 
to be heard is in all proceedings in which sanctions, in particular 
fines or penalty payments may be imposed a fundamental principle of
■
Community law which must be respected even if the proceedings in
343question are administrative proceedings.
.The right to be heard, as the Court has stated, is an important GP of 
EC law that arises with regularity in cases concerning EC staff.
The Alvis Case is an example. Here it was held "According to a
generally adopted principle of administrative law in force in the
256
from Articles 5,6 and 7 of Regulation No.99/63, that this Regulation,
Member States of the European Economic Community, the administrations 
of these States must allow their servants the opportunity of replying 
to allegations before any disciplinary decision is taken concerning 
them. This rule which meets the requirements of sound justice and 
good administration must be followed by Community Institutions".
Schermers was of the opinion that by 1977 this "principle in force in
the Member States has clearly developed into a general principle of 
346Community Law." In the 1977 Moll Case the court put It thus "... 
the general principle that when any administrative body adopts a 
measure which is liable gravely to prejudice the Interest of an
individual it is bound to put him in a position to express his point
_ . 347of view.
I
It must not be thought that the right to be heard is relevant only in 
staff cases. By Regulation 99/63 of the Commission that institution 
must inform an undertaking of objections lodged against it. The 
Commission may not act, under Article 85 EEC, to enforce competition 
rules until it has done so.
In the Transocean Marine Case the Court held "it is clear, however, 
both from the nature and objective of the procedure for hearings and
notwithstanding the cases specificially dealt with in Articles 2 and 
4, applies the general rule that a person whose interests are 
perceptibly affected by a decision taken by a public authority must be 
given the opportunity to make his point of view known. This rule
'
■■«I
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essence of conditions to which the commission intends to subject an
requires that an undertaking be clearly informed, in good time, of the
the parties to the case but by the Advocate General. He said that, 
"There is a rule embedded in the law of some of our countries that an 
administrative authority, before wielding a Statutory power to the
"that review, which I sought to keep short, of the laws of the Member
exemption and it must have the opportunity to submit its observations
to the Commission. This is especially so in the case of conditions
which, as in this case, impose considerable obligations having
348fast-reaching effects."
,For English lawyers the case is of special interest as it is (as
Hartley notes) the first example of the ECJ drawing on English law for
349the elaboration of the GP. The principle was advanced not by
i
M
detriment of a particular person, must in general hear what that
,
person has to say about the matter, even if the statute does not
expressly require it. "Audi alteram partem" or, as it is sometimes 
.expressed *audiatur et altera pars’". He stated the GP was well 
established in the law of England where "It is considered to be a 
"rule of national justice"". He considered for French law that "It 
appears that the principle here in question is of fairly recent origin
and that its scope is not yet settled." "The position in Belgium and
Luxembourg is similar, though the Conseil d'Etat of these countries
.seem to have been less hesitant in developing the principle than that 
of France",
{
:
«
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States, must, I think, on balance lead to the conclusion that the
informed of the facts upon which their complaints are based. It is 
not necessary however that the entire content of the file should be
right to be heard forms part of these rights which 'the law' referred
to in Article 164 of the Treaty upholds, and of which, accordingly, it 
is the duty of this Court to ensure the observance.
.The Case of Mollet v Commission allows an opportunity to assess
whether the Court has modified its conception of the GP the right to 
351be heard. The "somewhat broad statement" (As Hartley put it) of
the Court in Transocean was narrowed from "interests perceptibly
affected" to "measure which is liable gravely to prejudice the
352interest of an individual". In Mollet the Court stated
"that opportunity was not given to the applicant, with the result that
the Commission violated the general principle that when any
administrative body adopts a measure which is liable gravely to
prejudice the interest of an individual it is bound to put him in a
353position to express his point of view."
,
In Grundig the folowing ECJ statement is of interest "The proceedings
before the Commission concerning the application of Article 85 of the
Treaty are administrative proceedings, which implies that the parties
,concerned should be put in a position before the decision is issued to 
present their observations on the complaints which the Commission 
considers must be upheld against them. For that purpose, they must be
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imposing the same kind of sanctions." Thus a gap is left for
J
communicated to them. In the present case it appears that the
statement of the Commission of 20 December 1963 includes all the facts
the knowledge of which is necessary to ascetain which complaints were
taken into consideration. The applicants duly received a copy of that
statement and were able to present their written and oral
observations. The contested decision is not based on complaints other
354than those which were the subject of those procaedigs".
14, Non Bis In Idem
The principle of non bis in idem is, once again not the sole property
of any one legal order. In some MS eg The Federal Republic of West
Germany, it is a right guaranteed by Article 103 (3) of the
Constitution. Schermers notes that this GP has not gained total
355acceptance from the ECJ. He wrote the right not to be proceeded
against more than once for the same act "... has been accepted, albeit
356only to a limited extent by the Court of Justice." According to
Toth, non bis in idem is a necessary consequence of res 
357judicata. The principle non bis in idem functions to prevent
"The institution of double criminal administrative or disciplinary
proceedings and the imposition of double punishment, fine or sanction
in respect of the same act which has already been the subject of a
358decision which has acquired the status of res judicata."
1,1
It should be noted the GP only applied "to proceedings instituted 
before the authorities of the same jurisdiction with a view to
260
duplication of proceedings and sanctions within different
jurisdictions, eg Community and national jurisdications. In point of
fact it could be within the same jurisdiction if the proceedings and
sanctions were of a different nature * Thus non bis in idem allows
the institution of parallel competition before the SC and national (or
third state authorities) with regard to the same agreements. In the
latter case however as Toth points out "a general equitable
requirement implies that any previous negative decision should be
359taken into accont in determining any further sanctions".
The following cases are relevant examples of ECJ usage of the GP, In 
Gutmann the Court held "The applicant alleges that the rule non bis in 
idem was violated by the decision of 20 and 21 January 1965.
This rule prohibits not only the imposition of two disciplinary 
measures for a single offence, but also the holding of disciplinary 
proceedings more than once with regard to a single set of
facts."3^0
In Gutmann the GP non bis in idem was invoked against two proceedings 
with regard to a single act, both proceedings started by EG 
institutions. In Walt Wilhelm an act was proceeded against both by 
Community and national authorites. Here the Court stated that
"The possibility of concurrent sanctions need not mean that the 
possibility of parallel proceedings pursuing different ends is 
unacceptable.... the acceptability of a dual procedure of this kind
between the Community and the Member States with regard to cartels. 
If, however, the possibility of two procedures being conducted
■■■
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,follows in fact from the special system of the sharing of jurisdiction
Î
separately were to lead to the imposition of consecutive sanctions, a 
.general requirement of natural justice, ....demands that any previous 
. . . .punitive decision must be taken into account is determining
any sanction which is to be imposed. In any case so long as no 
.regulation has been used under Article 87 (2)(e) no means of avoiding
. ■such a possibility is to be found in the general principles of
. „ 362community law.
In the First Boehringer Case an undertaking was prosecuted by an EC 
.institution and a non-Member State, Boehringer being fined both by the
363Commission and by a United States court. Boehringer pleaded non
. . .bis in idem but the ECJ considered that the US fine related to 
—
competition restrictions that has taken place outwith the Community 
and thus could not be taken into consideration. The Second Boehringer 
Case showed a continuity of ECJ ideas on this situation. They
held "In fixing the amount of a fine the Commission must take account
• fof penalties which have already been borne by the same undertaking for 
the same action, where penalties have been imposed for infringements 
of the cartel law of a Member State and, consequently have been 
committed on Community territory. It is only necessary to decide the 
question whether the commission may also be under a duty to set a 
penalty imposed by the authority of a third state against another 
penalty if in the case in question the actions of the applicant
$
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complained of by the Commission , on the one hand, and by the American 
authority, on the other, are identical.
The Community conviction was directed above all towards the 
gentleman's agreement for the division of the common market and Great
offence relating only to the US)
Ï
Britain." (the applicant being convicted by the US and the
■Ï
15. Freedom of Trade Union Activity
Freedom of Trade Union Activity has been defined by the Court in the 
Union Syndicale Case, where it was held "Under the general principles 
of labour law, the freedom of trade union activity recognised under
Article 24a of the Staff Regulations means not only that officials and 
servants have the right without hinderance to form associations of
their own choosing, but also that these associations are free to do
anything lawful to protect the interest of their members as 
366employees." Further this statement was repeated in the Syndicat
General Case. As the above statement shows the ECJ accepts that
the general principles of labour law it recognises allows trade unions 
366to be formed.
i
The remaining GP to be examined are those that fit into no particular 
category. They are thus given in their own right. No inference is 
attached to the order of presentation.
■■
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370taxes.
institutions are obliged to treat Identical situations in the same way
and in its negative form whereby to treat different situations in the
371same way may be contrary to Community law." Schermers was of
■ 3
i'
16. Equality
The first such GP to be discussed goes under more than one name. It 
is the GP of equality, or alternatively, the GP of prevention of 
discrimination. Louis classified equality as a fundamental GP. 368
Hartley stated that, as regards its origins equality may in a broad
369sense, "be said to be a GP of almost every legal system". In EC
law Mertens de Wilmars states the principle..."is merely the 
transportation into economic law of the constitutional principle of 
the equality of citizens before the law and with regard to i
Mertens de Wilmars also notes with regard to application, and 
frequency of application, of the principle that, "The Court has on 
many occasions and in a very wide range of fields expounded the 
principle of non discrimination, both in its positive form whereby
the opinion that the GP of equality was most used in combating
discrimination between MS between goods from different MS or between 
37 2their nations. He wrote "The Court of Justice has repeatedly
37 3condemned this kind of discrimination." Examples of other forms
of discrimination the ECJ attempts to prevent are eg discrimination 
between the sexes (Article 119 EEC), discrimination on ground of 
nationality (Article 7 EEC and many other regulations), and the
II
I
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general case, ie what the Court sees as discrimination contrary to the 
GP in the EC legal order.
17. Unjust Enrichment
A further principle that has, on occasion, been used by the ECJ is
unjust enrichment. Toth wrote that the wording "unjustified
enrichment" is more accurate. He stated this implies that a
person unjustly enriched at the expense of another person, causing him
a corresponding loss must repay the money or return the object whereby
375he has been enriched. It was noted by Schermers that taxes and
levies prescribed by the Community are collected by the Member
States. If unlawfully collected then recourse by aggrieved
parties is to the laws of the Member States which "apply with respect
to legal actions for repayment. Only in staff cases may undue payment
377have been made to or by the Community" Noteworthy cases were
378Kuhl, Meganck and Danvin.
In the Danvin Case the applicant asked the Commission for compensation 
for work he had done claiming the Commission had been unjustly 
enriched obtaining work of a higher level than was actually paid for. 
The Court held "without prejudice to the question of the applicability 
to the relationship between the Community administration and its 
officials of the concept of unjust enrichment, it cannot, in any case 
be accepted that the Commission was unjustly enriched by reason of the 
applicant's activities. Moreover, according to a generally accepted 
principle in the national legal systems, the applicant's action would
Municipal laws of the Member States which in each case is determined
o p e r a t e . S c h e r m e r s  believes that any definition of force majeur 
"which would also include any impossibility of fulfulling a factual
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only be well founded if he had suffered loss corresponding to the
alleged enrichment of the other party. In this case, the applicant
379had not proved his claim "
18. Force Majeur
Another GP considered at some point by the ECJ is force majeur. Force 
majeur has again according to Toth, "acquired a peculiar Community law 
meaning, different from and broader than that usually known in the
by reference to the legal context in which it is intended to
condition which must be satisfied in order to qualify for a particular
381benefit" is not within the scope the GP has in Community law.
Cases that helped to define the concept were Schwarzwald Milch, 
Handelgesellschaft, Fleischkontor , Pfutzenreuter, Kampfmeyer and 
Reich.
■
In Schwarzwald Milch the Court held "the significance of this concept
must be determined on the basis of the legal framework within which it
383is intended to take effect".
Fleischkontor held "With regard to the reference to the existence of 
a general legal principle governing cases of force majeure, it is true 
that the legal system of the Member States provide, in certain 
contexts and legal relationships, for the possibility of derogation
266 -
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.from the strict requirements of the law, especially from the legal
consequences resulting from the non-fulfilment of an obligation, on
. . . . . .  384account of force majeure .
immediate, the danger imminent, and there must be no other lawful
.In Kampffmeyer, the Court stated that the precise meaning of force
majeur had to be decided by reference to the legal context in which it
is intended to operate but the concept was not limited only to
385absolute impossibility. In Reich v Hauptzollant Landau the Court
implied a force majeur clause into a regulation that did not contain
%
one; the basis being that such clauses were contained in parallel 
386regulations.
I
These cases are interesting examples of the new legal order evolving,
as with equality and legitimate expection, new GP of law or adapting 
old GP to radically new meanings exclusive to Community law,
19. Legitimate Self-Defence
A close relative of force majeur is the GP of legitimate self-defence. 
The First Modena Case given an excellent definition 'legitimate 
self-protection presupposes an action taken by a person which is 
essential to ward off a charge threatening him. The threat must be
I
' Î
_ , 388means of avoiding it .
1'
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20. Estoppel
Various cases of interest are as follows :
392examination procedure. He then pleaded illegal dismissal as no
medical examination had taken place. The Court held "This complaint 
must emphatically be rejected owing to the fact that the applicant
from good faith. It is that no one may plead a situation created by
The GP of estoppel though considered here independently follows on
i
his own conduct in order to escape an obligation, a sanction, or a 
judicial proceeding. The cases of Klockner v High Authority and
■Mannesmann v High Authority showed that an administrative authority is
not always bound by its previous actions in its public activities to
389the same extent as private individuals. As estoppel does not
exist in the legal systems of the MS within the Civilian System it was 
not expressly recognised, though similar principles were expressed by 
the Court. However as Usher, for example, noted the Court had 
considered the doctrine under non venire contra factum
390proprturn. In Klockner the Court stated "Moreover the
administrative authority is not always bound by its previous actions 
in its public activities by virtue of a rule which, in relations
between the same parties, forbids them to venire contra factum 
391proprium." As however estoppel is a definite principle of the
Anglo-Americal system it is likely it is an acceptable principle 
within Community law.
i
In the Alfieri case a staff member was dismissed on the grounds of ill 
health but refused to co-operate with the subsequent required medical
I
393refused to appear before the Committee."
I
I
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The Premiums for Slaughtering Cows Case saw the Court holding "the 
defendant cannot in any case be allowed to rely on a fait acc ompli of 
which it is itself the author so as to escape judicial
,,394proceedings
The Court held in the Continental Can Case that the addressee of an
act cannot refuse to take cognisiance of an act and plead lack of
395proper notification of that act.
In the Meganck Case the court held "Thus having placed himself in an
irregular situation by his own conduct ...(the applicant),., cannot
rely on his good faith to be released from the obligation to return
396the sums overpaid during this period". The facts in the Unil-It
Case were that Unil-It had failed to obtain importation certificates
demanded by Common Market regulations, This led to Italy
charging Unil-It for imported goods from other EC Member States as if
such goods had their origin outwith the EC. Unil-It however
showed that, at the time , it was impossible to obtain the relevant
certificates. Accordingly, the Court held ".... the Member State
which has not adopted substantive measures to implement this decision
cannot claim that traders have failed to fulfil the obligations which
it involves and must, provisionally, allow other means of proof to be
used which are appropriate to the fulfilment of these conditions." 
397b
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"implies a degree of priority is to be given to intra-Community trade
398over and above trade with non member countries." It could be
said that this GP justifies goods coming from MS being preferentially 
treated to goods coming from third countries.
A further noteworthy point is seen in the Providence Agricole 
Case This recent case again shows the ECJ applying a GP in a
«
21. Community Preferences 
.The principle of Community preference is yet another GP that is
derived directly from the treaties. This principle is stated within
the framework of the Common Agricultural Policy, in Article 44 (2) of
.the EEC Treaty according to which minimum prices must not be applied
so as to form an obstacle "to the development of a natural preference
between MS". The same principle is stated in the 1973 Act of 
Accession, Article 55, with regard to trade betwen the new MS and the
Ioriginal MS. Mertens de Wilmars wrote that Community preference
It should be noted that, as the Balkan Import Exprort v Hauptzollamt
Berlin Packhof Case shows, there is no GP in the treaties requiring
the Community to afford equal treatment to third countries in all 
399respects.
Î
narrow fashion. As Mertens de Wilmars wrote "the Court... interpreted 
the principle rather restrietively by refusing to apply it to systems 
of monetary compensation amounts which must be strictly confined to
neutralising variations ip exchange rates in both extra-Community 
trade and intra-Comraunity trade.
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22. Res judicata pro veritate accepitus
a
The GP is to the effect that a judicial decision is conclusive until
.reversed, and that its verity cannot be contradicted. It is common
within all the Member States. The principle also has full application 
as regards decisions of the ECJ. As stated previously this principle 
should be studied along with non bis in idem.
According to the principle of res judicata a judgment of the EG is 
binding only between the parties in the particular case and in respect 
of that case.
The EC Treaties have no provisions that exempt ECJ judgments from res 
judicata. Thus the ECJ has, in theory, great freedom when giving its 
judgments.
The res judicata effect of any ECJ judgment stems from the operative 
part of the judgement taken together with the decisive ground on which 
it is based.
Strictly speaking the case law of the ECJ cannot be regarded as a 
formal source of EC law. In practice however, as for example Toth 
notes , the case law of the ECJ may be regarded as a quasi-source of 
Community law.
■vs;
-V:
which are subject to rapid changes. The comments of AG Trabucchi, in
amended by Regulation No. 509/73 of the Council of 22 February 
1973.
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23. Cessante ratione legis, cessât et ipsa lex 
Cessante ratione legis, cessât et ipsa lex states that, when a rule 
loses its raison d'etre it must cease to be applied. It is
based on considerations which also underly rebus sic stantibus and
doctrines of contract and treaty law in many legal orders, In EC law 
it also is mainly employed in the regulation of economic relationships
the First Roquette Case are of interest.  -
iThe First Roquette Case concerned a reference to the Court under 
Article 177 of the EEC Treaty by the Tribunal d'instance of Lille for 
a preliminary ruling in the action pending before that court between 
Roquette Freres ... and French State customs administration, on the
.
interpretation of certain provisions of Regulation No. 974/71 of the 
Council of 12 May 1971 on certain measures of conjunctural policy to
■I
be taken in agriculture following the temporary widening of the 
margins of fluctuation for the currencies of certain Member States, as
AG Trabucchi said
"... if, because of the contention of the Commission and the Danish 
Government for a literal interpretation, the Court felt unable to 
accept my suggestion and place a restrictive interpretation on the 
concept of "charge on Importation" it would perhaps be necessary to 
invoke a principle which achieves its full significance in the 
regulation of economic relationships. This principle embodied in the
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maxim 'cessante ratione legis, cessât et ipsa lex'; its
application would mean that, at least in part the rules would cease to
1 n 406 apply."
He also continued this theme further on in his statement, "Returning 
to the general principle laid down in the basic regulation, which 
echoes the old maxim that, when a rule loses its raison d'etre, it
must cease to be applied."
24. Continuity of the Legal System
This is a principle common to the legal systems of the MS which may be
traced back to Roman law. It is a GP that has been applied in
EG law. Toth explained the GP thus "when legislation is amended, 
unless the legislature expresses a contrary intention, continuity of 
the legal system must be ensured. Accordingly, where a law which 
repeals an earlier law does not include any transitional provisions 
for the resolution in the future of disputes arising under the old law 
the jurisdictional and procedural rules of the new legislation which 
usually become immediately applicable are to be applied to such 
d i s p u t e s T h e s e  disputes however remain governed by the 
substantive provisions of the previous law. The comments by AG Gand
in the Klomp Case are of interest here. He stated "First the
repeal as from 1 July 1967 of Article 11 (b) of the ECSC Protocol, the 
substance of which is re-entered by Article 13 of the 1965 Protocol 
does not preclude an appraisal of the plaintiffs position with regard 
to a contribution charged for 1959, and any right which he may have to 
exemption, with reference to the provisions in force at the later
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date, that is, the provisions of the former Protocol. That is a 
principle common to the laws of the Member States."
"... as soon as a law of this kind is repealed by another law it is no 
longer possible to apply the former law for the resolution of 
disputes, even if such disputes relate to facts or legal relationships 
which arose while the former law was still in force. This rule which 
the commission has expounded and which it supports by an analysis of 
legal opinion seems to me correct. It is, however, qualified by 
certain fairly wide reservations drawn from the doctrines 
of vested rights and no doubt essentially justified by a concern for 
legal certainty; hence proceedings begun under a given law may be 
continued even if such proceedings are no longer possible under a new 
law".
25. The GP of Unity of the Market
This GP can be said to have evolved almost directly from the law of
the Community. It is that the rules of the Treaty must be interpreted
systematically so as to ensure conditions which are as close as
possible to those prevailing in an internal market. Mertens de
Wilmars notes that this GP "dominates a large part of the case law of
the court and in particular the case law relating to Articles 30 and
36 which are concerned with the free movement of goods." He
cites as "particularly significant" the cases of Casis de Dijon and 
411Fietje.
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Of even more significance however was Polydor. This was defined
by Mertens de Wilmars as a "most remarkable judgment". The ECJ
case arose through English Court of Appeal asking whether Articles 14 
and 23 of the association agreement betwen the EG and Portugal, which 
prohibit measures having an equivalent effect to quantative 
restrictions and are drafted in terms almost identical to those of 
Articles 30 and 36 of the EEC Treaty must be interpreted in the same 
way as those two provisons. Mertens de Wilmars notes that "It is well 
known that the court adopts a broad interpretation of Article 30 which 
prohibits measures having equivalent effect, and a restrictive 
interpretation of Article 36, which allows derogation from that 
prohibition, in particular on grounds relating to the protection of 
industrial and commercial property. The Court systematically 
endeavours to reduce the partitioning of the market resulting from the 
territorial effect of industrial and commercial property rights.
In the case the Court made clear that its case law on Articles 30 and 
36 must be seen against the background of the creation of a single 
market having the features of an internal market. The Court then 
stated that the association agreement between the EC and Portugal 
despite the almost idential wording to that of Articles 30 and 36 does 
not seek to achieve the same purpose. Therefore within the 
framework of the association agreement, restrictions on trade in goods 
resulting from national industrial property legislation may be 
regarded as admissable even if in the Community context they are 
inadmissable.
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This case will undoubtedly cause much interest among legal theorists 
For the purposes of this thesis however the major point of interest 
is, once again, how rules are to be interpreted in the light of 
principles, and the consequent power that such principles have with 
regard to the true meaning of apparently clear rules.
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Micro Cases - Conclusions
As Kutscher noted, and the preceding catalogue showed there are 
present within EG law many GP and many cases involving GP. The wealth 
of material provided by these GP and cases is such as to present a 
variety of options to legal theorists. Many topics of value to EC law 
could have as their starting point one or more aspects of GP and micro 
cases. With regard to this thesis and its major themes of how the ECJ 
arrived at and carries out what it sees as its duty, the promotion of 
integration, GP and micro cases are most valuable seen from a 
collective aspect. That is, the real significance of GP and micro 
cases, for this thesis, are the implications that can be drawn from 
the body as a whole rather than from any of its parts. These 
implications are now broken down into individual points and 
discussed.
The first point to be tackled is that it is suggested that it is
accepted beyond any real dissention from legal theorists that it is
the duty of the ECJ to call upon GP in certain situations, Further
the need for GP by the law of the Community is particularly strong at
this time, that is, in the early years of the new legal order. The 
statement by Schermers sums up the basic situation well "On account of 
it not being mature and as yet very detailed the Community legal order 
has the necessity of even greater recourse to GP for its completion 
than ... most other legal o r d e r s " . S o m e  further aspects of point 
one are these. As the Treaties have been strongly (though not 
exclusively) influenced by the Civil Law tradition, the EC should be 
receptive to use of GP. Equally it could be said that the civilian
K9A41Y
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background of ECJ judges imbues them with a positive attitude about 
the use of GP in the cases. The statement of Lord MacKenzie Stuart 
touches upon this latter theme "I find it difficult to point out any 
specific decision of the Court where the horor vacui has been a 
decisive element, yet in terms of general approach I find it all 
pervasive. However sparse or intractable, the available sources of 
Community law-must somehow be persuaded to reveal an answer .. The 
litigant, or the national judge must not be sent away without an 
answer. This would truly be a denial of J u s t i c e " . D u r i n g  the 
course of his statement Lord MacKenzie Stuart takes the opportunity to 
address actual or potential critics of the Court. "Accordingly if, 
from time to time, you are tempted to think that in its search for a 
solution the Court has made too much of too little, please remember 
the spirit that has informed the attempt".
The second point follows directly upon this theme. It is to note that
the percentage of cases which had GP present constituted and still
constitutes a high proportion of all ECJ cases. As Green stated in
1968, "almost every judgment of the ECJ refers to principles which
enable it to interpret Community law and decide the particular 
418case". Kutscher in an article in 1976 wrote that Green's
419analysis "could still apply today". It is believed that the
1980's will follow this trend, that is, that GP are still present in a
high proportion of cases.
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Thus taking these first two points together it can be said that the 
ECJ, of necessity, has consistently used GP in a great many aspects of 
EC law over a period of approximately twenty five years. Further the 
backgrounds of most ECJ judges is such as to allow these judges to 
bring a knowledge of, and enthusiasm for, GP to the cases.
Point three begins the important series of implications which are 
deduced from these facts . It relates to how the case law of the ECJ 
may be seen. For as Toth noted ECJ case law is not a formal source of 
law. However he also added the rider that "it remains true that over 
the years the Court has created a body of law which ... has taken on a 
near binding e f f e c t " . I f  so, then it could be said that ECJ case 
law could be seen as creating a new common law of the European 
Community.
Point four is of a jurisprudential nature. It relates to the nature 
of GP as outlined in Chapter II; the implications drawn from the 
introduction of GP in International law by Schwarzenberger, and the 
ideas of the "father of European Law" Jean Monnet. Chapter II spoke 
of the depth of compexity of GP and, in particular, made the points 
that they were capable of being used for many more tasks than filling 
gaps. Schwartzenberger noted that by GP entering International law 
they brought with them a certain force or dynamism, that is their very 
existence in a system had implications for that legal order beyond any 
limitations imposed on them by institutions. As regards the EC it is 
suggested that a reading of the works of Monnet shows he too believed 
that GP, in particular the fundamental GP that constituted the spirit
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was that as a consequence of its existence the ECJ will develop to the 
point of playing an important role in EC law by becoming, in practice 
as well as in theory, the guardian of the law.
It is submitted that the beginnings of the realisation of the above 
ideas are to be seen in the points which follow.
Point five discusses the implications of ECJ use of GP in micro cases
of the law, had an inherent dynamism. That is, such GP, once 
introduced into the system develop beyond the ability of any one 
institution or authority to limit them. They will continue to develop 
in strength as a natural consequence of existing.
It is believed that this idea is related to the previously quoted 
statement by Donner that the most significant thing about the ECJ was :
that it existed. Surely a part of the thinking behind his statement
:ïî
f :
for the legal orders of the MS. This implication was clear to
Bredimas who wrote "The recourse to them (GP) becomes an ingenious way
421of indirectly achieving harmonisation of national laws". Further 
A.G. Lagrange was equally well aware of the effect of ECJ case law on 
the MS legal orders. He stated 'Two or three advisory opinions of the 
court concerning basic legal principles are more conducive to 
harmonisation of national laws than years of scholarly discussion
between those attending even the most outstanding congresses of
1 , 422comparative law'.
s
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Thus the action of the ECJ produces two distinct effects, a legal 
unification of the laws of states, pressure on the MS to take further 
steps in the development of the EC. The former effect, independent of 
any other developments that result from GP is, it is believed an 
important step towards the eventual political unification of Europe.
It is possibly an insidious method by which to achieve such a worthy 
goal but none the less effective for that. It will, it is hoped, help 
to bring about unifications of Europe by degrees, by the growing 
realisation by individuals as well as governments that unification is 
a natural consequence of mutual trade and peaceful coexistence.
As to the latter effect the harmonisation of MS laws may produce a 
desire to promote the idea of unity of European peoples by first 
strengthening and developing the existing concrete expression of this 
idea, the EC. That is, the MS proceed to unify through the vehicle of 
the EC.
Point six relates to the harmonisation of the law of the Communities 
and its future implications for the EC. As point three suggested the 
ECJ is developing a common law of the EC. The implications of such 
action (which it is believed were foreseen by Monnet) are of 
tremendous importance for the future development of the EC. Bredimas, 
writing in 1978 had no doubts as to these implications or as to their 
importance. She wrote "The Court has proved its creative capacity to 
amalgamate the law of the treaties into a body of law which may be the 
forerunner of a single European law ., This body of case law is
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likely to have favourable implications for the eventual political
423unification of Europe".
It is an important fact to note that the analysis of Bredimas seemed 
to give credit to the Court for its role in bringing the above state
1
■ S
■ys:
of affairs about. She wrote "The Court has operated as an instrument 
of European unity, as a federator rather than as a conservator .... 
the court has given thrust to the process of integration"
"W
Point seven analyses the above statements, that is, it is contended 
that Bredimas is correct, both in her appraisal of the potential that 
now exists for eventual political unification and also in her
attribution of a major part in the creation of the situation being
'down to the deliberate work of the ECJ. An analysis of how it is 
believed this boost to political integration was achieved by the Court 
now follows. I
The Court achieved its long term results by a judicious mixture of 
action and inaction in the micro cases. The micro cases delve into 
almost every aspect of EC law. It is here within the body of EC law, 
where as Chapter V noted "real rights and duties begin" that the Court 
reveals its true strength. In the micro cases the Court actively 
seeks to clarify and enforce such rights and duties. It deliberately, 
as section Four noted, uses a method of interpretation which seeks out 
the objective of the text in dispute and tries to give practical 
effect to it. In short it looks for a solution that makes things work.
t
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Further, as the catalogue of GP and cases showed, the Court was able 
to draw from several sources (but mainly from the Municipal laws of 
the MS) GP to aid them in this task. It was also shown in the
In short they help the legal order function.
In fact it is at this point in the cases that the deliberate inaction 
policy of the Court takes over, that is, having tried to the best
preceding examination of various cases that the Court had successfully 
adapted these GP for their purposes. For example, as Mertens de 
Wilmars noted the ECJ occasionally extended the use of a GP with a 
well known core of meaning to new areas of law. Also as Usher stated 
the ECJ broadened the municipal definitions of GP. Finally it was 
shown that several references were made by the ECJ to GP originating 
from the Treaties themselves.
An equally relevant factor was the actual handling of GP by the Court. 
GP, it is suggested, were always looked upon as tools with which to 
find solutions to the particular problems before the Court. Thus in 
effect GP are tools which serve the needs of the ECJ and its subjects.
IiMS:
Such actions on the part of the Court are not to be confused with so 
called "government by judges". Though as Chapter VI Section 6 noted 
there is no clear cut law division between law and politics such 
action it is contended does not constitute, and is not meant to be 
seen, as political interference by judges with EC law.
I
judgements of great import. Lord Mackenzie Stuart has attempted to 
make this clear. He wrote "Commentators both kind and critical have
and its benefits.
point where the snow will slip off the leaf. It is not suggested that
"'I
283 »
;of its ability to solve the problems before it precisely as any other
court faced with similar problems would (and should) do, it goes no
further. That is, in the great majority of micro cases it does not
seek to find political issues so as to make broad political
statements. The Dyestuffs Cases were an excellent example of such—
judicial policy. Nor will it attempt to load every case with dynamic
I
referred to the approach of the Court as "activist" or dynamic, but
.with great respect I wonder whether these adjectives do not obscure
Î!the issue ... For one they conjure up a vision of the Court rising from its collective bed with - ... - "a glad cry upon its lips" saying 
"let us be dynamic today
It is, as Lord MacKenzie Stuart has pointed out, this phase of 
inaction by the ECJ that seems to cause confusion among commentators.
Further as the idea of deliberate inaction is of relevance to this
.thesis in explaining the success of the Court in the development of
I:.-..its ideas several comments are made as regards the idea of inaction
It should be recognised that a deliberate use of inaction is in fact a 
most subtle and powerful weapon. The concept and importance of
:inaction can be explained by relating it to the Zen teaching of leaf 
and snow. There it is pointed out that the leaf frees itself of its 
burden by allowing the weight of the falling snow to build up to the I
I!
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the ECJ is influenced by such concepts but rather that the Court does 
pursue a policy of deliberate inaction at certain instances and that 
this is an important policy which should be recognised as such and not
1
dismissed as involuntary behaviour and mere happenstance.
' ■A reason to pursue a policy of inaction was also shown by the example
of the Supreme Court. McCluskey wrote; "In the critical literature of
the past generation or two, one has read much about judicial
tyranny .... In truth the Supreme Court has seldom, if ever, resisted
a really unmistakable wave of public sentiment. It has worked on the
premise that constitutional law, like politics itself, is a science of 
426the possible". In short, as Chapter VI, Section 5 has noted the
427ECJ cannot push the EC in a direction it does not wish to go.
Further it was also noted previously in that section that the Court 
was conservative in its character and that it desired to meet the 
expectations of its audience. Given that these statements are correct,
■■then the notion of an active dynamic political Court (in every case) 
becomes, as MacKenzie Stuart pointed out, a trifle absurb. In short 
the court is only "active and dynamic" in its search for the solution 
to a particular problem before it.
'
Thus the ECJ does not load its judgments in micro cases with political 
statements and attempt to "push" EC law is a new and, to most EC
I
'i
members, unwelcome direction.
'
A result of, in the main, functioning as an "ordinary" court is that 
the ECJ is respected by its clients. By being prudent in its
functions the ECJ has gained some rewards. Kutscher noted that "It
cannot he said the case law of the Court has encountered difficulties.
Its judgments have been "accepted" and followed by those affected....
(including) the Member States. At most there has been a certain delay 
428before acceptance. The above should not be taken to mean that the
be taken to mean that the Court pursues its policy of advancing
Court does not have, or does not pursue, a policy. Instead it should
i.
integration with intelligence and discretion. It is suggested the 
Court realises the most effective way to pursue this policy is by, in
the main, inaction as regards direct political pronouncements.
Instead the Court has noted and analysed the various meanings of 
integration and their interrelationship. Thus the Court is aware that 
political integration cannot be contemplated before the economic 
integration aspect of the Treaties is made to function. Thus the best 
way for the Court to promote integration is to do no more and no less 
than its duty in protecting economic rights and enforcing economic
;
f
Ï
duties.
By doing so, such action effectively aids political integration. This 
is because political integration can only be the choice of a Community
in an advanced state of economic integration. It requires a
deliberate act of will, at that stage, to go further. By promoting 
economic (and legal) integration as described, the ECJ helps advance
the EC to the stage where the MS feel ready to take the next step.
Thus ECJ action could be said to be promoting political integration.
i
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precisely because of their doraestic“law type nature, act as a catalyst 
for political integration. The majority of macro cases, as has also 
been stated, are of a defensive and not an offensive nature. Though,
'1;,!
Point eight discusses the relationship between the micro and macro 
cases. As has just been stated it is believed the micro cases.
as in Van Gend, their outward appearance is dramatic and, it must be 
admitted, their individual influence on EG law considerable, the
majority of such cases are saying no more than could be deduced with 
little effort from a reading of the Treaties. They do not lead 
integration in a hew direction, they act to keep it alive.
-
It should be noted that one of the factors that makes macro cases Î
acceptable to EC subjects, including MS is their infrequency. Thus 
the mass of micro cases could be said to function as a cushion to 
soften the detrimental effects defensive macro cases, and the 
occasional undeniably political macro case such as ERTA, have on the 
MS relationship with the EC.
-i;
Further it is in the micro and not macro cases that the real work of 
the Court takes place. The day to day solving of complex fact 
situation problems is the real stuff and substance both of the law and 
of the work of the Court. An analogy might be that macro cases are 
the ingredients that provide an occasional exotic meal while micro 
cases are the bread and potatoes that sustain life. Overall therefore, 
taking a long term view, the steady work of the Court in micro cases 
is of far greater importance to EC law than the occasional so called 
dynamic decision.
Î
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Third World".
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"The Case Law of the Court of Justice - A Critical examination of 
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law orientated towards the future", (paraphrased), "Viewed as a
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context in relation to the other paragraphs of the same article
and in its place in the general scheme of the Treaty". In 85/75
Bresciani (1976) ECR 129, consideration 7, the Court stated "The
position of these articles at the beginning of that part of the
Treaty is sufficient to indicate their crucial role in the
construction of the Common Market".
. .65. This is also called the "functional approach". Schermers (fn. 
49), p.14; Bredimas (fn. 23), "effect utile", or the "purposive"
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approach, Lord MacKenzie Stuart (fn. 29), p. 76. Schermers, p.24 
actively opposes use of terra "functional".
66. Pescatore, "The Law of Integration" (1974), p.88 - "Contrary to a 
widespread idea, this is not simply one method among others.
The rule of law being in its nature a provision with a certain 
objective, the teleological method is, in the last analysis, the 
decisive criterion of every legal interpretation. This is doubly 
true in the context of the Treaty which proceeds by laying down 
objectives rather than substantive rules."
67. Bredimas (fn. 23), p. 178. As her book is the most comprehensive 
analysis on this particular subject, her conclusion is thus 
accordingly weighty. See also Schermers (fn. 49), pp. 10-19.
68. Lord Mackenzie Stuart (fn. 29), p. 76 - "Accordingly the Court in 
seeking guidance, looks frequently to the purpose of the text in 
dispute “ what has now become fashionable to call the 
teleological approach".
69. See Lord Mackenzie Stuart (fn. 29), p. 72-74; Schermers (fn. 49),
pp. 15-16; Bredimas (fn. 23), pp. 37-40. All these authors also 
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See also the comments by Dowrick (Chapter V) on Article 164, on
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70. Lord Mackenzie Stuart (fn. 29), p.73.
71. Professor Lyon-Caen (1966) Revue Trimestrielle du Droit Européen, 
p. 693.
72. See later on in Chapter VII, Fundamental Rights, where Stauder v
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commentators, the Court is only too well aware".
73. Lord Mackenzie Stuart (fn.29), p. 74.
74. Lord Mackenzie Stuart (fn. 29), p. 74; See 36/75 Rutili v 
Minister for the Interior 1975 (ECR) 1219. See also the coming 
section on limitations on judicial power. As Lord Mackenzie
' -I'
.75. Advocate General Gand described there as words "ambiguous ™ no 
doubt intentionally ambiguous". Gases 5, 7 and 13-24/66
kampffmeyer v Commission (1967) ECR 262.
76. Lord Mackenzie Stuart (fn. 29), p. 75, calls them "intentionally
ambiguous". In the Convention presented by the drafting
committee of Experts to the governments of the Six Member States 
* *in 1968, it was stated that, "The Committee has not specified
. . .^ a t  should be understood by "civil and commercial matters" nor
.has it ruled on the problems of qualifying the expression by
determining the law according to which it should be 
interpreted", see Bulletin of the European Communities, 
Supplement 12/72 English version, p.17.
77. Lord Mackenzie Stuart (fn. 29), p. 75. He states that Community 
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78a Dr C.D. Ehlermann, "The Interpretation of Community Law" paper
(University of London, king College, June 11, 1976).
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:
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principle of effectiveness (1'effect utile)... In Community law 
it may come to mean that "preference should be given to the 
construction which gives the rule its fullest effect and maximum 
practical value".
79a See generally Cardoso, Griffiths, Becker and Schubert (all at fn.
3) See also Joel Grossman, "Social Backgrounds and Judicial
Decisions: Notes for a theory", Journal of Politics, 29, 1967 pp.
.334-351; Jack W. Peltason "Fifty-Eight Lonely Men" (1961), All 
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79b Brown and Jacobs (fn. 78b), pp 190-191, consider the collegiate
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authority. Other advantages are that no particular judge is 
identified with a particular decision; the court as a whole finds 
it easier to depart from its previous case law; judicial 
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strengthened.
80. Lord Mackenzie Stuart (fn. 29), p. 70 makes plain his dislike of
over-analysis of the teleological approach. See also Lord
Porter, who, in giving advice to the Judicial Committee of the
3:
Privy Council stated, "The human mind tries, and vainly tries, to
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South Wales, 1950 AC 591 at 628.
81. Kutscher (fn. 46), p. 6.
82. P. Pescatore, "The Law of Integration", (1974),p. 88.
83. Bredimas (fn. 23), p. 128.
84. Bredimas (fn. 23), p. 128.
85. Mann (fn. 1) p . 352.
86. Bredimas (fn. 23), p. 134. This is but one example of what is a 
widespread opinion.
87. Bredimas (fn. 23), p. 124. 3-18, 25 and 26/58 Barbara Erzbergbau 
V High Authority (i960) ECR 1731. See also T.C. Hartley, "The 
Foundations of EEC law" (1981), p. 122.
88. 21/58 Walwerke v High Authority (1959) ECR 99.
89. On comparative analysis in EC law see generally Kutscher (fn. 46) 
"Judicial and Academic Conference, 1976", pages 23-29.
Dumon (fn. 57), Judicial and Academic Conference, 1976, pages 
106-108. Bredimas (fn. 23), pages 125-137; Toth (fn. 53), pages 
86-88; W. Lorenz "General Principles of Law" AJCL (1964), pp. 
1-29.
90a Bredimas (fn. 23), p. 126. See also Usher p. 368 "The influence
of National Concepts on Decisions of the European Court" ELR 
1975-1976 pp. 359-374. "At the simplest level, comparative 
studies may be carried out by the Court staff to supply 
background information relevant to the case before the Court".
See 9/74 Casagrande v Landeshauptstadt, München (1974) ECR 773. 
15/74 Centra farm v Sterling Drug Co (1974) ECR 1147; 16/74 
Centra farm v Winthrop (1974) ECR 1183. It can be noted that
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reference to these studies is seen, not in the judgments, but in 
the opinion of the Advocate General.
90b For an authoritative account of the general procedure during the 
course of a case see John Usher, "European Court Practice", 
(1983).
91. Bredimas (fn. 23), p. 126,
92. feredimas (fn. 23), p. 126.
93. Toth (fn. 53), p. 86.
94. Bredimas (fn. 23), p. 126.
95. Toth (fn. 53), p. 86-87.
96. Toth (fn. 53), p. 87.
97. Toth (fn. 53), p. 87.
98. Toth (fn. 53), p. 87.
"Likewise, a general principle common to the laws of the Member 
States must remain outside the Community legal system if the 
question is already governed by a rule or a principle belonging 
to this system, which is independent of or different from the 
national principles."
99. Bredimas (fn. 23), p. 125-126.
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100. See the following section for an analysis of the phrase 
"government by judges".
101. In point of fact, this is not quite accurate. As H.J.M. Boukema 
points out in "Preservation of the Judiciary in the EEC" LIEI 
1981- at p.93 the Court can indicate its policy even when not 
deciding cases , "The Members of the Supreme Court should be 
active - give lectures, publish articles, teach at law schools 
etc. Through these activities they can publically announce a 
(new) policy of the Court". See also R.M. Dworkin, "Taking 
Rights Seriously," pp. 131-149 where he argues that judicial 
activism fits into the constitutional theory on which the Western 
democracies rest.
102. Lord Mackenzie Stuart (fn. 29), p. 36.
103. Bredimas (fn. 23), p. 145.
104. Bredimas (fn. 23), p. 145. See also the Chapter on Problems of
Jurisprudential Policy pp. 144-148. See also Green, "Political
Integration by Jurisprudence", (1969), generally.
105. A.M. Donner, CMLRev 1974 Volume II, p. 127-140 at p. 138, "The 
Constitutional Power of the European Court of Justice of the 
European Economic Community" - "We should not travesty the 
reality by speaking of quasi-legislation or government by 
judges".
106. This fact is well known see e.g. Lord Mackenzie Stuart (fn. 29), 
pp. 45-46. See also Montesquieu "L'espirit des Lois" Book 2 
Chapter 6 for the basis of the idea of separation of power. It 
should be pointed out, however, that the systems of checks and 
balances, in practice, is failing to work (that is, the
:
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108. F.A. Mann "Industrial Property and the EEC Treaty" ICLQ No. 24 
(1975) pp. 31-43 at p. 43.
S
Commission is weakening at the expense of the Council). See the 
Report on the European Institutions (1980) (fn. 44), pp. 45-59.
107. Robert G. McCloskey (fn. 3), p. 20. i
109. This article appeared in Le Monde (a widely read and influential 
paper) on 24.4.1971, p. 19.
.110. There are numerous examples of divergent opinion on ECJ decisions 
e.g. see C.J. Hams on (fn. 57). His article contains critical Icomments on Defrenne v SARENA (fn. 55) and 26/62 Van Gend en Loos 
V Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (1963) ECR 1.
111. McCloskey (fn. 3), p.20.
112. The evil doer hates the light (attributed).
113. Bredimas (fn. 23), pp. 144-148. Another relevant quote was on
Î
p. 145, "The Court has been very prudent in the exercise of its 
functions".
114. Prott (fn. 24), p. 146. Its audience is composed of Member 
States, other EC Institutions, Companies, individuals etc.
115. It is suggested that an appropriate analogy is the Greek legend 
of Sisyphus , King of Corinth who was condemned in Tartatus to 
roll a stone up a hill for eternity. The task of the EGJ may be 
seen likewise. If the Court pushes the stone (the EC), up the 
hill towards integration too quickly the stone will roll up, out 
of control and then roll down to crush the EGJ. If the Court
rolls the stone too slowly, then progress towards integration (as ■ ■'
directed by the ECJ) stops.
Thus the progress made towards integration is actually dictated
Vi"
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116. Where "some" Member states are mentioned in the text without 
reference to any one member state in particular, the term is used 
in the collective sense; that is no one Member State in 
particular is automatically included in, or excluded from, this
grouping. Further where the singular term "Member State" is
I
employed in the text, it is meant to be seen as a theoretical 
model. No allusion is made to any Member State in particular.
117. The concept national sovereignty is of great importance for it 
has a profound effect on EC law. Therefore, an extensive 
analysis of the concept is now given. Andre M. Donner, "The Role 
of the Lawyer in the European Community" (1968) pp. 22-23
wrote that, "National sovereighty ... is in large part a legal 
work of art. It was conceived by the Capetian lawyers and
I
perfected by the crown lawyers of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries". A more extensive discussion of the history of 
sovereignty was by Djura Nincic, "The Problem of Sovereignty in 
the Charter and Practice of the UN", (1970), pp. 1-3. Note 4 
page 3 is quoted below.
"Bodin is usually considered to be the founder of the modern 
theory of sovereigty and his famous "Six Livres da la Republique" 
to provide the first comprehensive formulation of that theory. A
century before Bodin, however, we find the following fairly 
accurate definition of sovereignty; "Souverain est celui dont la 
seigneurie ne releve d'aucune autre seigneurie". (See Reds lob, 
"Traite du droit des gens", Paris, 1950, p.73). Francisco de 
Vitoria also seeks to elaborate the notion of State and the 
concept of independence (... est per totum, id est quae non est
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alterius rei pablicae pars, sed quae habet proprias leges, 
propriura consilium et proprios magistratus). Classical, 
nonetheless, remains Bodin's definition of a State as the "droit 
governement de plusieurs ménagés et de tout ce qui leur est
propre avec puissance souberaine," and of sovereignty as the 4
"absolute and perpetual authority of a State" ("les Six Livres da 
la Republique de" J. Bodin, Angouin, Paris, chez Jaques du Puys,
1576, Cf. L.I.IX.125). Charles L'Oyseau, who is a generation 
younger than Bodin, seeks to probe somewhat more deeply into the 
essence of sovereignty: "... la souveraineté est du tout
1
4inseparable de I'Estat, duquel si elle était ostee, ce ne serait
ï
plus en Estât et celui qui l'aurait, aurait l'Estat en tant et I
|î
pour tout qu'il aurait la Seigneurie souveraine ... Car enfin la
Souveraineté est la forme qui donne l'estre a 1'Estât voir meme
1'Estât est ainsi appela, per ce que la Souveraineté est le
comble et période de puissance ou il fait que 1'Estât s'arrête et
s'établisse". (Ch. L'Oyseau, Parisien, "Traicte des
Seigneuries", Paris, 1609, pp. 24-25). It will be observed that
in these writings sovereignty already appears as an essential and
substantive attribute of state power, as the attribute which 
.endows it with the quality of "state" power which tends to become 
synonymous with that power and with the State itself. Grotius 
and Pufendorf hold similar views on sovereignty and on the 
possibility of its being limited. Of particular interest for the 
further development of the theory of sovereignty in international 
law, are the writings of Emeric Vatel. In Vatel's opinion, the 
State is the supreme judge of its own behaviour and its
'Ï
3»
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sovereignty is almost absolute, as not even the international
,
community may impose its "collective" will upon indvidual States.
.Vattel at the same time endeavours to define the concept of 
.sovereignty by posing, as the sole indispensable conditions for a
State to take its place in the international community, that it
be "genuinely sovereign and independent, which means that it 
.should govern itself, through its own authorities and under its
own laws". (Vatel, "La droit de gens ou principes de la loi
naturelle, apliquee a la conduite et aux affaires des nations et
des souverains". London, 1758, p. 18). Vatel, it will be seen,
equates sovereignty with independence, and then clearly sets 
.forth the meaning of both concepts".
Modern definitions of sovereignty are as follows - Nincic (ibid) 
p.2, "The essence of sovereignty is constituted by the
#
.4
independence of state power from any other power"; D.D. Raphael,
"Problems of Political Philosophy", (1976), p.55, "Sovereignty
means supremacy. To say that a state is sovereign is to say that
its rules, the laws, have final authority. While the rules made
by other assocations or comunities are subordinate to the
authority of the state's rules"; Raphael, also (p.55) raises an 
.interesting point when he speaks of the need (according to some 
theorists) for a definition of political sovereignty in terms of 
power instead of legal authority. However, as yet political 
sovereignty is according to Raphael "simply a confusion".
118. Spinelli (fn. 6), p.65.
119. Spinelli (fn. 6), p.65.
120. An interesting analogous situation was the problem facing the US
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Supreme Court in the late 18th and early 19th Century as to the
scope of their power under the constitution. See McCloskey (fn. j
!3), Chapter 1, "The Genesis and Nature of Judicial Power", and 
Chapter 2, "Establishment of the Right to Decide".
!
121. Peter Wellington and Jeremy McBride, "Civil Liberties and a Bill I
of Rights", (1976), p.29. "Our overall assessment is that judges !
Itoday are rather cautious men... and conservative in their 
views".
122. This is a noteworthy factor in the "struggle" of the ECJ against 
member states. See Chapter VIII for further explanation.
123. H. Lauterpacht, "The General Works", Volume I (1970), p. 443.
124. Lauterpacht (fn. 123), p. 443. The following quote is, due to 
the importance of the points within to EC law, given in full, "In
recent years criticism of the sovereignty of the State as a I
characteristic trait of International law has abated. In the \
years which followed the World War, this criticism spread to the 
point of becoming almost popular, and of being applied without 
discrimination. To a certain extent that has sapped its 
strength. Secondly it has produced in International 
Institutions, which one thinks of as potential brakes on the 
sovereignty of the State, a continual and visible regression.
Thirdly, there has arisen the development of the omnipotent power
of the State, directly as a political ideology in certain 
countries, indirectly and by necessity in others. All these 
factors have contributed to the restoration of power, if not the 
prestige of the sovereignty of the State".
125a Kutscher (fn. 46), p. 31,
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125b Lauterpacht (fn. 123) p. 443.
126 Douglas Bence and Clive Branson, "Roy Jenkins - A Question of 
Principle?", (1982), p. 221.
127a Andre M. Donner (fn. 117), p. 22
127b Andre M. Donner (fn, 117), p. 22. It is suggested that the quote
by Nincic (fn. 117) in his Introduction is of equal relevance for 
EC law. "The problem of sovereignty is undoubtedly one of the 
most fundamental problems of International law and International 
relations in general".
127c Walter Murphy and C. Hermann Pritchett, "Courts, Judges and 
Politics", (1961), p. 7.
127d Becker (fn. 3), p. 345.
128 232/78 Commission v France (1979) ECR 2729, (Sheepmeat case).
129 Report of the Renton Committee on the Preparation of Legislation
(1975) Command 6053). See p. 19.
"We conclude that acts drafted in a simpler, less detailed and 
less elaborate style than at present would present no great 
problems providing that the underlying purpose and the general 
principles of the legislation were adequately and concisely 
formulated. The real problem is one of confidence. Would 
Parliament be prepared to trust the courts? We refer again to 
the evidence given by Lord Emslie and Lord Wheatley: "It is 
probably the case that legislation in detail is resorted to 
because Parliamentarians harbour the suspicion that judges cannot 
be trusted to give proper effect to clear statements of 
principle. This with respect is wholly unfounded".
130. Anna Bredimas (fn. 23), p. 147.
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131. "Report on European Institutions presented by the Committee of 
Three to the European Council", (fn. 44), p. 63.
132. Anna Bredimas (fn . 23), p. 147.
133. Lord Mackenzie Stuart (fn. 29), p.78. It is suggested that the 
rest of the Court is equally aware of its critics.
134.L.B. Bodin, "Government by Judiciary" Political Science Quarterly 
1911; J.P. Colin "Gouvernment des Juges" (1960). There are also 
other works that have helped the term come into being.
135. Dumon (fn. 57), p. 5. See pp. 55-58 on "Government by the Court"
136. H. Kelsen, "The Pure Theory of Law" (2nd edition, 1967), p. 349.
137. Anna Bredimas (fn. 23), p. 149, note 2.
138. H. Schermers (fn. 49), p. 57.
139. Anna Bredimas (fn. 23), p. 179; J. Dugard, "The South West 
Africa/Nambia Dispute" (1973), p. 36.
140. H.J. Boukema, "Preservation of the Judiciary in the EC" LIEI 
1980, p. 85, pp. 87-98.
141. Quoted by D. Swann (fn. 38), p. 11.
142. Kutscher (fn. 46), p. 11.
143. P. Pescatore "Les Objectifs de la Communauté Européen comme 
Principes d'Interpretation dans la Jurisprudence de la Cour de 
Justice" in Miscellanea W.J. Gansho^an der Mersch, Volume II, 
p. 325.
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144. 43/75 Defrenne v SABENA S.A. (1976) ECR 455. (Second Defrenne 
case)
145. Eric Stein, "Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Constitution" 
pp. 771-796 in Herbert Berstein/Ulrich Drobnig/Hein Kotz
(Editors), "Festschrift fur Konrad Zweigert" (1981). Stein made 
a major survey of "more than a thousand opinions" (p.773) but 
selected only ten cases for analysis as "major cases in which 
constitutional law was made" (p.773).
146. E.G. 3 out of 4 cases in this particular section were also among 
the ten cases chosen by Stein (fn. 145).
147a 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der
Belastingen (1963) ECR 1. To avoid unnecessary repetition, no 
footnotes will be given every time the case name is mentioned in 
the text, save where a direct quote is taken from the case.
147b Pierre Pescatore "The Doctrine of Direct Effect; An infant
disease of Community Law;" ELR 1983 Vol 8 No 3 pp. 155-177 at p.
156.
147c Van Gend en Loos Case (fn. 147a) Question 1, p.3.
148. Lord Mackenzie Stuart (fn. 29), p.18.
'149. Lord Mackenzie Stuart (fn. 29), p. 19. On the subject of 
submissions by MS See the articles by K. MorteImanns 
"Observations in the cases governed by Article 177 of the EEC 
Treaty; Procedure and Practise" 16 CMLRev 1979 pp. 557-590; C.A. 
Ghrisnam and K. MorteImanns "Observations of Member States on the 
Preliminary Rulings Procedure before the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities: some Analytical and Comparative Remarks". 
pp. 43-69 in David O'Keefe and Henry G. Schermers (Editor)
f
H9B40A
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"Essays in European Law and Integration", (1982).
150a Harason (fn. 57), p.9.
150b Pescatore (fn. 147b), p.156.
151. Stein (fn. 145), p.781.
152. Stein (fn. 145), p.781.
153. Anna Bredimas (fn. 23), p.145; L.V. Prott, (fn. 23), p.146.
154. Anna Bredimas (fn. 23), p. 145. It should be noted that this
particular case. Van Gend is an exception to this theory. See 
however the other cases in this section.
155. Hamson (fn. 57), p.8 was of the opinion that "a hesitant or 
timorous Court could, I think, have legitimately declined 
jurisdiction upon the ground of any of the preliminary objections 
proposed to it".
156. P. Pescatore, "The Law of Integration" (1974), p.87.
157. Hamson (fn. 57), p.15 and p.25.
158. Lawrence M. Friedmann, "A History of American Law" (1973), p.231.
159. Friedmann (fn. 158), p. 231.
160. Felix Frankfurter, "Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court"; 
Editor Philip B. Kurland, (1970), p.539.
161. The phrase was used of the Supreme Court by A.G. Lagrange (See 
Chapter III).
162a Lord MacKenzie Stuart (fn. 29), p.23.
162b Van Gend en Loos (fn. 147a) p.12.
162c Van Gend en Loos (fn. 147a) p.12.
163, Stein (fn. 145), p.777.
164a Stein (fn. 145), p.794.
164b Pescatore (fn. 147b), p. 158.
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164c Van Gend en Loos (fn. 147a), p.12.
164d Pescatore (fn. 147c), p.158.
165. See the table (appendices) where it is shown that in the ten 
constitutional cases analysed by Stein (fn. 145), the position of 
the Advocate General on major constitutional issues (as opposed 
to his views on other points) are taken up by the Court in all 
ten cases except Van Gend. See also A. Dashwood, "The Advocate 
General in the Court of Justice of the European Communities", 
Legal Studies 1982, p.202.
166. Hams on (fn. 57), p.9.
167. Stein (fn. 145), p.776.
168a Hamson (fn. 57), p.9. See also Brown and Jacobs (fn. 78b), p.35 
who quote W. Feld. Feld remarked, "The broad knowledge possessed 
by some of the justices in the field of economics, finance and 
administration may be a significant factor in arriving at 
decisions which transcend narrow judicial considerations".
168b Pescatore (fn. 147b), p.157.
168c Pescatore (fn. 147b), p.157.
169. P. Pescatore, "The Law of Integration" (1974), p.87.
170a Hamson (fn. 57), p.25.
170b Murphey and Pritchett (fn. 127c), p. VII.
170c Karl Deutsch "The German Federal Republic" in Roy Macrides and 
Robert E. Ward (Editors)" Modern Political Systems; Europe" 
p.358.
171a To date (April 23 1983) the case has gone on appeal in the UK. 
There has since^ been concluded a new fishing agreement between 
the MS. It could be argued that the action by Kent Kirk, using
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the ECJ as a "threat” provoked or embarrassed the MS into 
agreeing this policy.
171b Theodore L. Becker (fn. 3), p.347.
172. E.G. F.E. Dowrick, "Overlapping European Laws” , ICLQ 1978, Volume 
27 pp.629-660, p.630 wrote that this was a dynamic ECJ decision.
173. Harason (fn. 57), p.10.
174. Pescatore, "The Law of Integration" (1974), p.87.
175. 6/64 Costa v ENEL (1964) 585. 17/67 Neumann (1967) ECR 456.
176a 106/77 Araministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Siramenthal,
(1978) ECR 629.
176b Pescatore (fn. 147b), p.156.
176c Siramenthal Case (fn. 176a), p.645-6.
I
I
Ï
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NOTES - CHAPTER VI - SECTION 8
177a Costa v ENEL (fn. 175).
177b Costa v ENEL (fn. 175) p.593.
177c Costa V ENEL (fn. 175), p.594.
178. Lord MacKenzie Stuart (fn. 29), p.16.
179. P. Pescatore, "The Law of Integration" (1974), p.85.
180. Anna Bredimas (fn. 23), p.145.
181. P. Pescatore, "The Law of Integration" (1974), p.87.
182. P. Pescatore, "The Law of Integration" (1974), p.94.
183. P. Pescatore, "The Law of Integration" (1974), p.94. It should
be noted that the opinions of Pescatore are quoted at length 
because, as a judge of the ECJ, these opinions produce valuable 
insight into the judicial mind,
184. To quote again from Pescatore, "The Law of Integration" (1974),
p.92, "Van Gend en Loos is and remains the Magna Carta of the
doctrine of direct effect".
185. Lord MacKenzie Stuart (fn. 29), p.78.
186. P. Pescatore, "The Law of Integration" (1974), p.94.
187b Defrenne V SABENA (fn. 187a) p.457.
187c Defrenne V SABENA (fn. 187a) pp.457-8.
188a Defrenne V SABENA (fn. 187a) p.481 consideration 1.
188b Defrenne V SABENA (fn. 187a) pp.481-2 consideration
188c Defrenne V SABENA ( fn. 187a) p.492.
188d Defrenne V SABENA (fn. 187a) p .492.
188e Defrenne V SABENA (fn. 187a) p.492.
189. Hams on (fn. 57), p .15.
190. Hams on (fn. 57), p .15.
191. Hams on (fn. 57), p .18.
5/
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NOTES - CHAPTER VI - SECTION 9 
187a 43/75 Defrenne v SABENA (1976) ECR 455. (2nd Defrenne Case) 1976.
• f
192. Anna Bredimas (fn. 23), p.146.
193. Schermers (fn. 49), p.44.
194. Hamson (fn. 57), p.15.
195. Lord MacKenzie Stuart (fn. 29), p.26.
196. Hamson (fn. 57), p.15; Schermers (fn. 49), p.44.
197. Schermers (fn, 49), p.44.
198. Salleilles, "De La Personnalité Juridique" the quote is taken 
from Cardoso (fn. 3). p.45. The full quote (pp. 45-46) is "One 
wills at the beginning the results; one finds the principle 
afterwards; such is the genesis of all juridical construction. 
Once accepted the construction presents itself, doubtless in the 
ensemble of legal doctrine, under the opposite aspect. The 
factors are invested. The principle appears as an initial 
clause, from which one has drawn the result which is found 
deduced from it".
1
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NOTES - CHAPTER VI - SECTION 10
199. 22/70 Commission v Council (1971) ECR 263 (The ERTA Case). For 
articles on this case, see Winter "Annotation of the ERTA case 
22/70" 1971 CMLR p. 550-556. See also Brinkhorst (1970) SEW 
479-484. Also see the comments of Pescatore in The Law of 
Integration (1974), pp.111.
200a Pescatore (fn. 19,9) p. 86.
200b The ERTA Case (fn. 199) pp 276-7, considerations 38-41. 
(paraphrased)
201. Winter (fn. 199), p.551.
202. Winter (fn. 199), p.551.
203. Pescatore (fn. 199), pp. 87-88.
204. See Winter's article generally. He also notes that the Court 
gave the Commission more than it actually asked for p. 551; "The 
Court offered more than the Commission had bargained for".
205. Walter Van Gerven; "De grenzen van de rechterlijke functie, en 
het gevaar van overschrijding, in het Europese Recht", 
Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn Therius (1974) p.645. Van Gerven was of 
the opinion that the Court would prefer to apply legal principles 
in cases where it has a choice to apply either such principles or
an express treaty provision. He cites the 25/70 Roster Case
(1970) ECR 1173 as an example. Schermers (fn. 49), p.23 supports 
this opinion but only for cases where the Treaty provisions and 
the legal principles do not conflict.
206. Anna Bredimas (fn. 23), p. 145.
207. Anna Bredimas (fn. 23), p.145-146.
208. Winter (fn. 199), pp.400-401.
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NOTES - CHAPTER VI - SECTION 11
209. T. Koopmans , "Stare Decisis in European Law", pp. 11-29 at p.27
in David O'Keefe/Henry G. Schermers (Editors) "Essays in European
'*1
Law and Integration", (1982).
210. Koopmans (fn. 209), p.27.
211. Koopmans (fn. 209), p.27.
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NOTES - CHAPTER VI ~ SECTION 12
212. These issues are absent in one of two ways. First the issues may
not be present or implied in any part of the case. Second these 
issues may be present or implied in the case but the Court 
chooses not to deal with them. See the Dyestuffs Cases (fn. 251) 
for an example of this latter statement.
213. Schermers (fn. 49), pp. 20-21.
214. See Chapter VII for examples of cases where such disagreements 
arose.
215. Kutscher (fn. 46), p.5. See also Lord MacKenzie Stuart (fn. 29),
p.33 who noted "The list (of GP) is not closed since we are
dealing with an evolving system".
216. T.C. Hartley "The Foundation of European Community Law", (1981)
p.126.
217. Bredimas (fn. 23), p. 136.
218. John Usher "The Influence of National Concepts on Decisions of 
the European Court" EL Rev 1975-1976 pp. 359-374 at p.360.
219. See the statement by Ex-President of the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities J. Mertens de Wilmars "The Case-Law of the 
Court of Justice in relation to the review of the legality of 
Economic Policy in Mixed-Economy System". LIEI 1982/1 pp. 1-16 
at p.14.
220. Warner "Some Aspects of the European Court of Justice" Journal of 
the Society of Public Teachers of Law, 1976, p.30.
221. C.J. Mann (fn. 1), p.353.
222. Lord MacKenzie Stuart (fn. 29), p.72.
223. As to classification of GP used by Community law, see H. 
Schermers, "Judicial protection in the European Communities" (3rd
I9A437
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Edition, 1983) pp. 26-75. J. Usher (fn. 218), pp.359-374; Dumon, 
"The Case Law of the Court of Justice" (fn. 27), pp. 60-78; Toth 
(fn. 53), pp. 85-94 and also pp. 226-234; T.C. Hartley (fn. 216), 
pp. 138-140; Mertens de Wilmars (fn. 219), pp.9-16. Usher also 
notes that a problem in listing those principles of Community law
which have been derived from national sources is that the same
principle may (in effect) be known by more than one tag p. 362.
224. See Schermers (fn. 223), pp. v-vi "Table of Contents".
225. Schermers (fn. 223), p. 45.
226. Usher, (fn, 218), p. 366.
227. Schermers (fn. 223), p. 45; "In Community law an important role 
is played by the principle of legal certainty". Toth (fn.53), 
p.88; "Apart from the principles mentioned under (a) the
principle of legal certainty is perhaps the most important GP of
Community law, pervading all its aspects substantive and 
procedural alike". Usher (fn. 209), p.366; "It is of 
considerable importance in the case law of the Court".
228. Hartley (fn. 216), p.129.
229. Mertens de Wilmars (fn. 219), p. 15.
230. Usher (fn. 218), p. 366. He quotes the two Deuka Cases as 
examples - see p. 366-7 and also Case 78/74 Deuka v EVGF (1975) 
ECR 421, 5/75 Deuka v EVGF (1975) ECR 759.
231. Usher (fn. 218), p. 367: "This follows the decisions in the 
second Brasserie de Haecht case and in BTR v Sabam to the effect 
that Article 85 (1) and 86 EEC produce direct effects and could 
not therefore be modified or limited by Regulation 17 of the 
Council". See 48/72 Brasserie de Haecht v Wilkin-Janssen (1973)
a
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249. Riva Case (fn. 248), p.109 consideration 13.
250. 30/72 Commission v Italy (1973) ECR 161. (Premiums for Grubbing 
Fruit Trees); 120/73 Lorenz v Germany (1973) ECR 1471;
589.
251. Quinine Cartel Cases, 41/69 AC F Chemiefarma v Commission (1970)
I
ECR 77.
232.13/61 Bosch v Van Rijn (1962) ECR 45.
233. Bosch V Van Rijn (fn. 232), p.48.
234. Bosch V Van Rijn (fn. 232), pp 47-48.
235. Bosch V Van Rijn (fn. 232), p.52.
236. 10/69 Portelange v Marchant (1969) ECR 309.
237. Portelange v Marchant (fn. 236), p.311.
238. Portelange v Marchant (fn. 236), p.316, considerations 15,16.
.239. 48/72 Brasserie de Haecht v Wilkin-Janssen (1973) ECR 77. (Second_
Brasserie de Haecht Case)
.
240. 23/67 Brasserie de Haecht v Wilkin and Wilkin ECR (1967) 407 at 
pp 414-416.
Sî'
241. Brasserie de Haecht v Wilkin-Janssen (fn. 239), p.86, 
considerations 8,9.
242. Schermers (fn. 223), p.46.
243. Schermers (fn. 223), p.47.
244. Schermers (fn. 223), p.47.
245. 59/70 Netherlands v Commission (1971) ECR639 (Steel Subsidies 
Case).
246. Steel Subsidies Case (fn. 245), p.653 consideration 15.
247. Steel Subsidies Case (fn. 245), p.653 consideration 18.
248. 2/70 Riva v Commission (1971) ECR 97.
I
Einfunr-und Vorratsstelle Getride v Pfützenreuter (1974) ECR
J
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ECR 66; 44/69 Buchler v Commission (1970) ECR 733; 45/69 
Boehringer Mannheim v Commission (1970) ECR 769 (First Boehringer 
Case). Dystuffs Cases, 48/69 ICI v Commission (1972) ECR 619; 
54/69 Francolour v Commission (1972) ECR 851; 55/69 Cassella v 
Commission (1972) ECR 887; 56/69 Hoechst v Commission ECR (1972) 
927; 57/69 ACNA v Commission (1972) ECR 933.
252. Schermers (fn. 223), p.47.
253. Chemiefarma v Commission (fn. 251), p.683 considerations 
19,20,21.
254. Buchler v Commission (fn. 251), pp. 750-1 considerations 5,6,7.
255. Schermers (fn. 223), p.48.
256. ICI V Commission (fn. 251), p.633 considerations 49 and 50.
257. Francolor v Commission (fn. 251), p.873.
258. Cassella v Commission (fn. 251), p.913.
259. Hoechst v Commission (fn. 251), p.928 consideration 9.
260. ACNA V Commission (fn. 251), p.949-50, considerations 31-33.
261. Allen, N.L. "The Development of European Economic Community 
Anti-Trust Jurisdiction over Alien Undertakings" LIEI 1974/2 pp.
. 35-78.
262. Allen (fn. 261), p.56,
263. Allen (fn. 261), p.57.
264. Allen (fn. 261), p.57.
265. Allen (fn. 261), p.57.
266. Schermers (fn. 223), p.50; Toth (fn. 53), p.89.
267. Toth (fn. 53), pp.89-90.
268. Schermers (fn. 223), p.50.
23/68 Klomp v Inspektie der Belastinger (1969) ECR 43.
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269. Klomp Case (fn. 268), p.50 considerations 12,13,14.
270. 7/56 and 3 to 7/57 Algéra v Common Assembly (1957) ECR 39 at 
pp ,55-56.
271. 15/60 Simon v Council of Justice (1961) ECR 115, at p.123.
272. 54/77 Herpels v Commission (1978) ECR 585, P.599 consideration 
38.
273. 177/73 and 5/74 Reinarz v Commission (1974) ECR 819 (Fifth 
Reinarz Case) p.829 considerations 21 ,22,23.
274. Schermers (fn. 223), p.51.
275. 77/71 Gervais-Danone v Hauptzollamt Bad Reichenhall (1971) 1127. 
(First Gervais“Danone Case) see consideration 8 p.1137.
276. 98/78 Racke v HZA Mainz (1979) ECR 79. (2nd Racke Case) See p.84
i"
consideration 15.
'
277. 17/67 Neumann v Hauptzollamt Hoff (1976) 441. See p.456.
278. 212-217/80 Post Clearance Recovery Case (1981) ECR 2735.
279. Post Clearance Recovery Case (fn. 278), p.2751 considerations 
9,10.
280. 40/79 Mrs P. v Commission (1981) ECR 361. See p.373 consideration
12. ï
281. 88/76 Exportation des Sucres v Commission (1977) ECR 709.
282. Schermers (fn. 223), pp. 52-57.
283. Schermers (fn. 223), p.52.
284. Schermers (fn. 223), p.52.
285. 37/70 First Rewe Case (1971) ECR 23. See p. 36 consideration 
15-17.
286. 81/72 First Remunerations Adjustment Case (1977) ECR 575, 59/81 
Third Remunerations Adjustment Case (1982) ECR 3329 138/79 Fifth
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299. 78/77 Lührs Case (1978) ECR 169.
.
Roquette Case (1980) ECR 3333, 139/79 Maizena Case (1980) ECR 
3393, 114/81 Second Tunnel Refineries Case (1982) ECR 3189.
287. Schermers (fn. 223) p.53.
288. Schermers (fn. 223) p.53.
.289. 7/76 IRCA v Amminstrazione delle Finanze dello Stato (1976) ECR 
1215. See p.1229 consideration 29.
290. Schermers (fn. 223) p.53.
I291. Neumann Case (fn. 277).
292. Schermers (fn. 223), p.57.
293. Hartley (fn. 216), p.132.
294. Hartley (fn. 211), p.132.
295. Toth (fn. 53), p.89.
296. 112/77 Tbpfer v Commission (1978) ECR 1019. (2nd Topfer Case)
297. Topfer Case (fn. 296) pp.1032-3 considerations 18,19,20.
298. 1252/79 Luccini v Commission (1980) ECR 3753.
300. M. Waelbroeck "Examen de Jurisprudence 1971 a 1977", 22 RCJB 
(1978) pp. 76-77; Schermers (fn. 223), p.59.
301. Schermers (fn. 223) p.59.
302. Mertens de Wilmars (fn. 219), p. 14.
303. Mertens de Wilmars (fn. 219), p.14,
304. Mertens de Wilmars (fn. 219), p. 15.
305. 74/74 CNTA v Commission (1975) ECR 533.
306. 66/74 Farrauto v Bau-Berufsgenossenschat (1975) ECR 157.
307. 32/79 Commission v United Kingdom (1980) 2403. (First 
Conservation Measures Case) p.2445, consideration 46.
308. Conservation Measures Case (fn. 307) consideration 46.
S
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309. 14/68 Walt Wilhelm Case (1969) ECR 1, page 15 consideration 11.
310. 78/77 Lührs v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas (1978) 169.
311. Lührs case (fn. 310) p.180 considerations 13 and 17.
312. Schermers (fn, 223) pp. 64-65.
313. 94/77 Zerbone Case (1978) ECR 99.
314. Zerbone Case (fn. 313).
315. Schermers (fn. 223) p.65. On proportionality in the EC see Lord 
MacKenzie Stuart "The Court of Justice of the European 
Communities and the Control of Executive Discretion" 13 Journal 
of the Society of Public Teachers of Law (1974) pp. 22-26.
316. Lord MacKenzie Stuart (fn. 29), p.31,
317. Mertens de Wilmars (fn. 219), p.13. Hartley (fn. 216), p.137.
318. Toth (fn. 53), p.90.
319. Hartley (fn. 219), p.137.
320. Mertens de Wilmars (fn. 219), p.13.
321. Mertens de Wilmars (fn. 219) pp.13-14.
322. Toth (fn. 53) p.90.
323. Toth (fn. 53) p.90.
324. 9/73 Schlüter v Hauptzollamt Lorrach (1973) ECR 1135.
(Second Schlüter Case)
325. Second Schlüter Case (fn. 324) p.1156 consideration 22.
See also 62/70 Chinese Mushrooms Case (1971) ECR 909.
326. 8/55 Fédération Charbonnière de Belgique v High Authority 
(1956) ECR 245.
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1. Introduction
This chapter deals with the use, by the ECJ, of GP in the series 
of cases concerning fundamental rights. The issue of fundamental 
rights has, over the past decade, become one of great importance 
to legal orders in Europe and to EC law in particular. With
regard to this dissertation this subject has several points of 
interest which, as will be shown, justify a chapter on 
Fundamental Rights .
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outstanding feature of the Community treaties. And this seems to
some on the Continent sufficient reason to pass a negative
2
verdict on the Community Legal Order."
EC law.
J
2. The GP of Fundamental Rights - an Explanation
The GP of fundamental rights has, in the eyes of various people, 
changed in weight. In the early seventies the principle became 
so important that it was the main issue in Community law. This ■
.situation was recognised by Hilf. He wrote, "The absence of a
catalogue of fundamental rights in the Community seems to be the
■I
Isa
:t
It seems relevant, in view of the weight of the GP of fundamental
rights, to give an explanation of the basic concept as a 
. .necessary preliminary to examining its initial reception into
,ay 
.As Hilf observed, a definition of such a complex concept is a 
3
difficult task. This task is made easier as fundamental rights 
.can be linked to GP. If there were a generally acceptable 
definition of what constitutes a fundamental principle, as 
opposed to which principles are fundamental, it might be that 
fundamental principles are principles which people subjectively 
believe are closely linked to values. In law it might be said 
that fundamental principles are those GP with a close attachment 
to moral values such as justice. Fundamental rights are of a 
similar ilk. They are principles based on values relating to the 
human being. Such values, being too general to obtain action in 
their own right, are therefore crystalised into specific
338 ~
principles, which in turn are directly applicable to fact
■■■
situations.
.
In relation to a legal system, fundamental rights are all those
legal rights and situations which must not be violated by an
action of the public authorities, whether by the legislature, the
4
executive or the judiciary. These rights can be classified into
5
two basic categories, negative rights and positive rights. 
Negative rights are basic political rights. Such rights require 
that authorities and other persons should not interfere when the 
holder of these rights chooses to exercise them. They are thus 
rights of a defensive nature. Stein and Shand claim such rights
can be safeguarded in any country, whatever its economic 6
situation. Positive rights are mainly economic and social I
rights. Their implementation depends upon the state of the 
economic and social development of the individual country. Such 
rights are more aggressive or offensive in nature, for example 
the right to demand entrance to state universities. It is the 
latter rights that are most relevant to EC law.
Î
I
I
E
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I
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3. FR in EC Law
As there are no provisions in the Treaties specifically dealing
with fundamental rights , not unnaturally the question first
7
entered the EC through the cases. In dealing with cases on this
subject it is helpful to split them into two definite groups,
those in which the plea invoking FR was rejected and those in
which the plea was given credence. Cases in the first group
included the Stork Case, the Second Ruhrverkohlen Case and the 
8
Sgarlata Case.
In Stork the plaintiff, a German company sought the annulment of 
a decision of the High Authority of the ECSC which had an adverse 
effect on its business operations. In support of its claim. 
Articles 2 and 12 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of 
West Germany were invoked. This guaranteed the free development 
of the human personality and the unhampered exercise of one’s 
profession.
In the Second Ruhrverkohlen Case similar decisions of the High 
Authority were at stake. One of the plaintiffs, Firma Nold 
invoked Article 14 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic which 
guaranteed the right to private property.
In Sgarlata, various Italian citrus fruit producers sought the 
annulment of a number of EEC Regulations dealing with 
agricultural matters. To support their argument that Article 
173 EEC should be interpreted to give them standing to challenge
I
s
nor the Advocate General attempt to investigate this plea. This
the Regulations, basic rights were again invoked. However, they 
were introduced into the arguments not as components in a 
constitutional system but as "fundamental principles applicable
in all Member States". Pescatore noted, "that the plaintiffs
9
did not develop their arguments further". Neither did the Court
was a possible flaw in the ECJ's actions for as Usher has stated, i
"the Court is not dependent solely upon the arguments which the
10
parties choose to put before it". In all cases the arguments 
.of the plaintiffs were rejected. The grounds were that the Court 
had competence only to apply Community law, and that therefore it
did not have to concern itself with rules of national law.
Having thus dismissed these arguments, the further question,
whether similar guarantees were provided by the Community itself,
.was ignored. I
Why did the Court reject the arguments of the plaintiffs in all 
these cases? There are several reasons, it is suggested, for 
such action.
The first reason is simply that the Court was totally unprepared
I
.5
for the question to arise at all. As Pescatore has stated, "one
may even wonder how a problem concerning human rights could
possibly arise in an organisation whose tasks are mainly of an
11
economic, social and technical nature". Secondly, an 
examination of the interaction between Community law and 
fundamental rights by the Court convinced them that the concept
î
was of little relevance to Community law. Pescatore, in an
article written after the cases cited above had been heard by the 
Court wrote, "These examples tend to show that ... the protection 
of fundamental rights and freedoms will never become a question 
of paramount importance in the Communities". A third reason is
I
the general attitude, as opposed to intellectual schema, of the
ECJ. As Chapter II suggested the Court has a conservative
attitude, due both to the general nature of courts and the
specific character of the ECJ. Pescatore in his defence of the 
. . .decisions in the first fundamental rights cases referred to "This
I
13
purely defensive attitude of the Court..." Thus the Court 
would tend to reject any new and potentially disruptive element,
y
as the "introduction of appraisal criteria drawn from the 
constitutional law of one Member State would result in
14
compromising both the unity and the efficacy of Community law". a
The fourth reason is self-explanatory in view of the role of the 
Court as guardian of the Treaty, "the problem of basic rights
|.
arose for the first time in the case law of the Court of Justice
arid this in a very typical way: to evade the provisions made by
the Community authorities, some litigants invoked the guarantees
15
given by their national constitutions". This reason is, 
strictly speaking not a proper one for a Court to consider, as it 
is irrelevant to the validity, or otherwise, of the plaintiffs* 
case. However, it is an excellent illustration of the working of 
the judicial mind. It supports the argument that EC law is a 
struggle between various parties. The Court thus would tend to
T--
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reject such individual pleas in order to safeguard the overall
good of the Community. The fifth reason is that, as stated, the
cases, with the exception of Sgarlata, invoked national
guarantees. This provoked concern by the Court for the primacy 
16
of Community law. To sum up it could be said that the ECJ saw 
the first FR cases as micro cases. Further they routinely 
allowed the GP of integration and primacy to override what they 
thought were GP of Municipal law.
In fairness to the Court however, it should be noted that
logically, on the Van Gend/Costa v ENEL doctrines that Community
law is a distinct, independent legal order, national law must be
17
irrelevant to measure or judge the legality of EC law. Primacy, 
being a principle of Community law closely related to integration 
would be given more weight, in such circumstances, than the
18
seemingly unimportant concept that the national laws contained.
Overall, therefore, the attitude of the Court to the above cases
is readily explicable. The next set of cases to be examined
however will show a marked change in attitude. What caused this
change of attitude by the ECJ, this expiation for their "sins of 
19
youth".
The reasons are as follows. In brief, certain events took place 
which resulted in the concept of fundamental rights becoming a 
threat to Community fundamental principles. The events in 
question were doctrinal discussions that developed in Italy and
i
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Germany and which eventually resulted in judicial disputes in
both countries. The Italian Corste Constituzionale in its
decision of 18 December 1973 refused any national control over
secondary rules of Community law. It reserved, however, the
possibility to question the basic act of ratification should the20
Community interfere unlawfully with the rights of its citizens.
On the same subject, and of greater political importance, was the
21
majority opinion of the Bundersverfassungsgericht.
The majority said: "Article 24 of German basic law does allow a 
transfer of sovereign powers to an interstate organisation. But 
there are limits. Article 24 does not open the way to altering 
or affecting the inalienable and essential part of the 
constitutional structure of the Basic law, including, beyond any 
doubt, the system of protection of fundamental rights. The new 
organisation should have at least an equivalent system and in the 
opinion of the five judges this is not yet the case for the EEC.
The case law of the ECJ may have its merits, but as long as the 
Community does not have a codified catalogue of Fundamental 
Rights which have been approved by a Parliament, which is 
generally applicable and is equivalent to that contained in the 
Basic law, the Constitutional Court will retain its powers to 
control Community law (or more precisely to control acts of the 
German public authorities such as lower courts applying for 
Community law) in respect of the fundamental rights guaranteed in 
the Basic law. The Constitutional Court does not claim to be
344
Community law. This left the door wide open for challenging yet
22
again the very basis of Community law". Thus fundamental 
rights constituted a direct and dangerous threat to the
In this light the probable subsequent intentions of the ECJ in 
the following cases becomes clearer. The objective of the Court 
is not primarily to promote fundamental rights but to defend 
fundamental Community principles and thus protect both the 
Community itself and the process of integration. The following
4
able to invalidate Community law which would in any case remain 
.effective for eight other Member States. But it maintains its
power to declare such a conflicting rule of Community law as 
.inappropriate within the territory of the Federal Republic of 
Germany".
. . . . .These decisions had implications of enormous importance to the EC
and thus to the ECJ. Pescatore stated them clearly, "Such 
notions not only justify the introduction of national concepts, 
but they result once again in the affirmation of the primacy of 
the national constitutional concepts and provisions over
I
fundamental principles of Community law; the autonomy and primacy
of the legal order. Such threats, as various analysts noted.
demanded a speedy response from the EC. Pescatore wrote, "To
prevent such developments, it became urgent to draw up, within
23
the Communities, a system for protecting such rights." Hartley
stated, "it became imperative for the European Court to take
24
action to head off a possible "rebellion"."
Î■4,:
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cases will now be examined:
Stauder, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, Nold, Rutili and
25
Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz.
The Stauder v Him case was as follows: On February 12, 1969 the
Commission authorised the Member States to make butter available, 
at reduced prices, to certain groups of consumers receiving 
social assistance, where their income did not permit the purchase 
of butter at normal prices. Article IV of this decision, in the 
German version, stated that, "The Member States shall take all 
measures necessary to ensure that ... the beneficiaries of the 
measures provided for in Article 1 receive the butter only upon 
the presentation of a voucher issued in their name." The 
plaintiff was entitled to receive the low cost butter but felt 
that the conditions of the offer constituted a violation of human 
dignity.
Thus the Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart requested a preliminary 
ruling. The relevant question as regards this chapter was 
whether the original version of the German text violated the 
basic human rights of Mr Stauder (the right not to be 
humiliated), and in particular whether the ECJ would have to 
apply such human rights.
The Court held that, "the provision at issue contains nothing 
capable of prejudicing the fundamental human rights enshrined in 
the general principles of Community law, and protected by the
346
26
Court".
The case itself was solved on the basis of the principles of 
interpretation applicable in such cases of disagreement between 
different linguistic versions of the same text. Thus Mr Stauder 
was not required to disclose his name.
Yet the last statement quoted from the judgment contains one 
essential difference from previous decisions. By use of general 
principles it had filled the gap in Community law as regards 
FR. Thus if a threat to "basic rights" had been sustained it 
would have been upheld.
Though basic rights or FR was now within, or to put it more 
accurately, overtly recognised in Community law, the concept 
needed clearer definition. Furthermore, the weight of this new 
concept vis a vis other Community principles was also in doubt. 
More cases were needed to begin to tackle these tasks. The next 
chance came in 1970 with the advent of the Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft case.
The facts of the case were as follows: Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft obtained an export licence for 20,000 tons of 
cornflour, valid until 31 December 1967, On the grounds of 
Article 12, paragraph 1(13) of Council Regulation 120/67 EEC of 
13 June 1967, a deposit on 0.50 units per ton was required as a 
guarantee that the export would be realised. When
347
Handelsgesellschaft did not export the full amount of cornflour, 
a notice for forfeiture of the deposit of 17.026,47 DM was then 
served. Handelsgesellschaft maintained before the 
Verwaltungsgericht that such a forfeiture was unconstitutional. 
From 1966 onwards the Verwaltungsgericht Frankfurt am Main had 
declared certain similar regulations invalid without calling for 
a preliminary ruling. This time, however, the Court referred two 
questions to the ECJ:
"1) Are the obligations to export, laid down in .... Regulation
No.120/67 EEC...... the lodging of a deposit, upon which
such obligation is made conditional, and forfeiture of the 
deposit, where exportation is not effected during the period 
of validity of the export licence, legal?
2) In the event of the Courts confirming the legal validity of
the said provision, is Article 9 of Regulation No.473/67
EEC.. , legal in that it excludes forfeiture of the
27
deposit only in cases of force majeure?"
The Court observed, after much analysis, that it was a matter of 
ordinary economic discipline aiming to regulate the Communities 
external trade with a minimum of restriction and therefore no 
basic perrogative was at issue. "It follows from all these 
considerations that the fact that the system of licences 
involving an undertaking, by those who apply for them, to import 
or export, guaranteed by a deposit, does not violate any right of 
a fundamental nature. The machinery of deposits constitutes an 
appropriate method, for the purposes of Article 40(3) of the 
Treaty, for carrying out the common organisation of the
348 —
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fundamental nature respect for which must be ensured within the 
29
Community system"
There are several features of the argument of the Court worth 
noting. First and foremost, it firmly squashes any threat to the
,agricultural markets and also conforms to the requirements of 
28
Article 43."
Once again the actual decision stated no fundamental rights were
at issue. However, the chance had been taken to clarify both the
meaning and weight of fundamental rights. "Therefore the
validity of a Community measure or its effect within a Member
State cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to
either fundamental rights as formulated by the constitution of
that State or the principles of a national constitutional 
„structure.
"However an examination should be made as to whether or not any
,analogous guarantee inherent in Community law has been Jdisregarded. In fact respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles of law protected by the 
Court of Justice, The protection of such rights, whilst inspired 
by the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, 
must be ensured within the framework of the structure and 
objectives of the Community. It must therefore be ascertained, 
in the light of the doubts expressed by the Verwaltungsgericht, 
whether the system of deposits has infringed rights of a
'S
y
'Ey
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primacy of Community law. The Court strongly emphasises the
autonomy of the legal system and rejects the introduction into
Community law of all concepts drawn from national constitutional 
30
law.
Secondly, it clarified its previous reference to basic personal 
rights in the general principles of Community law by speaking of 
"general principles of law" as such. Thus the ambit of 
fundamental rights is considerably broadened. This brings in the 
constitutional traditions of the Member States as part of the
.Community law. However, the Court makes it clear that national 
.constitutional traditions only "inspire" FR not give them
'S 'rvalidity in EC law, such rights deriving their validity solely
from the Treaty. At the same time, it gives an assessment of
the relative weight of such rights. They "must be ensured within
the framework of the structure and the objectives of the
Community." A further important point brought about is that it
will be the ECJ itself that sets the boundaries of fundamental
rights. As Pescatore stated, "it being understood that it is for
31
the Court of Justice to define their actual content."
3
5
The next case of importance regarding fundamental rights was 
Firma J. Nold K.G. v Commission. The basic question arose from 
European Court procedure Locus Standi. On the related topics of 
Human Rights, Community law and GP, the Court said, "As the Court 
has already stated, fundamental rights form an integral part of 
the general principles of law, the observance of which it ensures.
350
In safeguarding their rights, the Court is bound to draw 
inspiration from constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States, and it cannot therefore uphold measures which are 
incompatible with fundamental rights recognised and protected by 
the Constitutions of these States.
Similarly, international treaties for the protection of human
rights on which the Member States have collaborated or of which
they are signatories, can supply guidelines which should be
32
followed within the framework of Community law." On the more 
specific Human Rights of property and commerce, the Court stated, 
"If rights of ownership are protected by the constitutional laws 
of all the Member States and if similar guarantees are given in 
respect of their right freely to choose and practice their trade 
or profession, the rights thereby guaranteed, far from 
constituting unfettered perogatives, must be viewed in the light 
of the social function of the property and activities protected 
thereunder.
For this reason, rights of this nature are protected by law 
subject always to limitations laid down in accordance with public 
interest.
Within the Community legal order it likewise seems legitimate 
that these rights should, if necessary, be subject to certain 
limits justified by the overall objectives pursued by the 
Community, on condition that the substance of these rights is
351
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left untouched."
The Court dismissed an application for annulment of a decision of 
the Commission authorising new terms of trading of the Ruhr Goal 
Sales agency whereby the applicant would lose its status as a 
first stage wholesaler.
This case led Scheuner to remark that a tradition of judge made
law has been established which introduces into Community law
general principles, requiring the respect of these fundamental
liberties which belong to the common constitutional tradition of 
34
the Member States.
The Nold case has attracted both praise and criticism. Hilf 
noted approvingly that the Court bound the Community to these
35
rights protected by "the" constitutions of the Member States.
The previous case judgment has spoken of traditions common to 
"all" constitutions of the Member States.
This new statement by the Court adds more precision to the 
definition of fundamental rights. Thus the Court will not employ 
a minimum standard, that is a common denominator of all 
constitutions will not be used. Instead it will observe a 
maximum standard, that is it will invalidate any rule of 
Community law which is in conflict with any of the rights 
guaranteed by any of the Member States constitutions.
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legislation but a gross misuse of the power of such judicial
step being reserved for the political institutions.
A further criticism is, paradoxically, that the limitations 
imposed on FR such as social function, public interest and
Hartley summed up the case thus, "Nold took two further steps
_
beyond Handelsgesellschaft. First it made it clear that a 
Community measure in conflict with FR as expressed in the 
constitutions of the MS will be annulled; second a new source of
_
"inspiration" for these rights was revealed ; international 
36
treaties." I"This tenet has three effects. It binds the Community in 
relation to the Member States as noted above. Second, it binds 
the Member States among themselves. That is, no Member State 
should use its respective power without taking into account the 
repercussions this may have on the legal order of the other MS. 
Third, it binds the Community not to legislate in any possible
way which would be contrary to the essential rules of Member
37
States constitutions."
The critical comments fall into two categories. Again they 
. . .concern the definition of Fundamental Rights. It is argued that 
.acknowledging a vast variety of rights, ownership, profession,
. . . .work and other activities is not only an act of judicial
5
..................................
legislation. This is so as it is claimed that the decision binds
6the EC to a liberal economy, the right to take such a definite
38
Ï
■
'¥
,||
- 353
39
overall objectives pursued by the Community were too restrictive.
■ ' :
.............
Both criticismsit is suggested, show lack of awareness of the 
.true intentions of the Court, On the one hand public and
1Ipolitical pressure demands fundamental rights which the Court hasthus acknowledged. By such action the other institutions havenot been excluded from legislation. This point is argued 
.further on in this chapter. On the other hand the argument 
.against the "open-endedness" of the limitations is attacked by
the ECJ critics. However, it is precisely by keeping such
restrictions indistinct that the Court can reserve for itself the
sole rights of further defining their meaning in any particular 
40
case.
Further steps in FR classification and clarification are as 
follows. In the case of Roland Rutili v Minister of Interior 
(preliminary ruling requested by the Tribunal administracht 
Paris), the following Court statement is relevant : "Taken as a 
whole, these limitations placed on the powers of Member States in 
respect of control of aliens are a specific manifestation of the 
more general principle, enshrined in Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and ratified by all 
the Member States, and in Article 2 of Protocol no.4 of the same 
convention, signed in Strasbourg on 16 September 1963 which 
provide in identical terms that no restrictions shall be placed
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It IIdemocratic society".
In Rutili the process of integrating fundamental rights is 
carried further by reference to the Convention of Human Rights.
contended that this latter interpretation is correct.
-ÿ,.
on the rights secured by the above quoted articles other than
such as are necessary for the protection of those interests "in a
41
I 
.Louis points out that it is not the Convention as such but the GP
42
it expresses that is invoked here. The Bulletin of the
European Communities 1979, however, seemed to cite Rutili as an
43
example of a reference to the Convention itself. It is i
■ i
t
A further important case was Hauer v Land Rheinland Pfalz. It 
was alleged that certain Community legislation, forbidding the 
planting of new vineyards for a limited period, infringed the 
right of property guaranteed under the German Constitution. It 
was said that rights of property were guaranteed in the Community 
system according to the concepts common to the constitutions of 
the Member States, reflected also in the First Protocol to the 
European Convention of Human Rights. In determining the scope of 
this right of property, the Court expressly referred to, inter 
alia, provisions of the German, Italian and Irish Constitutions.
It determined that the measure in question did not entail any 
undue restriction on the exercise of rights.
ri
.The considerations of the Court are of interest; "As the Court 
declared in its judgment of the 17th December 1970, I
• - i f
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Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (1970) ECR 1125, the question
of a possible infringement of fundamental rights can only be
judged in the light of Community law itself. The introduction of
special criteria for assessment stemming from legislation or
constitutional law of a particular Member State would, by
damaging the substantive unity and efficacy of Community law,
lead inevitably to the destruction of the Common Market and the
44
jeopardising of the cohesion of the Community."
It was noted by the Court, in a retrospective look at its 
previous judgments, that the Court had emphasised in the 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case and "later in the 
judgment of 14 May 1974, Nold (1974) ECR 491, that fundamental 
rights form an integral part of the general principles of the 
law, the observance of which it ensures;" that "in safeguarding 
those rights, the Court is bound to draw inspiration from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States so that 
measures which are incompatible with the fundamental rights 
recognised by the constitution of these States are unacceptable 
in the Community; and that, similarly, international treaty for 
the protection of human rights on which the Member States have 
collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply 
guidelines which should be followed within the framework of 
Community law. That conception was later recognised by the joint 
declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission of 5 April 1977, which after recalling the case law of 
the courts, refers on the one hand to the European Convention for
I
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the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of
45
4 November 1950 (Official Journal C103 1977 p,l)."
In Hauer's case the guarantees examined were the (1) European 
Convention of HR; (2) the German Constitution; (3) Italian
Constitution; (4) Irish Constitution.
t
The right to property is guaranteed in the Community legal order 
in accordance with the idea common to the constitutions of the 
Member States, which are also reflected in the First Protocol to 
the European Convention for the protection of HR.
Article 1 is then discussed, so is the German Grundgesetz Article 
14(2), Italian Constitution Article 42(2), Irish Constitutional 
Article 43,2,112 no.20. The Court then stated, "Therefore in 
order to be able to answer that question, it is necessary to 
consider also the indications provided by the constitutional 
rules and practices of the nine Member States. One of the first 
points to emerge in this regard is that those rules and practices 
permit the legislature to control the use of private property in 
accordance with the general interest. Thus some constitutions 
refer to the obligations arising out of the ownership of property 
(German Grundgesetz Article 14(2), first sentence), to its social 
function (Italian Constitution Article 42(2)), to the 
subordination of its use to the requirements of the common good 
(German Grundgesetz, Article 14(2) second sentence) and, the 
Irish Constitution, Article 43,2,2) or of social Justice (Irish
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Constitution, Article 43,2,1). Thus in all the Member States
there is legislation on agriculture and forestry, the water
supply, the protection of the environment and town and country
planning, which imposes restrictions, sometimes applicable, on
46
the use of real property."
The Hauer case is particularly interesting. Here the Court goes 
over its previous judgments and analyses, thus giving an insight 
into the motivation of the Court. These statements of the Court 
clearly bear out previous statements that the main objective of 
ECJ policy is protection of the EC (the good of the city being 
the chief goal).
Also Hauer for the first time specifically examines the
constitutions of the Member States. As always this action should
be seen in the light of overall ECJ objectives. In particular,
with regard to the doctrinal discussions and cases in Italy and
Germany, it can be seen as the culmination of the Court's efforts
in that direction. As Usher stated, "in the light of this it may
be hoped that the problem envisaged by the German Constitutional
47
Court will not arise in practice."
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4. Conclusions
The conclusions that flow from the complex problem of FR in the 
EC are varied and numerous, for the sake of clarity of 
exposition they are dealt with as a series of separate points.
It should be noted that most points are interrelated and thus 
some amount of overlap between points is unavoidable.
Point one is to note that the question of FR posed a new problem 
for the ECJ. Hartley in his review of HR in the EC stated this 
fact and also emphasised its significance. He wrote, "It is 
important to note that the Courts approach regarding FR is
48
probably a little different from that in other GP of law."
Point two explains and analyses the problems. The potential for 
such a problem to arise in EC law was noted by Section 12 Chapter 
VI. There it was stated that individuals, institutions, and MS 
need not arrive at the same conclusions as to whether a case is a 
macro or a micro case. Such a situation arose with regard to FR. 
The ECJ regarded the early FR cases as micro cases while some MS
regarded them as macro cases. Though it is not suggested all
parties saw the issues in precisely those terms, it is put
forward that the ECJ did not attach any particular importance to
these cases while the Federal Republic of West Germany and Italy 
viewed the implications of ECJ action with misgivings.
To take this basic explanation further it is relevant to take 
account of the consequences of the judges not seeing the cases as
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their judgments lacked the strategic depth and longterm
macro. Not being forewarned of the importance of these cases
considerations that the judgment of e.g. Costa v ENEL contained.
■£"
There, as Pescatore noted the "potentially explosive" nature of
49
the question before the Court was known to them at the time.
In the first HR cases the judgment as in all micro cases simply '
.attempted to decide the point of law at issue. Further it is 
suggested the ECJ compounded their original error by nevertheless 
adopting a macro case - type attitude without using any of their 
usual appeasement methods. That is, in all these cases the Court f
,saw the GP of primacy (a GP which forms part of the basis of 
.integration) as possessing greater weight that any rights 
guaranteed in municipal law.
In defence of the ECJ it would, taking a rational view of the
.matter, have been difficult for the Court to have arrived at any
other decision, national law being irrelevant to measure the
legality of an EC act. Yet, as stated previously, integration
and primacy are GP not rules. Thus they are not to be
automatically applied in every fact situation in order to protect
the EC from various "threats". In a new legal order survival of
the Community as a whole must be the primary consideration, yet
in carrying out these aims the Court can easily fall into the
error of equating (as Plato did) the good of the individual with
the good of the whole, (in this case the EC). The error of, and
dangers inherent in, such a policy were clearly illustrated by
. .Bertrand Russell. "Our political and social thinking is prone to
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that the Court was at fault in the first FR cases.
with a specific problem. Hartley noted that, "The solution was
to proclaim a Community concept of HR and to lay down the
doctrine that the ECJ itself would annul any provision of
51
Community law contrary to HR." This course of action was
Point four deals with the attitude of the Court to the problem of 
FR. This, of course, is a matter of subjective opinion rather 
than fact. It is suggested that the ECJ saw FR only as a problem 
requiring a short term solution. The GP of FR posed a threat to 
the GP's of primacy and integration. The Court reacted by 
elevating the GP of FR to the status of a fundamental GP of EC
what may be called the "administrative fallacy"...the habit of
looking upon society as a systematic whole...it is in the 
. . .individuals, not in the whole, that ultimate value is to be
sought. A good society is the means to a good life for the
50
individuals who compose it." Overall therefore it is suggested
Point three outlines the action the ECJ took. Having been made 
aware that FR cases were in fact macro cases the ECJ then 
attempted to find a solution to the problem. Another way to 
state this is to say the ECJ evolved a specific schema to deal
■followed by the Court in subsequent FR cases beginning with 
Stauder v Ulm.
ï':.
,1
1i5law. Further such a reassessment of the GP of FR by the ECJ is 
only of a temporary nature, that is, the GP of FR is a 
fundamental GP of EC law only as long as FR present a threat to
AS
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the GP's of integration and primacy. In short the ECJ never at 
any time changed its long term attitude towards the GP's of FR, 
primacy and (above all) integration.
Point five answers various potential charges of government by
judges. One such charge is by Dowrick who cited the Nold case as
evidence for his statement, "it is undeniable that, by occasional
52
dynamic judgments the Court has legislated." It is believed 
that Dowrick is mistaken on several counts. First as to the 
charge that the Court legislates it is true that the GP of FR was 
given concrete expression in EC law through the statements of the 
Court, However, as Chapter V and Section 12 of Chapter VI 
showed, the concept of FR was already inherent in EC law.
Further as has been stated previously some degree of judicial 
legislation is unavoidable. Taken together these two statements 
show the so-called judicial legislation on FR is well within the 
acceptable bounds of "judicial legislation", whereas Dowrick's 
statement seems to imply ECJ action in this instance was an 
especially noteworthy example of judicial legislation. Second, 
if by dynamic judgment Dowrick implied that the ECJ judgments on 
FR amounted to political integration it is suggested that the 
analysis contained in Chapter VII shows clearly that the HR 
judgments from Stauder v Ulm on were examples of defensive 
integration. In all these cases the primacy objective of the 
Court was to protect the established GP of primacy and 
integration. Equally study of the earlier FR cases showed that 
the introduction of FR into EC law was regarded by the ECJ as a
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dubious innovation. It should also be noted that Dowrick was 
mistaken, as Chapter VI section 2 showed, in implying that 
political integration is outwith the ambit of the Court.
A further charge of government by judges, to be answered by point 
five, related to the general charge as such, as opposed to the 
above specific instance, of government by judges.
The FR question showed that where, as in the earlier FR cases, it 
could be said that the Court attempted to lead the EC, and the 
MS, in a direction they did not wish to go, such attempts were a 
total failure. The subsequent national constitutional Court 
outcries in the Federal Republic of West Germany and Italy (and 
subsequent ECJ remedial action) makes it clear that the charge of 
government by judges is a fallacy.
Point six covers the development of the GP of FR by the ECJ 
through the cases. It notes this development then analyses 
whether such development was commensurate with the needs of the 
EC. The GP of FR was first recognised by the ECJ in Stauder v 
Ulm. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft went one stage further 
by noting that FR was inspired by the constitutional traditions 
of the MS. Nold revealed a second source of inspiration ~ 
international treaties. Hauer took the further step of actually 
referring to national constitutions. In all these cases it 
was made clear by the Court that the GP of FR was always to be 
weighed against GP representing overall Community objectives.
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The development: of FR in EC law was steady though never
spectacular. Such development fits in well with the previously
stated theory (Chapter VI) that the Court is inherently
conservative. Nevertheless as e.g. the Nold case showed the ECJ
was criticised both for giving too much scope to the GP of FR and
for not developing it adequately to meet the needs of the EG
citizens. It is suggested that the critics are incorrect for
these reasons. The Court, while playing a political role in the
EC is neither the sole, nor the major legislative origin. The EC
.however, as the constitutional debates within the MS showed, had 
an urgent need for the GP of FR to be explicitly recognised in EC 
law. By its actions the Court has, on the one hand, satisfied
.the immediate need for overt recognition by the EC of FR but has 
on the other hand, not given it such wide scope and precise 
definition so as to usurp the role of the legislator. In point 
of fact there has been a lively debate within the EG on FR in the 
past few years culminating in the publication by the Commission 
of a Memorandum, Bulletin supplement 2/79. This approves of the 
idea of a Community Bill of Rights.
Thus in conclusion the following can be said. With regard to the
#question of FR in the EC the Court had, at all times, the good of 
the EC as a whole as its main priority. As for example Usher 
noted, by its action in the series of FR cases the Court has been 
successful in its main aim of preventing the emergence of a 
serious threat to the unity and harmony of EC law. Further it 
should be noted that the Court has, with equal success,
ÿ
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................................accomplished its subsidiary aim of meeting the expectations of
its audience. Individual EG citizens now have a wide variety of 
FR under EC law. Also the number and scope of such rights is 
continually being expanded. MS do not feel that their 
constitutionally protected FR are any longer under threat from EC 
law. EC institutions have been left sufficient scope with regard 
to FR to decide how best to shape the concept with regard to the 
present and future needs of the EC.
The whole question of FR in the EG is, overall, a fascinating 
area of study representing as it does a microcosm of the dynamic 
(and complex) problems that can arise in a new legal order.
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Why has the ECJ promoted integration? There are several reasons.
Chapters V and VI showed that it was the duty of the Court to 
actively seek the spirit of the law. In practical terms it was 
suggested this became a search for the fundamental GP or values on
Chapter VIII : C o n c l u s i o n s
The subject of this dissertation, being of wide scope and complexity, 
lent itself to the detailed analysis which has preceded. It would 
add nothing to the understanding of this topic if Chapter VIII merely
Î
I
acted as an orderly precis of Chapters I-VII. Instead Chapter VIII
attempts to gain a clear understanding of the salient points of this
dissertation by posing the major question, "What has the Court,
through use of GP, done?" By doing so, further, more specific 
.questions immediately arise. In answering the questions thus posed, 
Chapter VIII acts as the complement to the exposition of facts and 
analysis in Chapters I-VII.
What has the Court, through use of GP done? Chapter VI noted and 
agreed with the concensus of opinion that the Court has promoted 
integration. Chapter VI Section 2 showed that many legal theorists, 
ECJ judges, and individuals involved with the actual formation of the 
Community, among them AG Lagrange, all believed the ECJ had acted as
a factor of integration in EC law. Further Chapter VI showed that 
the GP of integration could be broadly interpreted to include 
political, economic and defensive integration. I
The most important is that it was the duty of the Court to do so.
which the ECJ was founded. It was a major theoretical statement of 1
'S■"i
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this thesis that the ECJ analysed the Treaties and their preambles 
and came to hold the view that union was the major fundamental GP or 
value of EC law. The method of translating this intellectual 
conclusion of the ECJ into action was to promote the GP that was most 
closely associated with this GP or value. Integration therefore was 
chosen as the GP that could attempt to realise union.
It should be noted that this sequence o f  events was predictable, that I
I
is, chapters V and.VI showed that the Treaties were strongly |
integrationist in nature. As such it may be supposed that I
integrationist treaties produce an integrationist Court. Equally |
relevant is the point that such a sequence of events was not 
inevitable. That is, the Court is composed of individuals with i: Iindividual personalities and ideas. Thus the ECJ, seen as an I
assemblage of human beings with free will, chose to follow this path. !
IA related point is that, as individual human beings whatever broad I
ipolicy is decided by the Court as such, the implementation of that I
policy is subject to many individual nuances of interpretation and I
implementation. Though the collegiate nature of the Court masks this |
fact to a large extent, it should nevertheless be kept in mind when j
analysing Court decisions. The statement by Lord Mackenzie Stuart is
'’y>M
quite explicit on this point "Too often in contemporary writing and 
in discussion with those interested I find implicit the view that 
because the Court is collegiate, it is also unipersonal. It would be 
more realistic to accept that the Court consists of a group of 
individuals, each no doubt the epitome of reasonableness but each 
having a mind of his own. The judgments of the Court are not
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infrequently an attempt to synthesise a number of voices agreed on
1
the end result but reaching the same destination by different roads".
Having established why the Court decided to promote integration, the 
obstacles that prevented the smooth transition from thought to action 
are now restated. There were, at base, two major obstacles to 
integration; the complexity of the task; the resistance of Member 
States to integration.
Chapter VI Section 3 stated the reasons why the apparently explicable 
phrase "promotion of integration" in reality functioned as a concept 
phrase for a most complex undertaking. It remains only to state here 
that whatever the difficulties of, and problems caused by, promotion 
of integration, they were all within the acceptable ambit of the 
problems that might be faced by a new legal order. Further there was 
a positive aspect to these problems in that they helped to check the 
tendency of the Court to overestimate its role.
The second problem, the resistance of Member States to integration, 
was one of wider ambit. It arose from International law. Chapter IV 
showed that the high regard states had for the GP of sovereignty had 
a directly detrimental effect on the development of International law 
by GP. Further this principle had equally detrimental consequences 
for the ICJ in the eyes of its clients. As Chapters IV and VI 
showed, both these disruptive factors, hindrance of the progress of 
the law, curtailment of judicial effectiveness, albeit in less overt 
fashion, were also operative in the case of the EC, the EC being at
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base an agreement between states. This second problem was to a
greater extent relevant in the ECJ macro cases. That is, in the
majority of macro cases all interested parties, including MS were
aware of the potential problems that a particular judgment might
spark. An excellent example of the tension that such cases generated
among observers was the Costa v ENEL case where Pescatore
made use of the adjective "explosive" to describe the preliminary
2
question the ECJ was called upon to deal with.
It was contended that the ECJ was aware of, and took counter measures 
to combat, both the above mentioned problems. There is little point 
in outlining separate solutions for each problem as both problems 
arose simultaneously in macro and micro cases. Further it may be 
that a solution intended to combat one problem simultaneously has an 
effect on the other. In individual cases and also in the overall 
series of GP cases, counter measures arise in a haphazard fashion, 
that is with regard to integration each case throws up a problem or 
problems, which, though related to the general problem has unique 
features which demand a suitable counter measure or counter measures 
as part of its solution. It is up to individual commentators to 
analyse the case or cases and collate the measures in accordance with 
his or her particular project or line of enquiry.
The ECJ solutions or counters to the above problems which were noted 
and analysed from Chapter VI section 6 onwards are now listed below, 
in no particular order of importance. They are as follows:
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1) The Court deliberately limited the scope of the concept of 
integration in three ways. It limited the number of fundamental 
GP or values that, more or less, permanently comprise 
integration to as few as possible e.g. primacy and direct 
effect. It restricted the number of other GP which occasionally 
metamorphosed into GP of integration. It restricted the use of 
such GP to as few cases as possible.
2) The Court preferred the use of fundamental GP to rules in macro 
cases .
3) The Court made use of values as well as fundamental GP in macro 
cases.
4) The Court was deliberately vague in its handling of GP, that is 
the choice, origin, transfer to EC law from place or places of 
origin and use of particular GP in cases were not explained at 
length by the Court.
5) The Court limited the number of macro cases, that is it 
deliberately did not look at the wider constitutional 
implications of every case.
6) In macro cases the Court did not always state the full 
implications of its decision.
I
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7) In some macro cases the Court avoided or fudged the actual
3a
immediate problem before it.
8) In macro cases the majority of its decisions and statements were 
examples of defensive integration.
9) In the majority of economic integration cases, the micro cases, 
the Court behaved with curcumspection, that is, there were few 
direct political overtones to its judgments.
10) The Court attacked the GP of sovereignty directly in the macro 
cases and indirectly by the overall effect of its micro cases.
11) The Court attempted, to the best of its ability, to answer the
3b
questions before it in the micro cases.
What were the effects of these actions by the Court? It is contended 
that there are four major results of its action over the past twenty 
five years, which, collectively speaking, promote integration. These 
results can be stated as the consolidation of the power of the Court; 
the enhancement of the power of the Court; the consolidation of the 
EC; the enhancement or advancement of the EC and its institutions.
As to the first claim, it is contended that the Court has
consolidated its role and power in the early macro cases such as Van
3c
Gend much as did the Supreme Court in the early Marshall cases. 
Further the EC court, by its solid work in the micro cases has
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enhanced its power by becoming possibly the most respected of the
4
Community institutions. The works of legal theorists as well as the
writings of the judges tend to confirm this opinion. Further as
Kutscher and Bredimas noted the respect the ECJ has is manifested in
a practical form - the lack of dissention from EC citizens as to its 
5
judgments.
.As to the EC, it is suggested that it has, thanks in part to the ECJ,
.successfully consolidated its position as an International
institution. By stating that it is a new legal order, its right to
exist as an independent Institution was affirmed. Further, it is
believed that, despite any present problems the EC faces, there is no
real possibility of MS resigning or the EC disbanding. Perhaps this
fact, that the EC is (still) here is, to borrow again the ingenious
concept of Donner, the most important thing of all and thus the
6
greatest achievement of the ECJ.
As to enhancement of the EC, despite the present gloom it is
contended that the EC has achieved some major successes. As Gaston
Thorn noted in "Europe 82", "the people of Europe have seen the
absurdity and futility of fratricidal strife. Secondly a number of
milestones have been passed on the road to economic and political
unity... Thirdly Europe is now the main source of aid to the third 
7
world" These successes are in part the result of the work of the 
ECJ. By acting as guardian of the EC the Court gives the EC the 
chance to develop and thus to allow the powerful GP or ideals of 
peace, prosperity, helping.the third world and union to take root in
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Such statements are surprising in view of the talk of gloom and doom
that tends to dominate discussions among Europeans about the EC. The
Report by the Committee of Three on European Institutions is aware
that EC subjects tend towards this view. They note, "The standing of
the EC is often rated far higher by its external partners than by its 8
own members."
In fact as regards advancement of the EC, observing its development
over the past twenty five years, it is suggested that the EC has
achieved commendable results. A period of twenty five years is, in
reality, an extremely short time for any real development of what is,
after all, the most advanced International institution of its type
ever created. This was also the view of the Committee of Three "In
fact the achievements of the Community are impressive both for their
richness and for the unique manner in which they have been obtained.
9
For the Community is a quite unprecedented creation."
However, as regards the consolidation and development of the
institutions, it cannot be said that the Court has achieved great
success. Despite the support of the Court for the Commission in
cases such as ERTA the report by the Committee of Three showed that
10
there is an imbalance between the Commission and Council. The 
Commission is in decline while the Council gains in strength. The 
results of this imbalance inhibits the smooth development of the EC 
to some extent. In fact it is in large part due to this reason that
380
so much attention is paid to the pronouncements of the Court. As
the Committee of Three note, such weaknesses in the Commission were11
caused both by external and internal factors. Such factors are
the Commission that body has declined in power. This was clear by
the use of phrases such as "Elements in the Commission's decline" and
13
"weakended Commission performance" by the Committee of Three.
the law close to the people, that is the Court, by its use of GP has
■ ' Ï
■
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beyond the scope of the Court to affect or counter. In point of fact 
this is another argument against the view of some legal theorists of 
an all powerful Court with wide political influence. As the table by
I
Stein shows, the Court agreed with the Commission in a high number of 
12
macro cases. Yet despite this boost by the Court for the views of
i
. . .Why was the Court successful in its aims? There are, it is 
suggested, several reasons over and above the eleven counter measures 
listed previously.
The first and most important reason is that the EC has, for more than
.a quarter-century, upheld rights and enforced duties in micro cases
by intelligent and sympathetic use of GP; and also by sheer hard work
and unremitting effort there has been created what could be termed a
common law of the Community. The wider implications of such action
were analysed at length in Chapter VI Section 12. However, it can
also be noted here that the EC, by its recognition of the many GP
outlined in Chapter VI Section 12, had effectively introduced FR into
the EC, even before their explicit recognition of such rights in 
14
Stauder v Him. By such action the ECJ could be said to be keeping I
I
7ÏÏÏ
majority of micro cases, their very lack of noteworthy or exceptional 
features is the highest tribute that can be paid to the ECJ.
Second it is contended that the Court has made correct decisions on
- 381
acted as a bridge between law and the peoples of Europe. The major
,
result of ECJ action in Micro cases is, it is contended, to 
successfully introduce a kind of Municipal Law Court at the 
supranational level. Thus the apparent "ordinariness" of the
"aS
1Ï";
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the major matters at issue in the macro cases. As Chapter VI noted,
15
Hamson wrote Van Gend gave a fillip to the Community. More
important was the observation of Stein who stressed that the
correctness of the decision by the ECJ in Van Gend has been borne out 
16
in practice. This, it is suggested, is one of the most important
reasons why the Court has succeeded in its task. Third the
opposition to the EC and ECJ was never and is never united. The 
-insistence on the individual right to action is both the attraction
.and the weakness of the GP sovereignty. The analogous situation of
the United States and the US Supreme Court is relevant. As to that
situation McCloskey wrote, "The Court's progress was also aided by a
basic disability of the localist movement - its very lack of unity.
17
The States were so individualistic they defeated themselves."
.Fourth, in direct contrast to the above is the consistency of the ECJ 
as to their belief in, and handling of, fundamental GP. Chapter VI
; -
section 7 showed that the major statements of principle made in Van 
.Gend were consistently followed in later cases. Further, Chapter VII
showed that, even where the Court appeared to shift its ground in the I
1
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FR cases, in reality it consistently adhered to its fundamental GP of 
primacy and the overall good of Communities.
Fifth is the fact that the ECJ was forewarned of potential trouble
over the GP of sovereignty by the examples of International law and 
.the United States constitutional law of the 1820's. The basic tasks
of the ECJ were analogous to those McCloskey noted for the Supreme
Court. He wrote, "it was necessary both to confirm and to extend the
18
Courts claim to authority." Thus Supreme Court actions provided
Ïpossible solutions the ECJ could adopt. Of Gibbons v Ogden,
McCloskey wrote, "The opinion is a deft blend of boldness and 
.restraint", and also "Marshall managed to achieve ... results while
19sidestepping the area of greatest controversy."
,sixth is the part played by the individuals of the ECJ. It was made
,
clear by several commentators on the Supreme Court that the influence
of Justice John Marshall had a great effect in shaping the US law.
.As Felix Frankfurter succinctly summed up, "John Marshall is an20
example of Cleopatra's nose." It is therefore contended that the
success or otherwise of the ECJ should be attributed directly to the
individuals that comprise the ECJ. Though it could be argued that a
collegiate Court, like a company "has no body to be kicked and no
soul to be damned", it is still suggested that, as a recognition of 
.the scope given to judicial/human discretion in EC law, judges 
Pescatore, Kutscher, Donner, Lord Mackenzie Stuart et al each be
recognised as having contributed, in greater or lesser part, to the
21
development of EC law.
justified at any or all levels.
not to be a constant source of worry for EC citizens.
Section 6 mentioned, such fears, whatever their cause must
irrespective of the merits or demerits of such charges, they were
22
relatively unimportant due to the nature of the new legal order.
"I
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,Having discussed how the Court has successfully dealt with the major
problems it faced, the question of the validity of the fear of 
.government by judges is now dealt with.
.The question of government by judges is, it is contended, much 
misunderstood. The issue can be analysed by noting that the fear of 
government by judges in fact exists at several levels and analysing 
each level separately in order to try to find whether such fear is
The first level is the general fear by all EC citizens of misuse of
judicial power. Such fear is both acceptable and understandable but
it is believed that the restrictions on the ECJ outlined in Chapter .VI Section 5 are effective checks on the ECJ. Thus though the 
possibility of government by judges should not be forgotten it ought
Ï
On the next level MS fear government by judges due mainly, it is 
believed, to their own resistance to EC integration. As Chapter VI
I
nevertheless be investigated as to whether or not they have a real 
basis in fact. Chapter VI part 6 noted that while the charge by
_
states of government by judges was a subjective one and thus could
.not be fully answered, it was believed, equally subjectively, to be 
an insubstantial charge. Further Kutscher was of the opinion that
ii
is
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He noted for example the fact the laws of the Communities have not 
been adopted by an elected Parliament.
At a further level is the idea that the ECJ is a part of the
political structure. Thus it could be argued that, irrespective of
whether MS have other reasons, real or imagined, valid or invalid for 
fearing government by judges, on this level the view that the ECJ is 
a part of the political structure gives the MS genuine cause for 
concern. These two points, the correctness of the view and if so 
whether such a situation constitutes a genuine cause for concern as
regards government by judges are now examined.
The idea of Murphy and Pritchett that "political scientists have
sought ... to give the activities of the Courts new meanings by
placing them within the mainstream of political relationships" is, it
23a
is contended, also relevant for the EC. That is, it can be seen
that the ECJ is a part of the overall political structure of the EC 
and does interact politically with the other institutions. While 
this statement may shift the accepted idea of the function of a Court 
it is submitted that it fits in with the activities of the Court vis 
a vis the other institutions and the MS.
However, the actual actions of the ECJ which justify such an 
assertion must be clearly stated. It is believed the ECJ should be 
regarded as part of the political structure on two grounds; the 
deliberately selective way it chooses certain cases in which to make 
certain statements; the clarity and force of its exposition of these
I
i
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statements in such cases.
The former statement is justified as follows: Analysis of the body
If.
of EC cases involving GP showed only a small percentage were termed 
macro cases. Further it was shown that the ECJ deliberately did not
seek to make all cases with apparently clear examples of contentious
24
issues macro cases, e.g. The Dyes tuffs cases. Equally relevant is
the following statement by Hamson. Taken in conjunction with the
above statements it is contended that in Van Gend the Court, by an
act of will, carefully selected or chose to see the case as a macro
,case. Hamson wrote "a hesitant or timorous Court could I think have
legitimately declined jurisdiction on the ground of any of the
25
preliminary objections proposed to it."
As to the latter statement it is contended that, once the ECJ has
decided it has something to say, in the interests of Community law it 
will, by making full use of GP and fundamental values, and the scope 
for judicial interpretation such devices allow, state it Iunequivocally and with little regard for any legal technicalities.As Pescatore noted in Van Gend "The reasoning of the Court clearly
showed that the judges had "une certaine idee de l'Europe" of their
own, and that it is this idea which has been decisive and not
26
arguments behind the legal technicalities of the matter." This 
statement, that it is the ideas and not the rules "the legal 
technicalities" that are important clearly came out in the Van Gend 
case. It is hard to see how the profound statements made in this
386
the clear implications of the Treaties. As stated in Chapter VI
reasonably be asked why everyone did not see the idea or its 
consequences at that time. One answer is to slightly qualify the
consequences. As with many profound yet simple ideas they are easily 
seen by almost everyone but only after the idea has first been 
discovered by someone of imaginative insight. Here that person or 
more accurately that body was the Court. An alternative answer is
f
case could have been uttered without the Court having a deep 
political understanding of the EC and a willingness to let that 
knowledge be put to use (and a willingness to "fight" the MS in order 
to use it).
Having made the statement that the ECJ should be seen as a part of 
the ECJ political structure and also after having given the reasons 
behind such a statement a most important rider must be added. It is 
that the actual content of what the ECJ says does not form part of 
the reasons for seeing the Court in the light. It has been a theme f
of this thesis that the statements in Van Gend and other macro cases, 
though showing a profound understanding of EC law, do not go beyond
anyone with the knowledge and awareness of law could read the 
treaties and come to this conclusion.
Pescatore wrote that the statements of the Court on the new legal
27
order was "the consequence of a democratic ideal." It could
i
statement that anyone could, upon reading the Treaties, see their
I
that the idea could be easily seen but many, in particular the MS, 
did not wish to look. Yet a third answer could be that the idea
;I
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could be easily seen and its consequences recognised but those who
disliked the idea simply ignored its implications. Equally those who
saw the consequences and were in favour of them kept their silence in
the knowledge that continued Community integration would eventually
force overt recognition of the idea and its consequences by all EC 
29
citizens and MS.
In conclusion, at this level of fear of government by judges it is 
contended that the view that the ECJ is an active part of the 
political structure of the EC is correct but that it does not follow 
that this fact constitutes a real danger of government by judges.
It is believed that at all levels the fear of government by judges is 
unrealised in both theory and practice.
Having now covered most of the ground of the topic of this 
dissertation, a further area still remains to be discussed. Bearing 
in mind that a major part of this dissertation concerned the use of 
GP for achievement of the ends mentioned, such usage is now collated, 
re-examined in greater detail and commented upon. The use by the ECJ 
of GP can be broken down into various categories. The first category 
is procedural, that is where the Court took GP from originally, how 
such GP were then assimilated into EC law and how these GP were 
referred to during the course of a case. In such action it was noted 
that there was a certain vagueness of procedure. The major question 
thus is, "Should the Court be more elaborate in explaining or 
implying a procedure or argumentative logic?" The Court up to now.
#
I
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translated the abstraction "spirit of the law" into the more 
ascertainable but still only partially concrete form of GP.
Î
has not done this. However valuable the contribution of the Court to 
the progressive emergence of the common law of the EC, the Court has 
thus far not tied itself to an argumentative or procedural logic as 
regards such procedural matters. This could be qualified as a 
weakness in the practice of the Court and in its approach to the 
function of GP in EC law. On the other hand did the ECJ have the
1
t
possibility to develop such a uniform logic of GP applicable to EC 
law? The answer must be no. This is so as regards two major
considerations, the first traditional, the second pragmatic/
functional. Traditional consideration refers to the shortness of the
judgment in the practice of Continental courts. Continental judicial
practice has historically influenced the methods and practice of the
ECJ in that the roots of EC law and the composition of the Court are
undeniably fixed firmly in the continental legal tradition. The
pragmatic functional reason for the Courts abstention from reference
to a procedural and argumentation logic is that EG law is too
comprehensive, too ambitious as to its objectives which range from
short term goals such as the Four Freedmons to implicit political 
.integration for the ECJ to pin itself down to argumentative logic in 
the form of intricate explanations and thus have its hands tied.
The second category relates to the new use made by the Court of GP.
It could be argued, especially in the macro cases, that the Court, by 
.speaking of the spirit of the law, has used GP and values in an 
original manner for an original purpose. By doing so they have
■f
389
The third category was the use by the Court of new GP. In the micro
cases several authorities had noted that the so-called GP of European
Community law were emerging. Though it was argued that this
terminology is incorrect, it is agreed that new GP of law capable of
use by any or all legal orders have emerged and will continue to
30
arise in micro cases. In the macro cases it could also be argued 
that new GP have emerged. The most important example is, of course, 
integration. No Member State has such a GP as an active source of 
law. Equally, International law is far from having integration as 
such a source of law. A counter-argument is that such principles as 
integration are not new but, after a long period of inaction, have 
become relevant; that is, at one time the Municipal legal orders of 
nations must have had integration as a basic need. The EC, if seen
as the product of developed municipal systems , has thus inherited
rather than invented the GP of integration.
The final category of use of GP is the conventional use by the ECJ of
accepted GP of law in order to fill gaps in EC law. As Chapter VI
showed such a usage occupied the majority of time of the Court and in 
the long term is the most important of all its uses of GP.
The above tends to reinforce another theme of this thesis - the 
unique flexibility and adaptability of GP and their possible, 
theoretically profound effects on the particular legal order in which 
they appear. In EC law GP were used for three distinctly different 
purposes. To make statements of great depth on EC law which affected 
the very foundations of that law; to help with the enforcement of
390 -
rights and duties, that is, to aid the finding of an answer to any 
questions raised in the Court; to solve the sudden and urgent 
problems set for EC law and for the ECJ by the issue of FR. In all 
these problems use of GP allowed the ECJ maximum freedom of action.
In fact, though its answer transcends the bounds of this 
dissertation, the question could be asked whether GP in any other 
legal system, past or present, in such large numbers has fulfilled so 
many functions. Despite the lack of an answer to this question being 
given in this thesis it is believed that the functions they fulfill 
may be taken both as an indication as to the comprehensiveness and 
ambition of the law of the new legal order, and as an indication of 
the unique flexibility and adaptability of GP.
Will the use by the Court of GP increase or decrease in the future? 
The logical answer seems to be that fewer GP will be seen in judicial 
practice as the flow of Community legislation increases to fill the 
gaps in EG law. However, it could also be argued that, given a 
relatively stable Community development, legislation covering new 
areas of law will create new problems requiring use by the ECJ of GP. 
Further any legislation whether enacted to clarify existing areas of 
EC law or to encompass new EC developments is, as Chapter VI noted, 
an imperfect process that consequentially requires clarification by 
the Court. Thus for this general question, no specific answer can be 
found. However, it may be that the use by the Court of GP will 
decrease but at a relatively slow rate.
■fi
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The above quesiton, dealing as it did with all GP, referred in the
main to micro case GP. A further query is to inquire whether use of
macro case GP will increase or decrease. Again, speaking logically,
as the EC develops the need for macro cases should lessen. For 
.example, in developed municipal systems macro cases occur only
;::>4rarely. A counter-argument to this is to note that the periodic 
crises within the EC, the Luxembourg Accords, the energy crisis, for 
example, show no signs of abating. Further the world economy is in 
recession.
In "Europe 2000", Peter Hall writes that a forecast of Europe's
economic and social evolution shows that European society of the
31
1980's and 1990's is likely to face severe problems. If this is 
correct, then the present instability will be a continuing fact of
life for the foreseeable future. This should result in a 
continuation of macro cases.
■
Are there limitations on the use of GP? Having stated throughout the 
text of this dissertation, the positive aspects of the GP by the ECJ, 
the negative side of principles, should also be restated. Where the 
Court consistently attempts to use on or more GP as a rule, and thus 
as inviolable, then the dangers inherent in Plato's dictum of the 
good of the city being the ultimate good are realised. As Chapter
VII showed, the first Fundamental Rights cases were examples of the 
Court paying too little attention to alternatives to the GP of 
primacy of Community law. Bertrand Russell noted, in the end there 
is no society only a collection of individuals and the individual
■II
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good cannot automatically be suppressed for a spurious greater good.
In conclusion, therefore, it could be said that due to various 
factors an undue burden had fallen on the ECJ as regards its role in 
the development of the law. Furthermore, these factors combined to 
make use of GP by the ECJ to accomplish its tasks the most suitable 
method. An overall evaluation of the stage of development of EC law 
in the 1980's shows that, in greater part, the Court has succeeded in 
its aims .
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recognised in the community legal order. The term GP of Law is 
to be preferred".
31. Peter Hall, "Europe 2000" (1977), p.24, 2. Also of interest is 
the article by Etienne Davignon "The End of the Road for Europe, 
or a new beginning?", pp. 119-138, in R. Dahrendorf (Editor), 
"Europe's Economy in Crisis", (1982), in which he sets out the 
new challenges for the EC. He notes p.120 that such challenges 
"call for an original response from Europe in particular. At the 
level of the EC, preparations are being made to take up the 
challenge". Such preparations, and their implementation may well 
result in new macro cases arising.
32. Plato, "The Republic of Plato", (1942) (translated by Francis 
MacDonald Crawford) p.107 "Our aim in founding the Commonwealth 
was not to make any one class specially happy, but to secure the 
greatest possible happiness for the community as a whole". As 
e.g. Trevor J. Saunders (Editor), "Plato - The Laws", (1970) has 
pointed out p. 1345, Plato's method of setting up, and putting 
into effect an ideal society "will usually call for an 
unpalatable degree of coercion". There are many analyses of 
Plato and his views on this, and other topics e.g. See Robert W. 
Hall "Plato" (1981).
L '4 , 4i- ;
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33. Bertrand Russell "Authority and the Individual" "The Reith 
Lectures for 1948-T949; 1949) p.116.
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APPENDIX
Position of principal actors on major constitutional issues
Issue and Case Government
direct effect: 
van Gend
no: Belg.
Lux., Germany
Commission Advocate General 
yes no (Roemer)
Court 
yes
supremacy: 
Costa V. Enel
Simmenthal
no: Italy yes yes (Lagrange) yes
no: Italy yes yes (Reischl) yes
Internationale unnecessary yes
Handelsges. to decide:
Germany ,
Neth.
expanding 
direct effect: 
Liitticke
Reyners
Walrave
Defrenne
Franz Grad
van Duyn
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no: Belg. 
Neth. 
Germany
yes
yes (Dutheillet 
de Lamothe)
yes (Gand)
yes
no: Belg. yes
Lux., Ire.,UK 
yes: Germany,
Neth.
no position no 
UK
yes (Mayras)
yes (Warner)
yes
yes
yes
no: UK, Ire yes on 
public 
emp1., no 
on private
yes (Trabucchi) yes
no: Germany yes yes (Roemer)
no: UK yes yes (Mayras)
yes
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